Opinion
95 Civ. 4490 (GEL)
May 25, 2001
Jeffrey Allred, pro se, for Plaintiff Jeffrey Allred
Rebecca Ann Durden, Esq. and Tiffany Foo, Esq., Office of the Attorney General, New York, N.Y. for Defendant Lawton Brown
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jeffrey Allred is an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services. He brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 15, 1995, against three corrections officers, Lawton Brown, John Fitzgerald and B Sughrim, charging cruel and unusual punishment and deprivation of his right to be free from the unjustified and excessive use of force in violation the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On September 17, 1999, all claims against defendant Sughrim were dismissed on summary judgment. On January 8, 2001, after a three-day trial, a jury found defendant Fitzgerald not liable on all claims, but failed to reach a verdict as to defendant Brown. This case is currently before the court on defendant Brown's motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b). For the reasons stated below, Brown is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the motion is granted, and judgment will be entered for the defendant Brown.
Facts
The present dispute centers on Brown's alleged use of excessive use of force against Allred on the morning of March 28, 1995. The parties do not dispute that the application of force against Allred was precipitated by his refusal to obey a direct order to submit to a frisk, or that the confrontation had its origins in a dispute rooted in the petty frustrations of prison life and discipline. However, the trial testimony provides conflicting accounts of the details of the incident.
Plaintiff was a "feed-up" worker in the mess hall of Sing Sing Correctional Facility on the morning at issue. (Tr. 26.) While he was working in the mess hall, Allred started filling his personal pitcher or "jug" with fruit juice. Brown approached the plaintiff and ordered him to empty his juice container — an order consistent with prison regulations, though perhaps inconsistent with prevailing practice in the mess hall. (Tr. 26, 45, 96.) Both Brown and Fitzgerald testified that although Allred complied with the order to throw out his juice, he was visibly upset and began cursing at Brown. (Tr. 97, 98, 110, 111, 135.) Brown walked over, took Allred's jug, informed him that he was going to take him back to his cell to place him in keeplock, and asked for his identification. (Tr. 27, 46, 70, 98, 135-36, 239.). Rather than handing his identification to Brown, Allred tossed it at Brown. (Id.)
"Feed-up" workers are inmates who prepare trays of food to be delivered to inmates who are in "keeplock" and therefore cannot get their food in the mess hall. (Tr. 70.) They apparently eat before the general population. (Tr. 26, 39.)
Although it is undisputed that no prison regulation permitted mess hall workers extra rations of food and beverage, there is conflicting testimony as to whether in practice they nevertheless were tolerated in taking extra portions. Two inmate witnesses testified that inmates were informally allowed to keep personal pitchers, although they were technically considered contraband, and that mess hall workers used these pitchers to serve themselves extra portions of beverage. (Tr. 46, 72, 81.) Defendants Brown and Fitzgerald testified that on the day in question, they had been told by Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Looney, the officer in charge of the mess hall, not to permit the workers to take extra rations since he did not want some inmates receiving preferential treatment or food to run out before all inmates had a chance to eat. (Tr. 97.) Looney himself testified that he routinely advised mess hall officers that inmates were not permitted to have jugs or to remove food from the mess hall. (Tr. 261-62) In addition, Fitzgerald testified that Looney instructed the officers not to allow inmates to bring personal containers into the mess hall since workers had been stealing food and they could also hide other contraband in the jugs. (Tr. 134-35.) Sughrim, the "feed-up" officer on that particular day, testified that he had never seen inmates use personal containers, and that he never permitted them to do so. (Tr. 243.) In contrast, the plaintiff testified that he had taken advantage of this customary privilege in the past and that when Brown ordered him to discard the juice from his container, he did not require the other mess hall workers to do the same. (Tr. 26-27.) The plaintiff's testimony is corroborated by two other inmates, Jason Joseph and Tyrone Rudolph, who testified on Allred's behalf (Tr. 46, 48, 53, 72, 73.)
Joseph disputes this account, testifying that Allred was not cursing. (Tr. 48.) Neither Allred nor Rudolph provided any affirmative testimony regarding Allred's purported cursing at Brown.
