Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises

14 Citing cases

  1. Urez Corp. v. Superior Court

    190 Cal.App.3d 1141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that constructive trust and equitable lien claims may not support a lis pendens

    Our lis pendens statute is in derogation of the common law. "Historically, the American statutes providing for recording of a notice of pendency of an action affecting title to or possession of real property were designed to limit, rather than to expand, the common law doctrine of constructive notice." ( Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 131, 132 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126].) (3) The history of the lis pendens legislation indicates a legislative intent to restrict rather than broaden the application of the remedy.

  2. In re Kaiser Steel Corp.

    80 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987)   Cited 2 times
    Reasoning that the jurisdictional grant of federal bankruptcy courts provides an exception to the rule that that subject matter jurisdiction over real property is generally limited to courts within the same state as that of the res and therefore holding that California's lis pendens statute permits a party to an action before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado to file a notice of lis pendens against California property

    There is no limitation concerning which federal litigants may file lis pendens notices pursuant to the California statute. In Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises, 265 Cal.App.2d 131, 71 Cal.Rptr. 126 (Cal.App. 1968), the California Court of Appeals commented upon an amendment to the California lis pendens statute providing for the recordation of notice of pending federal actions. As the Allied court stated: In 1959, the California legislature amended the lis pendens statute.

  3. Campbell v. Superior Court

    132 Cal.App.4th 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 58 times
    In Campbell, this court considering a petition for writ of mandate held that the real party in interest in that case, who had successfully moved to expunge a lis pendens in the trial court but was denied attorney fees and costs, could not raise any issue as to the court's attorney fees and costs order where she did not seek review of its decision on that question.

    The purpose was to prevent frustration of jurisdiction by transfers pendente lite." ( Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 131, 132 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126].) Similarly, as the court in Newman v. Chapman (1823) 23 Va. 93, stated, "Without [the common law doctrine of lis pendens], the administration of justice might, in all cases, be frustrated by successive alienations of the property, which was the object of litigation, pending the suit, so that every judgment and decree would be rendered abortive, where the recovery of specific property was the object."

  4. Lewis v. Superior Court

    30 Cal.App.4th 1850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 90 times
    Stating plaintiff with equitable title only has no standing to bring quiet title action

    " ( Id., at p. 817.) (See also MacDermot v. Hayes (1917) 175 Cal. 95, 110 [ 170 P. 616] [lis pendens in action to set aside sale of stock ineffective to give constructive notice]; Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 131, 134 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126] [lis pendens in action on loan "would have no legal effect"].) 2.

  5. La Paglia v. Superior Court

    215 Cal.App.3d 1322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 28 times
    Setting forth the history and purpose of lis pendens statutes

    At common law the mere existence of a lawsuit affecting real property was considered to impart constructive notice that anyone who acquired an interest in the property after the suit was filed would be bound by any judgment in that suit. ( Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 131, 132 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126].) (3) To ameliorate the harsh effect of the common law rule, Legislatures enacted lis pendens statutes to limit the constructive knowledge of pending claims to those instances where a notice of lis pendens was recorded.

  6. Moseley v. Superior Court

    177 Cal.App.3d 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 14 times
    In Moseley v. Superior Court, 177 Cal.App.3d 672, 223 Cal.Rptr. 116, 116-17 (1986), the underlying suit giving rise to the filing of the notice of lis pendens involved a lawsuit seeking to repeal an amendment to a local law enacted by the county board of supervisors that could ultimately have an effect on 491 condominium units governed under the provisions of said law.

    Under our existing statutory scheme, a lawsuit which does not affect real property cannot support the filing of a lis pendens. (See Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 131 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126] .) In Allied Eastern the plaintiff entered into a contract to secure a loan to finance proposed improvement of defendant's land, then sued defendant for an alleged breach of the contract. Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against defendant's property.

  7. McKnight v. Superior Court

    170 Cal.App.3d 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 23 times
    Noting without comment that plaintiff had obtained a writ of attachment against real property owned by defendant and his non-debtor spouse as community property

    ) In 1959, the section was amended to the present language making a lis pendens appropriate "[i]n an action concerning real property or affecting the title or the right of possession of real property. . . ." (Stats. 1959, ch. 382, p. 2306, § 1; see Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 131, 132-133 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126].)

  8. Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court

    60 Cal.App.3d 462 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 15 times
    In Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.App.3d 462, 131 Cal.Rptr. 515 (1976), the court was concerned with a claim to a similar easement — use of a private road over the servient estate.

    (3) When sections 409 and 409.1 are read together, the clear implication is that the phrase "concerning real property" should be construed as having the same meaning as the words "affecting the title or the right of possession of real property." (See Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises, 265 Cal.App.2d 131 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126].) Indeed, any other interpretation would be contrary to the ordinary rules of statutory construction.

  9. Parker v. Superior Court

    9 Cal.App.3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Parker v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 397, 88 Cal.Rptr. 352 (1970), the court held that a leasehold is an estate in real property and "under the broad language of" the lis pendens statute, "an action concerning... the right of possession of real property...."

    Similarly, it has been held that a lis pendens is improper in an action for money damages only even though the action was based on a contract to secure a loan to finance proposed improvements on described real property. ( Allied Eastern Financial v. Goheen Enterprises, 265 Cal.App.2d 131 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 126].) Obviously, none of the above cases involve the right of possession of real property.

  10. St. Matthews Baptist Church of Livermore, Inc. v. Foundation Capital Resources, Inc.

    Case No. 13-cv-05765-MEJ (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    An action for money damages alone will not support a lis pendens. Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1145 (1987) (citing Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enter., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 133-34 (1968)). 3.