Allstate Ins. Co. v. Larandeau

14 Citing cases

  1. Volquardson v. Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest

    4:00CV3340 (D. Neb. Mar. 14, 2003)

    00 claim, or $83,050. In support of its argument, the defendant refers me to Allstate Insurance Co. v. LaRandeau, 622 N.W.2d 646 (Neb. 2002). Many of the relevant facts in LaRandeau are strikingly similar to the facts of this case:

  2. Houchin v. Allstate Indem. Ins. Co.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:07-CV-00071-M (W.D. Ky. Jun. 25, 2012)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that, under Kentucky law, appealed conviction for arson in state court did not defeat issue preclusion in federal court insurance case arising from same facts

    (Id.) Thus, pursuant to the Policy's standard mortgage clause, Option One Mortgage Company, as the named mortgagee, was entitled to recover under the policy even if Plaintiffs could not. Allstate paid Option One the amount of $102,763.36 to pay off its lienholder interest in Plaintiffs' residence. Option One consequently assigned to Allstate all of its rights against Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Heldreth, 2003 WL 22871679, *2 (N.D. W. Va. May 22, 2003); Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 622 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Neb. 2001)("'Courts have generally allowed an insurer to subrogate against an insured arsonist responsible for causing the loss.'" Id. at 650 (quoting 16 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 224:11 at 224-27(2000)).

  3. Bacon v. DBI

    284 Neb. 579 (Neb. 2012)   Cited 18 times

    As noted by Couch on Insurance 3d, broad statements of the antisubrogation rule “tend to leave out a crucial boundary of the rule: the prohibition of insurers' subrogation against their own insureds applies to claims arising from the very risk for which the insured was covered by that insurer.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 261 Neb. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001).Id. at 246, 622 N.W.2d at 650 (emphasis supplied).

  4. Kirwan v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.

    261 Neb. 609 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 11 times
    Applying a Nebraska statute on attorney's fees in insurance actions, despite the fact that South Dakota law governed the underlying dispute, because Nebraska deems its attorney's fees statute to be procedural

    [1,2] Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, ante p. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.

  5. Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Humlicek

    284 Neb. 463 (Neb. 2012)   Cited 10 times
    Concluding that the Sutton doctrine "applies to bar subrogation against a duplex tenant as to both sides of the building"

    See, Control Specialists v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 228 Neb. 642, 423 N.W.2d 775 (1988); Reeder v. Reeder, 217 Neb. 120, 348 N.W.2d 832 (1984). See Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 261 Neb. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001).The antisubrogation rule has been extended to “implied coinsureds.”

  6. Tri-Par Investments v. Sousa

    268 Neb. 119 (Neb. 2004)   Cited 30 times
    In Tri-Par, the Nebraska Supreme Court, after an extensive review of the status of the law, adopted the Sutton rule and held: "[A]bsent an express agreement to the contrary in a lease, a tenant and his or her landlord are implied coinsureds under the landlord's fire insurance policy, and the landlord's liability insurer is precluded from bringing a subrogation action against the negligent tenant."

    In the context of insurance, the right to subrogation is based on two premises: (1) A wrongdoer should reimburse an insurer for payments that the insurer has made to its insured and (2) an insured should not be allowed to recover twice from the insured's insurer and the tort-feasor. Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 261 Neb. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001). Simply put, in the context of liability insurance, when a "liability insurer pays an insured's claim for damages caused by the . . . wrongdoing of a third party, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured against that third party."

  7. Volquardson v. Hartford Ins. Co.

    264 Neb. 337 (Neb. 2002)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that language identical to that in the intentional acts exclusion at issue in this case failed to provide the minimum coverage required by the New York standard fire insurance policy of 1943

    However, we have never specifically considered the question of whether, in the context of homeowner's insurance, public policy would bar enforcement of an intentional acts exclusion against an innocent coinsured whose spouse commits the intentional act that results in loss. Helen argues that this court's recent holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 261 Neb. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001), indicates that Nebraska public policy requires an insurer to compensate an innocent coinsured in her situation. Although LaRandeau did involve a payment by an insurer to an innocent coinsured whose spouse had caused a fire loss, the issue of whether such payment was required by public policy notwithstanding an intentional acts exclusion was not presented. The insurer in LaRandeau voluntarily paid one-half of the loss to the innocent coinsured and then sought to recover that amount in a subrogation claim against the insured spouse who intentionally caused the loss.

  8. Hatcher v. Bellevue Vol. Fire Dept

    262 Neb. 23 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 30 times
    Indicating that to state a cause of action for conspiracy, the pleader must allege the conspiracy, the doing of the wrongful acts, and facts showing damages

    [1,2] Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 261 Neb. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.

  9. Cepel v. Smallcomb

    261 Neb. 934 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 3 times

    Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, ante p. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001); Casey v. Levine, ante p. 1, 621 N.W.2d 482 (2001). On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the court below.

  10. Struempler v. Estate of Kloepping

    626 N.W.2d 564 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 3 times
    In Struempler v. Estate of Kloepping, 626 N.W.2d 564 (Neb. 2001), the Nebraska Supreme Court found the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a legal duty because the attendant risk of harm was modest, and the magnitude of the risk of harm was insufficiently high.

    In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, ante p. 242, 622 N.W.2d 646 (2001); Casey v. Levine, ante p. 1, 621 N.W.2d 482 (2001). ANALYSIS