There is contradictory evidence concerning Brown's reasons for taking Allred's jug and subjecting him to disciplinary sanctions. Brown testified that although at first he had no desire to take Allred's jug or impose disciplinary sanctions, he changed his mind because of Allred's aggressive reaction and its potential impact on the discipline of other inmates. (Tr. 98-99.) Thus he told Fitzgerald that he was "going to take his jug and escort him back to the block." (Tr. 135.) Plaintiff testified, in contrast, that he believed that Brown "could have [taken] the jug when he told me to throw the juice away, so [by revisiting the issue later] he's harassing me." (Tr. 27.)
Accounts differ as to whether Allred threw the card on a table, on the floor, or at Brown's chest. (Tr. 27, 46, 70, 98, 136, 239.) There is no dispute, however, that he reacted angrily and defiantly.
After picking up Allred's identification, Brown ordered Allred to walk to the "bridge," the enclosed hallway that connected the mess hall to the cell block. (Tr. 99.) There is some evidence that Brown behaved aggressively towards Allred as they walked onto the bridge. Allred testified that he was in front of Brown, and that Brown "put his elbow in my back and shove[d] me onto the bridge." (Tr. 27.) As a result, he claimed that he did not "feel comfortable turning my back and getting searched by this officer." (Id.) Inmate Joseph offered a slightly different, although consistent, account, testifying that Brown walked onto the bridge first, but that once Allred was on the bridge, Brown "gave him a bump of the shoulder, and they exchanged words again." (Tr. 45.) However, Brown, Fitzgerald and Sughrim each offered testimony that Allred, unprovoked, continued an aggressive and confrontational course of conduct. (Tr. 104, 136, 240.)
Once on the bridge, Brown ordered the plaintiff to put his hands on the wall and submit to a frisk. (Tr. 99.) Brown, Fitzgerald and Sughrim testified that the plaintiff refused to put his hands on the wall and submit to a frisk, continued his agitated behavior, threw his latex "feed-up" gloves in Brown's face, and took a "boxing stance." (Tr. 99, 104, 136, 169-70, 240.) Neither of the inmate witnesses was close enough to hear the conversation or to give more than an impressionistic account of what transpired on the bridge. (Tr. 67, 70.) Inmate Joseph testified that Allred did not throw his gloves in Brown's face. (Tr. 47.) Inmate Rudolph testified that Allred was talking to Brown in an "aggravated" manner; however, neither he nor inmate Joseph observed Allred take a fighting or aggressive stance. (Tr. 47, 75.) Allred himself, however, admits that he understood Brown's command to submit to a frisk as a direct order, that he knowingly refused to obey it, and that he took a "defensive" stance rather than comply. (Tr. 34, 43.)
Undisputed testimony clearly establishes that standard operating procedure for inmates returning from the mess hall to the cell block required officers to search inmates for contraband, such as weapons or food pilfered from the mess hall. (Tr. 102-03, 134, 190-91.) The New York Department of Correctional Services' policy regarding the use of force is also undisputed. The unchallenged trial testimony of William J. Connolly, the deputy superintendent of Sing Sing Correctional Facility, established that under the governing rules inmates are required to submit to frisks when given a direct order by a corrections officer. (Tr. 191.) Connolly testified that prisoners are explicitly instructed that if they disagree with an order, they must nevertheless comply with it, and may later bring it up through a formal grievance procedure. (See id.) If prisoners refuse to obey, corrections officers are trained to use force in order to make them comply. (Tr. 194.) Connolly also testified that if an inmate disobeys a direct order to submit to a frisk and takes either a defensive or offensive posture, corrections officers are trained and authorized to use physical force to secure compliance. (Tr. 195.)
