Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1116 (RMC).
April 19, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer. Having considered the motion, plaintiff's opposition, and the entire record of the case, the Court will dismiss this action.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, brings this civil action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. He alleges that the Parole Commission based its decision to deny parole on "unreasonable and irrational information contained in the [presentence investigation report]." Compl., ¶ 5. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was entitled to "present a different description of the offense behavior in his pre-sentence report (PSR)," id. at 2, such that he would qualify for a lesser punishment for violations of the conditions of his release. See Def.'s Mot., Ex. 7 (Hearing Summary and Addendum). Through this action, plaintiff demands monetary damages. Id. at 4.
Upon revocation of plaintiff's parole in July 2003, the Parole Commission set a presumptive parole date of March 29, 2007, after service of 84 months. Def.'s Mot., Ex. 8 (Notice of Action). Plaintiff alleged that the appropriate penalty should have been 34-44 months. Compl., ¶ 5.
II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff properly has stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true and are construed liberally in plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2001). The Court is not obligated, however, to draw factual inferences that are not supported by the facts alleged. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
B. Plaintiff does not state a claim for damages under the Privacy Act.
The Privacy Act requires that an agency:
maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as to assure fairness to the individual in the determination.5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). Although the Parole Commission is not obligated to comply with the amendment provisions of the Privacy Act, it still is obligated to address the accuracy of records before considering such records in making a determination affecting the prisoner. See Deters v. United States Parole Comm'n, 85 F.2d 655, 658 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). In order to recover monetary damages under the Privacy Act, "a plaintiff must assert that an agency failed to maintain accurate records, that it did so intentionally or willfully, and, consequently, that an `adverse' `determination [wa]s made' respecting the plaintiff." Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C)). Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the agency's actions in violating the Privacy Act were intentional or willful. Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4). To meet his burden, plaintiff "must prove that the offending agency acted `without grounds for believing [its actions] lawful' or that it `flagrantly disregarded' the rights guaranteed under the Privacy Act." Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d at 189).
The Parole Commission's decisionmaking files are exempt from the Privacy Act's amendment provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 16.85.
Plaintiff's complaint is deficient in that it makes no specific allegations as to an intentional or willful action of the Parole Commission in violation of the Privacy Act. The Parole Commission has no affirmative obligation to investigate information set forth in a presentence investigation report. See Buxton v. United States Parole Comm'n, 844 F.Supp. 643, 644 (D. Or. 1994). As long as the Parole Commission complies with established procedures for conducting a parole hearing, it complies with the fairness standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). See id; Bayless v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 94-0686, 1994 WL 525325, *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 1996).
C. Plaintiff cannot challenge his sentence by filing a Privacy Act suit.
A ruling in plaintiff's favor on this Privacy Act claim may have an impact on the duration of his confinement, and a challenge of this nature is properly brought in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) ("[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody."); Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[F]or a federal prisoner, habeas is indeed exclusive even when a non-habeas claim would have a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of custody."); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, ___ U.S. ___, 2005 WL 516415 *5 (Mar. 7, 2005) (habeas is exclusive remedy if success of an action "would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration"). The Privacy Act is not the proper means by which a prisoner collaterally may attack his sentence. White v. United States Probation Office, 148 F.3d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that plaintiff fails to state a Privacy Act claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this same date.