In an order dated December 2000, the superior court determined that Spillers was a permissive user of the vehicle and that Allstate's policy provided coverage. Allstate appealed that determination and in Allstate v. Spillers, 252 Ga. App. 26 ( 555 S.E.2d 489) (2001), this court determined that the superior court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that there was coverage. Accordingly, this court vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper legal standard.

" (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spillers, 252 Ga. App. 26, 28 ( 555 SE2d 489) (2001). Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Daniels, we conclude that the Daniels failed to come forward with competent evidence creating a genuine issue of fact. While the Daniels point to Falisha and Raymond's deposition testimony that they did not report the Trailblazer stolen, such evidence does nothing to establish that Smith had permission to drive the Trailblazer for the particular purpose for which she used it on the date of the accident.

Notably, we are not alone in following this rule. See Scott v. Government Employees Insurance Co. , 305 Ga.App. 153, 158, 700 S.E.2d 198, 202 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("[t]he permission to use contained in [the] omnibus clause refers to the purpose for which the permission was given and not to the operation of the vehicle."); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spillers , 252 Ga.App. 26, 28, 555 S.E.2d 489, 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he permission to use contained in [the] omnibus clause refers to the purpose for which [the] permission was given and not to the operation of the vehicle.") (quoting Ga. Farm & Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 190 Ga.App. 593, 594, 379 S.E.2d 619, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) ); Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Smith , 178 Ga.App. 420, 422, 343 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he ‘actual use’ contemplated and intended by the policy refers only to the purpose to be served and not the operation of the vehicle.") (quoting Strickland , 162 S.E.2d at 425 ). Turning to this appeal, the district court cited Strickland for the proposition that the scope of permissive use was limited "to whether or not permission to operate the vehicle had been given."

The relevant question before the Court, therefore, is "whether a reasonable person could conclude under the circumstances that the use of the [Looper truck] fell within the scope of the permission granted by the policyholder." See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spillers, 555 S.E.2d 489, 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (involving identical policy language on permissive users); see also Hurst, 470 S.E.2d at 661 (describing the inquiry as "whether the owner or one in legal possession of the car gave the user permission"). Reasonable persons could not differ on the answer to that question in this case.

But "where it is apparent that a trial court's judgment rests on an erroneous legal theory, an appellate court cannot affirm."Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spillers, 252 Ga. App. 26, 28 ( 555 S.E.2d 489) (2001). (Punctuation and footnote omitted.)

Georgia courts interpret the phrase "with your permission" to relate to the scope of the purpose for which the permission was given, rather than to the manner of the vehicle's operation or to whom operates the vehicle. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spillers, 555 S.E.2d 489, 491 (Ga. App. 2001). Georgia uses an objective inquiry test to determine "whether a reasonable person could conclude under the circumstances that the use of the [vehicle] fell within the scope of the permission granted by the policyholder."