When Allred refused to be frisked, Brown used force to compel his compliance, essentially by tackling Allred to take him to the ground. The testimony offers slightly differing versions of precisely how the takedown occurred. Allred testified that Brown took a swing at him prior to taking him down with the help of Fitzgerald and Sughrim, and Joseph corroborated this testimony, but both apparently agree that no blow actually landed. (Tr. 27, 70.) Brown then reached down and pulled the plaintiff's legs out from under him in order to put him off balance. (Tr. 27, 105.) Apparently in an attempt to keep from falling backwards, Allred grabbed Brown around the neck. (Tr. 27, 106, 171-72.) Fitzgerald and Sughrim then grabbed the plaintiff and helped take him to the ground. (Tr. 27, 46, 71, 241.) Once Allred was on the ground, Brown knelt on his back and pulled his arms back to restrain him. (Tr. 71.) A number of inmates, including Joseph and Rudolph, who had observed the unfolding events, pulled Brown away and separated him from the plaintiff. (Tr. 51, 71-72.) A commotion ensued until additional corrections officers, apparently alerted by inmates in the mess hall, arrived and restored order. (Tr. 28.)
The testimony varies concerning Fitzgerald's role. Although Allred, Joseph and Rudolph variously testified at trial that Fitzgerald either placed Allred in a "headlock" or grabbed him around the neck (Tr. 27, 46, 71), Fitzgerald and Sughrim testified that Fitzgerald only grabbed Allred by the arm. (Tr. 137, 241, 250.) The dispute is not material here since the jury found Fitzgerald not liable in any case.
The plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to the infirmary for treatment. (Tr. 29.) Contemporaneous medical reports indicate that he complained of some back pain and suffered abrasions to the left forearm and shoulder. (Tr. 213-14.) His injuries were treated with a bandaid, mild pain killers and an analgesic balm. (Tr. 213-14, 218-19.)
According to prison medical records, Allred complained of back pain periodically for some time after the incident. (Tr. 232-33.) He was advised to perform exercises, and occassionally given aspirin or acetaminophen, and eventually the complaints ceased. (Tr. 233-35.)
After a disciplinary hearing, Allred was eventually sentenced to one year in the Special Housing Unit for his part in the incident. (Tr. 31.)
Procedural History
Allred's complaint in this action alleged that on the morning of March 28, 1995, while being taken to his cell to be placed in "keeplock", he was unjustifiably "assaulted by the defendants." (Cmplt. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff specifically alleged that defendant Brown struck him in the face, that Fitzgerald placed him in a choke hold and threw him to the ground, and that once on the ground Sughrim "hit" him and Brown "came down on [him] knee first into [his] back." (Id. ¶ 18.)
At the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment both against plaintiff's case in chief and on their affirmative defense of qualified immunity. On September 17, 1999, Judge Berman, to whom the case was then assigned, granted summary judgment for Sughrim, finding that "the amount of force used by defendant Sughrim was de minimis (i.e., grabbing the Plaintiff and bringing him to the ground) and was used in an effort to maintain order and discipline." Allred v. Brown, 95 Civ. 4490, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1999) (RMB). However, he denied summary judgment as to defendants Fitzgerald and Brown in light of remaining factual disputes, including, but not limited to, the propriety of Fitzgerald's purported use of a choke hold to restrain the plaintiff and the intent of defendants Brown and Fitzgerald to restore order rather than inflict harm on the plaintiff (See id. at 8.) Judge Berman also denied summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity, finding that "disputed facts as to the nature and the motivation for the force used against Plaintiff" by the remaining defendants precluded a determination as to the objective reasonableness of defendants' belief that they were not violating the plaintiffs rights. (See id. at 8-9.)
A three-day jury trial was held before this court on January 3 through January 5, 2001. At the close of testimony, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, but their motion was denied. (Tr. 277.) On January 8, 2001, the jury found for Fitzgerald on all claims, but was unable to reach a verdict as to Brown. (Tr. 362-63.) Defendant Brown now renews his motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Discussion
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may grant judgment as a matter of law "if during a trial a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on the issue." FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a)(1). "Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury." FED.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2). A party that has moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence, may renew its motion if no verdict was returned. See FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b). The court may grant judgment as a matter of law if "the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one verdict that reasonable [people] could have reached." Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 688 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Mattivi v. South African Marine Corp., 618 F.2d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The basis of Allred's § 1983 claim against Brown is the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In order to prevail, the plaintiff must not only prove that a defendant's conduct actually violated the Amendment, but he must also overcome any defense of qualified immunity raised by the defendant. If, on the basis of the undisputed facts, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on either of these issues, the present motion must be granted.
