Our Supreme Court has held that OCGA § 16-6-5 (a) includes the element of asportation, which is satisfied "whether the taking involves physical force, enticement, or persuasion." Cimildoro v. State , 259 Ga. 788, 789 (1), 387 S.E.2d 335 (1990) ; Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 263 (2) (b), 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020). By itself, this evidence is sufficient to establish the elements of enticing a child for indecent purposes and to sustain his conviction.

"[T]he trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of child hearsay evidence, and we will reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of statements [under OCGA § 24-8-820 ] only if the trial court abused its discretion." Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 261 (1), 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). When the victims’ mother testified, Green objected to the admission of hearsay statements by A. G. After the State responded that A. G. was present and able to testify, the trial court admitted the hearsay statements over trial counsel's objection.

This is sufficient evidence to support a child molestation conviction. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) (child molestation occurs when a person "[d]oes any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person."); Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 261 (1) (a), 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020) (even where child is unresponsive to questions when called as a witness, the victim's forensic interview in which she confirmed indecent acts by the defendant was sufficient evidence to sustain child molestation conviction).

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 262 (2) (a), 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020) ; see also Smith v. State , 310 Ga. App. 392, 394 (1), 713 S.E.2d 452 (2011) ("Although [appellant] argues that the State did not establish that [the victim] understood the female anatomy, she spoke in clear, recognizable terms, and the jury was responsible for assessing the credibility of her statements.").

On appeal, "[w]e neither weigh the evidence nor determine witness credibility, which are tasks that fall within the exclusive province of the jury[.]" Allison v. State, 356 Ga.App. 256, 256 (846 S.E.2d 222) (2020). "That the jury apparently decided such [credibility] questions adversely to [Johnson] does not render the evidence supporting his convictions

While the victim did not testify as to the specifics of the incident in question at trial, "it is undisputed that the victim appeared at trial, took the witness stand, and was available for cross-examination[.]" Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 260 (1), 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020). As we have previously held, "there is no requirement that the child victim testify as to [the defendant's] specific actions or the specific contents of her interview video, let alone that the State successfully elicit such testimony on direct examination." Id.

See Hicks v. State , 254 Ga. App. 814, 816 (3), 563 S.E.2d 897 (2002) (victim's testimony that defendant "kept on trying to pull [her] towards him" satisfied asportation element); Cimildoro v. State , 259 Ga. 788, 789 (1), 387 S.E.2d 335 (1990) (asportation shown where defendant was in a tool shed with the victim and he persuaded her to lie down on a board so that he could molest her). "And [Reid's] actions were sufficient to establish that he acted with the requisite intent at the time he enticed" T.T. to move from the couch to the floor. Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 263 (2) (b), 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020) ("[T]he evidence authorized the jury to find that [defendant] enticed the ... victim to her mother's bedroom with the intention to engage in child molestation as established by his subsequent act of placing the victim's hand on his penis."). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence recounted above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Reid guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.

Because we conclude that the successor judge failed to exercise discretion in the review of Bernal's "general grounds" argument, we vacate that portion of the trial court's order and remand this case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion in considering Bernal's argument. See Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 258 (1), n. 2, 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020) ("For convenience of discussion, we have taken the enumerated errors out of the order in which [Bernal] has listed them.") (citation and punctuation omitted). It is well settled that

We do not agree. See Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 258 (1), n. 2, 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020) ("For convenience of discussion, we have taken the enumerated errors out of the order in which [Porter] has listed them.") (citation and punctuation omitted). When reviewing a defendant's conviction after a bench trial,

Stone contends that the State presented insufficient evidence that he had the requisite intent to commit indecent acts at the time he was messaging N. T. However, the subsequent act of statutory rape is sufficient evidence that Stone intended to engage in sexual activity with N. T. when he told her to come over and then paid for and sent an Uber to N. T.’s house to bring her to him. See Allison v. State , 356 Ga. App. 256, 263 (2) (b), 846 S.E.2d 222 (2020) (defendant's subsequent actions of molesting victim were sufficient to establish that he acted with requisite intent at the time he enticed victim into bedroom); Garza v. State , 347 Ga. App. 335, 337 (1) (a), 819 S.E.2d 497 (2018) (subsequent act of molestation is evidence that defendant intended to molest the victim when he told her to go to a motel with him). Moreover, N. T. testified that on the previous occasion she went to Stone's house, they kissed.