There are actually two court of appeals opinions and one Supreme Court opinion in Allred , all of which considered the applicability of a statutory exemption to a vehicle license fee for "implements of husbandry." Id. ; Allred v. J.C. Engelman, Inc. (Allred II ), 54 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1932), affirmed, Allred v. J.C. Engelman, Inc. (Allred III ), 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1933). In Allred I , the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction.
Howell T. Heflin, Tuscumbia, for appellant. In this case the bulldozer is an implement of husbandry, within the exception to Code 1940, Tit. 36, § 89. Allred v. J.C. Engelman, Inc., 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 75, 91 A.L.R. 417; Hickman v. Hickman, 149 Tex. 439, 234 S.W.2d 410; Simons v. Lovell, 7 Heisk. Tenn. 510; McCue v. Tunstead, 65 Cal. 506, 4 P. 510. Defendant was entitled to show that the bulldozer had been used before for farming purposes. John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and Jas. W. Webb, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Under that definition, the Andrews' feeder truck is an implement of husbandry because (1) it was modified by them so that it could be used for the sole purpose of feeding their cattle which is an agricultural purpose, and (2) it has been exclusively used for that agricultural purpose since it was so adapted over a decade ago. There was not even a suggestion that the truck was ever used for a non-agricultural purpose such as personal transportation. In this conclusion we are supported by the case of Allred v. Engelmen, 123 Tex. 205, 207, 61 S.W.2d 75, 77, 91 A.L.R. 417, 421 (1933), where the court held that "`trucks consisting chiefly of truck chassis with galvanized iron or steel tanks permanently mounted thereon,'" which hauled water for irrigation and gasoline to tractors in fields, were "implements of husbandry" even though in so doing the trucks travelled distances of less than a mile on public highways. Neither our statutory definition of an implement of husbandry nor the policy itself contains any restriction on the frequency or distance of the movement of a farm implement along a public highway.
There is no discussion in either the case or the annotation of an exemption similar to the one in subsection (1). Nor is there a need to make comparison of or distinction between crossing and moving along the highway. Allred v. J.C. Engleman, Inc., 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 75 (1933); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 422 (1934). The trial court concluded that former AS 28.10.040(1) did not exempt the mobile home from registration.
The language of section 321.453 is not so limited nor is such a construction of the statute reasonably called for. These authorities, in addition to those last-cited, tend to support our conclusion plaintiff's combine was being temporarily moved upon a highway: Park Transp. Co. v. Missouri State Highway Comm., 332 Mo. 592, 60 S.W.2d 388, 392; Allred v. J.C. Engelman, Inc., 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 75, 91 A.L.R. 417, 422; Bean v. Reeves, Tex. Civ. App., 77 S.W.2d 737. No decision of ours bears directly on defendant's first contention plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. Both sides cite Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655, which affirms the dissolution of a temporary injunction restraining criminal proceedings to enforce what is now Code section 321.454, prescribing the maximum width of a vehicle or its load.
The plaintiffs in error have such vested rights in their business as will entitle them to come into a court of equity and restrain defendants from interfering with their proper use of the State highways in connection therewith. J. H. McLeish Co. v. Binford, 52 F.2d 151; Allred v. J. C. Engleman, Inc., 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 107; Bean v. Reeves, 77 S.W.2d 737. William McCraw, Attorney General, and Vernon Coe, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant in error.
It is fundamental then, that whether a vehicle is an 'implement of husbandry' must be determined by the primary design and primary use or purpose to which the vehicle is put and turns on the 'facts of any particular case.' Attorney General Opinion Nos. M-1254 (1972) (four-wheel riding lawn mower not an "implement of husbandry" within article 6675a-1, V.T.C.S., because not used primarily for agricultural purposes), citing Allred v. J.C. Engleman, Inc., 61 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1933) (water truck designed for sole purpose of carrying water for irrigation and gasoline carrier truck designed and used for sole purpose of providing gasoline to tractors in orchards and fields were "implements of husbandry" within article 6675a-1, V.T.C.S.); M-1288 (piece of equipment designed and used primarily for application of fertilizer and herbicides an "implement of husbandry" within article 6675a-1, V.T.C.S.). In Reaves v. State, 50 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 1931), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals construed the phrase in the context of article 827a, section 3(a), of the Penal Code which exempted from length limitations placed upon motor vehicles "implements of husbandry, including . . . machinery temporarily propelled or moved upon the public highways."
In construing article 6675a-1, V.T.C.S., which governs vehicle registration and provides an exemption from registration for 'implements of husbandry,' this office declared that the test was one of primary design and primary use or purpose: 'It is fundamental then, that whether a vehicle is an 'implement of husbandry' must be determined by the primary design and primary use or purpose to which the vehicle is put and turns on the 'facts of any particular case." Attorney General Opinions M-1254 (1972) (four-wheel riding lawn mower not an 'implement of husbandry' within article 6675a-1, V.T.C.S., because not used primarily for agricultural purposes), citing Allred v. J.C. Engelman, Inc., 61 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1933) (water truck designed for sole purpose of carrying water for irrigation and gasoline carrier truck designed and used for sole purpose of providing gasoline to tractors in orchards and fields were 'implements of husbandry' within article 6675a-1, V.T.C.S.); M-1288 (1972) (piece of equipment designed and used primarily for application of fertilizer and herbicides an 'implement of husbandry' within article 6675a-1, V.T.C.S.). In Reaves v. State, 50 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 1931), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals construed the phrase in the context of article 827(a), section 3(a), V.T.C.S., which exempted from length limitations placed upon motor vehicles implements of husbandry temporarily propelled or moved upon the public highways.
The Supreme Court of this State sustained a law that made exemptions of motor vehicles used for agricultural purposes from the registration law. Allred v. J. C. Engleman, Inc., 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 75, 91 A. L.R. 417. Other exemptions made the basis of Park's complaint have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. State ex rel. Graham v. McMahon, 65 Minn. 453, 68 N.W. 77; Davidson v. Patnaude et al., 145 Minn. 371, 177 N.W. 495.