To the extent that Allred's § 1983 claim is also predicated upon an alleged use of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that claim is redundant since "the Due Process Clause affords [a] plaintiff no greater protection does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause" Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326(1986).
A. Violation of the Eighth Amendment
A claim for the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment must meet both objective and subjective requirements. First, the deprivation alleged must objectively be "sufficiently serious" to constitute a constitutional violation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298(1991). Second, "[t]o violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a `sufficiently culpable state of mind,'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834(1994), since the Eighth Amendment bars "only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain". Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297
In the case of alleged brutality by prison guards, these standards have been particularized in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1(1992) In such cases, the objective component does not require any particular "quantity of injury," for "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated." Id. at 9. Thus, in cases of deliberate use of force (as opposed to failure to prevent harm to inmates by neglecting their medical needs or security from attack cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97(1976)), the subjective standard predominates: the "core judicial inquiry" is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." 503 U.S. at 6-7.
Prison officials enjoy "wide-ranging deference" as to "prison security measure[s] taken in response to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates," and the Supreme Court has therefore cautioned judges and juries not to "substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. The test is derived from that earlier adopted by the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), which is quoted liberally and with favor in Hudson:
The management by a few guards of large numbers of prisoners, not usually the most gentle or tractable of men and women, may require and justify the occasional use of a degree of intentional force. Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Here, although the case is marginal, a jury could find that the objective injury requirement has been met. The abrasions and pain that Allred suffered as a result of being tackled by Brown, while unquestionably minor, would be sufficient to provide at least nominal damages if they were the result of Brown's malicious desire to inflict pain on Allred. See. e.g., Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1994). The specific holding of Hudson is that "the use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury." 503 U.S. at 4. It is true that the Court excludes from the Eighth Amendment an undefined category of "de minimis uses of physical force," and that the both the force used and the injuries suffered here are dramatically less than those held not to be de minimis in Hudson. Id. at 9-10. As Allred argues, by pulling his legs from underneath him, Brown potentially caused him to strike his head on the concrete floor, and Allred claims that Brown unnecessarily used his knee to restrain Allred on the ground. (See Pl. Mem. Opp. at 7, 13.) Were I the fact-finder, I would not find that these actions were "such as `to offend even hardened sensibilities,' or constitute force that is `brutal' and `offensive to human dignity.'"Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 n. 6 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174(1952)) (internal citations omitted). But jurors are better suited than judges for weighing "society's expectations" concerning "contemporary standards of decency." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Absent clearer guidance from higher authority, I cannot conclude that such force is, as a matter of law de minimis.
The Second Circuit has more than once made clear, moreover, that the critical subjective element of whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain order is essentially one of fact, ill-suited to summary resolution by a judge as a matter of law. Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir 1988); Martinez v. Rosado, 614 F.2d 829, 831 (2d Cir. 1980). In this case, a reasonable jury could find that Brown possessed the requisite state of mind to be found liable for a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
There is no dispute in this case that the force applied was at most moderate, and responded not only to a specific violation of prison rules, but also to Allred's offer of physical resistance to a legitimate order. No reasonable jury could infer a malicious motive from the objectively reasonable course of conduct pursued by Brown on this evidence alone. Allred argues, however, that Brown's actions preceding the use of force show that the apparent reasonableness of his actions masked a malicious intent to injure the plaintiff, and there is evidence that could conceivably support such a finding. For example, a jury that credited the testimony that taking extra juice or possessing a personal container were generally tolerated, and that Brown did not punish other inmates on the very occasion in question for similar conduct (Tr. 48, 53, 73), could find that Brown selectively punished Allred. From this, and from testimony that Brown shoved Allred unnecessarily in escorting him from the mess hall (Tr. 27, 45), a reasonable jury could infer that Brown's conduct evidenced an intent to harass and provoke Allred, and that this intent continued to operate throughout the incident. Admittedly, the inference is less than compelling, and the probative value of this evidence must be weighed in light of other evidence that Brown had never had any prior confrontations with Allred and that he was known as being a strict enforcer of rules. (Tr. 41.) But that weighing must be done by the fact finder. See Mallis, 717 F.2d at 688.
