Almazan v. State

9 Citing cases

  1. Paulus v. State

    633 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)   Cited 133 times
    Holding evidence showing motive or opportunity can be considered in connection with other evidence tending to connect the accused with the crime

    Clearly, the total failure to corroborate that the offense charged against an accused occurred at all, will render the corroboration insufficient as a matter of law to support any conviction. See, e.g., Odom, 438 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App. 1969); Melton, supra; and Hall, supra; Denson, supra. While some of the details related by the accomplice witness are supported by evidence from other sources, the cumulative force of that which is corroborated at best creates a suspicion that appellant might have advised or encouraged the murder of Hill, and at worst verifies fragmentary extraneous matters which in no way tend to incriminate appellant; either way, the requirements of the law are not met. Thomas v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 331, 313 S.W.2d 311 (1958); Roberd v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 188, 276 S.W.2d 270 (1955); Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. 432, 145 S.W.2d 576 (1940) (holding corroborative evidence creating suspicion that accused may have committed offense charged insufficient); Walker v. State, 615 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Reynolds, supra; Chapman, supra; Thomas, supra; Melton, supra; Jordan v. State, 122 Tex.Crim. R., 57 S.W.2d 127 (1933); Weatherred v. State, 100 Tex.Crim. R., 272 S.W. 471 (1925); Chambers, supra (holding corroboration of immaterial matters which are not criminative facts is never sufficient). As such, the evidence adduced by the State for corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice witness, Marcia McKittrick, is insufficient and appellant's conviction must be reversed.

  2. Long v. State

    319 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958)   Cited 3 times

    He concedes that Dan Lord's testimony established that the appellant passed to him the check set forth in the indictment and which was shown to be a forgery, but contends that it became incumbent upon the State to corroborate the remainder of Miller's testimony, such as the visit to the motel and the division of the proceeds of the forged check. Reliance is had upon some of the phraseology contained in the opinion of this Court in Almazan [167 TEXCRIM 215] v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 432, 145 S.W.2d 576. The holding in Almazan, as we see it goes no further than McInnis v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 128, 54 S.W.2d 96, opinion by Judge Hawkins and quoted in Almazan as follows:

  3. Holladay v. State

    709 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)   Cited 85 times
    Deciding that accomplice-witness instruction was proper because it told jury that it could not find defendant guilty unless it found, among others things, that "the testimony of [the accomplice] was truthful " and that there was evidence "outside of [the accomplice]'s testimony that tended to connect the appellant to the commission of the" crime

    Paulus v. State, 633 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982), and cases cited therein at 843. See also Eckert v. State, 623 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); and Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. R., 145 S.W.2d 576 (App. 1940). As required by Art. 38.14, supra, accomplice witness testimony must be corroborated with evidence tending to connect the accused to the offense committed.

  4. Runkle v. State

    484 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)   Cited 9 times
    Dissenting Opinion

    See Andrews v. State, 106 Tex.Crim. 366, 292 S.W. 217 (1927). "For the purpose of corroborating testimony which is considered to take human liberty, something stronger is required than mere suspicion.' Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. R., 145 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.Cr.App. 1940). See also Thomas v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. R., 313 S.W.2d 311 (1958).

  5. Lucas v. State

    482 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)   Cited 3 times
    In Lucas v. State, 482 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972), the defendant was found guilty of stealing items from a department store.

    "After mature consideration, we have concluded that the evidence offered in corroboration of the accomplice was not sufficient to meet the rule set out. At best, these circumstances merely raise a suspicion that the appellant participated in the homicide, but do not meet the requirements of the law." See also Carter v. State, 104 Tex.Crim. R., 283 S.W. 174 (1926); Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. R., 145 S.W.2d 576 (1940). For the reasons stated, I dissent.

  6. Sheffield v. State

    165 Tex. Crim. 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957)   Cited 12 times

    The holding on original submission was based upon what I believe to be an erroneous construction of the holding of this Court in cases such as Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. R., 145 S.W.2d 576, 579, where it was said: 'Every essential fact testified to by the accomplice alone must be corroborated by nonaccomplice testimony tending to connect appellant with the commission of the offense charged.' If this may be interpreted as requiring proof from sources other than Doris Sayles as to her status as a notary publich, then it is wrong and is contrary to the rule recognized elsewhere in the same opinion and in other opinions of this Court.

  7. Roberd v. State

    276 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955)   Cited 11 times

    The testimony of the three witnesses last mentioned, at most, only creates a suspicion that appellant might have committed the act of sodomy as charged. It has been held that suspicious circumstances are not sufficient, standing alone, to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. R., 145 S.W.2d 576. The conclusion is reached that the testimony of the accomplice witness is not sufficiently corroborated as required by law and, therefore, the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

  8. Brosky v. State

    915 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that "[b]y failing to obtain a ruling on the portions of the Motion to Quash pertaining to Count One of the indictment, Brosky waived any error arising from Count One of the indictment."

    testimony which is considered too unreliable to take human liberty, something stronger is required than mere suspicion. This court has always so held.Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. 432, 145 S.W.2d 576, 579 (1940). As a result, I believe that the State failed to corroborate Hendry's and Roberts's testimony.

  9. Hernandez v. State

    636 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App. 1982)   Cited 7 times

    Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. R., 145 S.W.2d 576 (1940). The purpose of Article 38.14 is to prohibit a conviction unless there is some evidence entirely exclusive of that of the accomplice which of itself, and without the aid of the accomplice, tends to raise something more than a mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused.