In cases such as this, intent to harm is inferred as a matter of law when the defendant has engaged in sexual misconduct with a child. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990). See also Swentkowski v. Dawson, 881 P.2d 437 (Colo.App. 1994); Nikolai v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co., 830 P.2d 1070 (Colo.App. 1991).
At the time or soon after Weetman was decided, several jurisdictions either had minority precedent, or competing minority and majority precedent. Since then, 1) the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and adopted the majority rule, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990), rev'g 768 P.2d 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); 2) the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the majority approach taken by one district court of appeals and overruled the minority approach taken by another, Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1989), aff'g 516 So.2d 305 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988) and overruling Zordan v. Page, 500 So.2d 608 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1986); 3) the New York Court of Appeals reversed the supreme court, appellate division, and adopted the majority rule, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 79 N.Y.2d 153, 581 N.Y.S.2d 142, 589 N.E.2d 365 (1992), rev'g 166 A.D.2d 474, 561 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1990); and 4) in Davis, the Supreme Court of Alabama approved adoption of the majority approach as predicted by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama in Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947 (M.D.Ala. 1992) and rejected adoption of the minority approach as predicted by the district court for the Northern District of Alabama in State Auto Mut. Ins. Co.
On a slightly different tack, the plaintiffs point to two additional cases where Colorado courts have determined that a certain type of conduct includes a per se intent to harm, even if the insured asserts that he had no intent to cause harm as a result of his admittedly voluntary action. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 419 (Colo.1990); Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 909, 911 (Colo.App.1997) (applying Troelstrup rule). But the Troelstrup rule was designed to apply only in the “limited circumstances” of child molestation cases, Troelstrup, 789 P.2d at 419 (quoting Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash.2d 381, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (1986)), and those circumstances are quite far afield from the instant case.
State Farm, 808 S.W.2d at 670. State Farm cites Allstate Insurance Company v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990), a Colorado Supreme Court case, as an example of such "extreme or outrageous" conduct. In Allstate, the court held that "an intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law where child molestation is involved."
Moreover, the 1988 Troelstrup case was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). Thus, in reality, the only cases truly enunciating the minority rule that have not been overruled (because the issue has not been entertained by a higher court) are the Ninth Circuit Jenner case, which the Whitt court noted might be at odds with state law as the California Supreme Court would have construed it, and the McIntyre case, which has not attracted one word of approbation from the judiciary.
We have previously held that an intentional harm will be inferred when the insured has engaged in such sexual misconduct. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 419 (Colo. 1990). Statutes dealing with unlawful sexual behavior define "sexual contact" as:
Courts in Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin have also adopted the majority rule inferring intent to injure in sexual assaults of minors. Additional cases from jurisdictions that have adopted the majority rule include; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815 (D.Alaska 1987); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Doe, 163 Ariz. 388, 788 P.2d 121 (Ariz.App. 1989); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying California law); J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 52 Cal.3d 1009, 278 Cal.Rptr. 64, 804 P.2d 689, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 280, 116 L.Ed.2d 232 (1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990); People v. Garciadealba, 736 P.2d 1240 (Colo.App. 1986); Motley v. Maddox, No. C.A. 90C-JL-82, 1992 WL 52206 (Del.Super., Feb. 19, 1992); Troy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp. 1134 (D.Kan. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 195 Ga. App. 335, 393 S.E.2d 489(1990); Scudder v. Hanover Ins. Co., 201 Ill. App.3d 921, 147 Ill.Dec. 386, 559 N.E.2d 559 (1990); Wiseman v. Leming, 574 N.E.2d 327 (Ind.App. 1991); Doe v. Smith, 573 So.2d 238 (La.App. 1990), cert. denied, 573 So.2d 1139 (La. 1991); Perreault v. Maine Bonding Cas. Co., 568 A.2d 1100 (Me. 1990); Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day School, Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 558 N.E.2d 958 (1990); New Hampshire Ins. Group v. Strecker, 244 Mont. 478, 798 P.2d 130 (1990); State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. van Gorder, 235 Neb. 355, 455 N.W.2d 543 (1990); State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Smith, 907 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Nevada law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Foster, 693 F. Supp. 886 (D.Nev. 1988); Atlantic Employers v. Tots Toddlers, 239 N.J. Sup
We are not aware of any decision by a state's high court that allows coverage for child molestation. ( Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup (Colo. 1990) 789 P.2d 415, 419; Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Fla. 1989) 546 So.2d 1051, 1053.) The New Hampshire Supreme Court initially seemed to allow proof of a molester's subjective intent.
See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (Pennsylvania law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987) (Alaska law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (Oklahoma law); Twin City FireIns. Co. v. Doe, 788 P.2d 121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, supra; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1989); Roe v. State Farm Fire Casualty Co., supra; Altena v. United Fire Casualty Co., 422 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1988) (sexual abuse of adult by victim's landlord); Harpy v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra; Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Gardipey, 173 Mich. App. 711 (1988); Estate of Lehmann v. Metzger, 355 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1984); Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521 (1986) (overruling sub silentio MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 124 N.H. 456); Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wn.2d 381 (1986) (en banc); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1988); N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis.2d 84 (1990) Only three cases lend any support to the proposition that inquiry into the sexual abuser's motivations is necessary.
(Leeber at 585). Judge Crabb mentioned five states that followed the minority rule when he wrote his opinion, namely, Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida and New Hampshire. Since that time several of those states have reversed themselves and adopted the majority rule such as Alabama (State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612 So.2d 458 (Ala. 1993)); Colorado (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990), rev'g. 768 P.2d 731 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988)) and Florida (Landes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1989)).