The same is true as to the events that transpired on the bridge and that preceded Brown's tackling Allred with the assistance of Fitzgerald and Sughrim. There are, unsurprisingly, differing accounts of whether Allred or Brown was behaving aggressively or was unnecessarily belligerent. Allred and the inmate witnesses testified that Brown unnecessarily shoved Allred and even attempted to punch him before taking him down. (Tr. 27, 45, 70.) Brown and Fitzgerald testified that Allred threw his latex "feed-up" gloves in Brown's face and then took a fighting stance is response to Brown's order to submit to a frisk. (Tr. 99, 104, 136, 169-70.) A determination of Brown's intent in using force against Allred would depend substantially on which testimony is more credible. Assessing credibility, like weighing evidence, is for the fact finder.
Thus, the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that Brown did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
B. Qualified Immunity
Even if a jury could find that Brown violated the Eighth Amendment, however, he is still entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct did not "violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818(1982). Whether an official may invoke qualified immunity "generally turns on the `objective legal reasonableness' of the action" as "assessed in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established'" when the action was taken. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639(1987) (citingHarlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19). The pertinent inquiry is how a reasonable official in the defendant's position would respond. See Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1992). Moreover, under governing Second Circuit precedent,
Even when a plaintiff's federal rights are so clearly defined that a reasonable public official would know that his actions might violate those rights, qualified or good faith immunity might still be available as a bar to a plaintiff's suit if it was objectively reasonable for the public official to believe that his acts did not violate those rights.Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922, 925 (2d Cir. 1991); accord Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987). Since the established test is one of objective reasonableness, qualified immunity claims may be decided as a matter of law. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816 (summary judgment); Malsh v. Austin, 901 F. Supp. 757, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[T]he use of an `objective reasonableness' standard permits qualified immunity claims to be decided as a mater of law.")
In this case, the undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that Brown's actions were objectively reasonable and lawful. There is no dispute that Brown issued a direct order for Allred to submit to a frisk, and that Allred refused to comply. (Tr. 34.) Nor is there any doubt that Brown had an entirely reasonable basis for issuing the order. It is apparently routine for a prisoner at Sing Sing to be frisked up to 20 times per day. (Tr. 102, 190.) Prisoners are explicitly instructed that they must comply when ordered by a prison officer to submit to a frisk. (Tr. 190-91.) Brown testified that prisoners were routinely frisked when leaving the mess hall, and that Looney had specifically instructed him to watch out for inmates stealing food from the mess hall. (Tr. 97, 102-03.) Deputy Superintendent Connolly testified that frisking an inmate leaving the mess hall was standard, because there was a particular concern about prisoners in common areas exchanging contraband such as weapons or drugs. (Tr. 190-91.) He unequivocally stated that force would be used to compel any prisoner that refused to submit to a frisk, especially one who displayed either a defensive or offensive posture. (Tr. 194-95.) Here, Allred has admitted that he refused to obey a direct order to submit to a frisk, and testified that he took a "defensive" stand. (Tr. 34, 43.) Whether the stance is characterized as "aggressive" or "defensive," it is undisputed that Allred refused to obey the order, and signaled his defiance by taking a posture that indicated his readiness to resist physically. Under these circumstances, Brown was clearly justified in using force to subdue Allred.
Nor is there any real dispute about the degree of force used by Brown. By all the witnesses' accounts, only moderate physical force was applied. No weapons were used, and no blows were struck. Moreover, taking an inmate to the floor is apparently precisely the degree of force sanctioned by prison authorities in these circumstances: Connolly testified that if when ordered to submit to a frisk, an inmate takes a fighting stand, prison officers are instructed to take him down to compel compliance. (Tr. 195.) The minimal injuries sustained further corroborate the moderate nature of the force applied. Medical records indicate that Allred suffered only minor abrasions and a (medically undiagnosable) backache, treated with a bandaid, aspirin and Ben Gay. (Tr. 213-14, 218-19.) The degree of force used was clearly such as any officer in Brown's shoes would have considered objectively reasonable to compel Allred to submit to a frisk.
