In its order in Zimmerman's case, the PUC questioned the continued vitality of our holdings in Wentworth and Monadnock Mills. The commission expressed doubt as to whether "the broad statements relative to [its] jurisdiction expressed [in those cases] remain viable statements of the law in this State." In support of this assertion, the PUC cited our decision in Allied New Hampshire Gas Co. v. Tri-State Gas Supply Co., 107 N.H. 306, 221 A.2d 251 (1966), as well as legislative additions to RSA 362:2 which, the commission claimed, alter the construction that should be given the term "public."

The PSC distinguished this case since the question presented was an interpretation of provisions of the Federal Natural Gas Act, which has no counterpart in Michigan law. The PSC felt that the case therefore had no bearing on the Michigan Legislature's understanding of the term "gas" as used in the public utility act. Also, the case is distinguishable because the commodity in question was the result of a chemical transformation rather than a simple change of physical state (as from gas to liquid). Plaintiffs also cite Summers Appliance Co v George's Gas Co, Inc, 244 Ark. 113; 424 S.W.2d 171 (1968) (gas subject to regulation by the Arkansas Public Service Commission did not encompass liquid petroleum gas; thus, liquid petroleum distributors were not public utilities), and Allied New Hampshire Gas Co v Tri-State Gas Supply Co, Inc, 107 N.H. 306; 221 A.2d 251 (1966) (liquid petroleum gas company not subject to regulation as a utility by the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission). However, in the Summers Appliance case, the court was not dealing with liquefied natural gases (LNG) such as ethane, but with liquefied petroleum gases (LPG), butane and propane, which are distributed by truck, not by pipeline.

Our analysis is founded on the principle that, even when a statute "delegates broad regulatory powers to the Public Utilities Commission . . . its powers are necessarily circumscribed by the purposes which the statute seeks to accomplish." Allied N.H. Gas Co. v. Tri-State Gas Co., 107 N.H. 306, 308, 221 A.2d 251, 253 (1966). All of the statutes cited in support of the Company's argument deal with the PUC's power to regulate public utilities.

Given this statutory, legislative, and constitutional history, we conclude that in enacting RSA 362:2 the legislature did not intend to place all companies and businesses somehow related to railroads, telephone, telegraph, light, heat, and power companies under the umbrella of the PUC's regulatory power. N.E. Household Moving Storage, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 117 N.H. at 1041, 381 A.2d at 748; Allied N.H. Gas Co. v. Tri-State Gas Supply Co., 107 N.H. 306, 308, 221 A.2d 251, 253 (1966); see Ram Broadcasting of Michigan, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 317 N.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Mich. 1982).

See Central Ry. New Jersey v. Dep't of Publ. Util., 7 N.J. 247, 254-55, 81 A.2d 162, 165-66 (1951). The commission's statutory power to reconsider and modify an existing order is not unlimited. Union Electric Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 39 Ill.2d 386, 235 N.E.2d 604, 610 (1968); see Allied N.H. Gas Co. v. Tri-State, 107 N.H. 306, 308, 221 A.2d 252, 253 (1966). The amendment or rescission must still meet the requirement of due process and must be legally correct.