This is so because it is the exclusive province of the trial court to judge of the credit of witnesses. Bell v. Strong, 96 Conn. 12, 112 A. 645; Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Opper, 75 Conn. 295, 298, 53 A. 586; Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 340, 56 A. 637. If, however, on the trial, anything occurred in the presentation of the evidence or otherwise in the nature of an admission, which disclosed the undisputed character of the fact omitted, a transcript of such portion of the evidence or proceeding should accompany the exception to the failure to find such fact.
(Dissenting opinion of Judge Baldwin.) By contrast, inferior courts, as creatures of the Legislature are inherently impermanent, since "one legislature cannot control the exercise of the powers of a succeeding legislature." Preveslin vs. Derby Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 140, 151 A. 518. Another of its characteristics is its universality. It is one court throughout the State. Fine vs. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683, 684, 169 A. 58; Mower vs. State Department of Health, 108 id. 74, 77, 142 A. 473; Allis vs. Hall, 76 id. 322, 327, 56 A. 637; Smith vs. Hall, 71 id. 427, 42 A. 86; Styles vs. Tyler, supra, p. 450. No such quality attaches to inferior tribunals.
Nor does the Court find that the plaintiff intended the price to be determined on a cubic yard basis, which also would permit a reformation of the contract here on the ground of "mutual mistake." Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 56 A. 637 (1904); Town of Enfield v. Hamilton, 110 Conn. 319, 148 A. 353 (1930). It appears from the testimony plaintiff was unaware of the actual difference between a square yard and a cubic yard and the effect this difference would have on the price he was to receive for spreading the loam at the time he entered into the contract.
We consider only the addition of facts which actually were undisputed. "To secure an addition on this ground, it is necessary for an appellant to point to some part of the appendix, the pleadings, or an exhibit properly before us, which discloses . . . that the fact in question was true or that its truth was conceded to be undisputed. . . . That a fact was testified to and [was] not directly contradicted by another witness is wholly insufficient. . . . The trier is the judge of the credibility of witnesses." Brown v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 145 Conn. 290, 293, 141 A.2d 634; Practice Book 628(a); State v. Dukes, 157 Conn. 498, 500, 255 A.2d 614; Drazen Lumber Co. v. Casner, 156 Conn. 401, 403, 404, 242 A.2d 754; Brockett v. Jensen, 154 Conn. 328, 330, 225 A.2d 190; Dexter Yarn Co. v. American Fabrics Co., 102 Conn. 529, 540-41, 129 A. 527; Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 340, 56 A. 637; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 158. The defendant has not established that the court failed to include in its finding any paragraphs which were conceded to be undisputed. The defendant's second assignment of error attacks the court's inclusion of nineteen paragraphs of the finding as being unsupported by evidence.
. . . The trial court is at liberty to discredit any witness . . . if it deems that it has cause to do so. It is one of the important functions of a trier to determine the relative credit to be given to oral evidence.'" Eastern Sportswear Co. v. S. Augstein Co., 141 Conn. 420, 422, 106 A.2d 476 (quoting from Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 340, 56 A. 637); Greco v. Morcaldi, 145 Conn. 685, 687, 146 A.2d 589. Although the plaintiff has been unable to point to any finding of fact tending to support the existence of a contract of indemnity, he makes the claim that the court in its conclusions recognized the existence of such a contract. The court concluded that "[t]he understanding which was entered into between the parties was nothing more than an offer by the decedent to indemnify the plaintiff for any loss the plaintiff might suffer in the purchase of the stock."
The Superior Court is one court throughout the state. Perell v. Warden, 113 Conn. 339, 343, 155 A. 221; Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 327, 56 A. 637; see General Statutes 51-1. The legislature had the power to prescribe, within the territorial limits of this state, where the resentencing could take place. State v. Pace, 129 Conn. 570, 572, 29 A.2d 755.
Martino v. Grace-New Haven Community Hospital, 146 Conn. 735, 736, 148 A.2d 259; Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91, 139 A.2d 58. Others are statements of law too elementary to require discussion. Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 339, 56 A. 637. The remaining claims are abstract principles which are merely restated in the brief with citations of authority.
Otherwise false testimony would be a more serious factor in the administration of justice than it now is." Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 340, 56 A. 637; Eastern Sportswear Co. v. S. Augstein Co., 141 Conn. 420, 422, 106 A.2d 476. Other proposed paragraphs consist of immaterial or evidential matters. The remaining requested additions would incorporate facts which would not advantage the owner.
Trenchard v. Trenchard, 141 Conn. 627, 631, 109 A.2d 250. "The trial court is at liberty to discredit any witness or multitude of witnesses, if it deems that it has cause to do so. It is one of the important functions of a trier to determine the relative credit to be given to oral evidence." Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 340, 56 A. 637; Eastern Sportswear Co. v. S. Augstein Co., 141 Conn. 420, 422, 106 A.2d 476; Dexter Yarn Co. v. American Fabrics Co., 102 Conn. 529, 541, 129 A. 527. The trial court is the final judge of credibility and may disbelieve a witness as to part of his or her testimony and accept it in other respects. Corvo v. Waterbury, 141 Conn. 719, 724, 109 A.2d 869; Clark v. Haggard, 141 Conn. 668, 674, 109 A.2d 358.
First, there must have been a delay that was inexcusable, and, second, that delay must have prejudiced the defendant. Kievman v. Grevers, 122 Conn. 406, 411, 189 A. 609; Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 621, 179 A. 5; Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 334, 56 A. 637; Waterman v. A. W. Sprague Mfg. Co., 55 Conn. 554, 574, 12 A. 240. We need not discuss whether the lapse of twenty-five years before the institution of the plaintiff's suit could be called inexcusable, since there is nothing in the finding to indicate that the delay prejudiced the defendant.