In his post-trial submission, Allred attempts to question the tactics used, arguing that the forcible takedown risked a head injury, and that Brown injured Allred's back by using his knee to restrain Allred on the ground. (See Pl. Mem. Opp. at 7, 13.) But there is nothing in the evidence to show that another officer would have acted differently, especially in light of the minor extent of injury suffered. Indeed, one of Allred's own witnesses testified that Brown's use of his knee to restrain Allred was no greater force than would have been used to handcuff someone. (Tr. 75.)
Nor is the remainder of the evidence highlighted by Allred in support of his Eighth Amendment claim relevant to the present inquiry on qualified immunity. As noted above, evidence that Brown selectively punished Allred for taking extra juice might conceivably permit a jury to conclude that Brown "had it in" for Allred. This might even occasion the further conclusion that, however outwardly reasonable his use of force against Allred, Brown was in fact motivated by a desire to harass or harm him. But even if Brown had engaged in provocative or harassing conduct toward Allred, the fact remains, and is not disputed by Allred, that Allred was required to submit to a frisk, and that the only physical force actually applied against Allred was a moderate and reasonable degree of force necessary to overcome his deliberate and threatening disobedience to a lawful order. However illuminating evidence of Brown's prior actions might be for the purposes of ascertaining Brown's intent or motive in using force against Allred, none of it speaks to the objective reasonableness of the force actually applied.
It is of course somewhat puzzling to consider that there can be a jury issue as to whether Brown's conduct was "malicious and sadistic," and that at the same time his conduct can qualify as "objectively reasonable" as a matter of law. The Supreme Court, however, addressed this very puzzlement in Anderson v. Creighton. There, the plaintiff's challenging an allegedly unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment argued that defendants "alleged to have . . . unreasonably searched or seized" should not be accorded an immunity "intended only to protect reasonable official action." 483 U.S. at 643 (emphasis in original). But the Court rejected that argument. Noting that the legal question of whether a search is "unreasonable" is often a difficult one, the Court concluded that "[l]aw enforcement officers whose judgments in making these difficult determinations are objectively legally reasonable" should not be held personally liable in damages. Id. at 644. With the benefit of hindsight, and after engaging in the murky inquiry into whether it was more likely than not that Brown acted with malicious intent to provoke, harass or harm Allred, some jurors might fairly conclude that the officer's actions were excessive or badly motivated. (Indeed, at least some of the jurors empaneled in this case evidently did so conclude.) But qualified immunity exists to protect a public official who acts as a reasonable, well-intentioned officer would have acted from being subjected to such close scrutiny and the possibly erroneous liability to which it might lead. And, as the Supreme Court held in both Harlow and Anderson, qualified immunity can be determined as a matter of law.
Notably, the Second Circuit cases cited above that reverse summary judgments in prison brutality cases dealt only with whether the plaintiff had established "a legally cognizable constitutional claim," Corselli, 842 F.2d at 26 cf. Martinez, 614 F.2d at 831 ("whether appellant has stated a proper claim for relief"), and did not address the potential applicability of qualified immunity. Neither Harlow nor Anderson is cited in Corselli, and neither had even been decided at the time ofMartinez.
In coming to this conclusion, the court is mindful that qualified immunity exists to protect government officials, who must make numerous decisions in the public interest, from being unduly inhibited by the fear of future lawsuits from taking legitimate actions. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. If it was objectively reasonable for Brown to tackle Allred, in a manner that minimized injury, for offering to fight rather than submitting to a required frisk, then an officer who chose that course of action should be protected from suit by qualified immunity, even if a jury might reasonably find that this particular officer acted from unconstitutional motives. Accordingly, Allred's failure to meaningfully contest the objective reasonableness of Brown's use of force warrants a finding of qualified immunity here.
of course, the usual way in which this protection can be extended is at the summary judgment stage, Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, and, as noted above, Judge Berman denied summary judgment in this case. However, after a full trial the record is far clearer than it could be at summary judgment, and the trial evidence in this case presented both a fuller and a somewhat different picture of the actual circumstances than was available at that time.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted, and judgment will be entered for the defendant.
SO ORDERED: