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Alliant Capital v. Singleton

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District
Jan 24, 2003
835 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

Summary

reversing trial court's injunction order because the court failed to set forth facts to support each element that a moving party must establish to be entitled to the issuance of a temporary injunction and erred in not setting and requiring a bond

Summary of this case from Reserve at v. Dixon

Opinion

Case No. 5D02-1442.

Opinion filed January 24, 2003.

Non-Final Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, George W. Maxwell III, Judge.

John R. Beranek, Robert N. Clarke, Jr. and Martin B. Sipple, of Ausley McMullen, Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Michael R. Levin, Christa C. Werder and Leslie B. Bissinger, of Rumberger, Kirk Caldwell, Orlando, for Appellee.


The appellants (collectively referred to as Alliant) bring this nonfinal appeal of an order granting appellees a temporary injunction, which mandated that appellees, partnerships owned or controlled by Singleton, and Singleton, remain in management control and as general partners of Crane Creek Senior Housing Partners Ltd. and Hatton House Senior Housing Partners "until further order of the court." The relationship between these complicated, inter-related parties was formed to finance the construction and management of two "affordable housing" projects: Crane Creek in Melbourne, Florida, and Hatton House in Sneads, Florida.

Alliant Capital, Ltd.; Alliant Tax Credit IX, Inc.; Alliant Tax Credit Fund IX, Ltd.; Alliant Tax Credit VIII, Inc.; Alliant Tax Credit Fund VIII, Ltd., Alliant Morgtgage Company, Inc.; Alan Schnier, Individually; Shawn Horowitz, Individually; and Scott Kotick, Individually.

Z. Cliff Singleton, individually and derivatively of RHT Crane Creek Partners, Ltd., RHT Hatton House Partners, Limited Partnership, Tax Credit Senior Properties, LLC.

The financing of these endeavors utilized a federal tax-incentive program, administered in Florida by the Federal Finance Housing Corp. Under this program, tax credits are provided to help fund affordable housing.

Disputes arose between the conglomerate opposing entities concerning the appellants' alleged commitment to and inability to raise funds for the projects, and their default in funding, and the appellees' alleged defaults and mismanagement of the projects. Based on documentation, appellants claimed appellees had defaulted and terminated them as general partners and managers of the project. However, appellees claimed their removal and termination was not justified and would jeopardize a "SAIL" loan, for which Singleton had applied, in order to salvage the projects. He claimed appellees' removal would result in the loss of the projects, elderly persons being thrown out of their homes, and the salutary purposes of the tax and loan benefits, state and federal, being offended. Limited testimony was taken at the initial hearing, although subsequent hearings were held which resulted in no change in the temporary injunction on appeal.

We have serious doubts that the circumstances set forth in the record before us justify the issuance of a temporary injunction. However, we do not reach the merits of that question because we find the trial judge failed to comply with the rule for entering a temporary injunction. See Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.610; Yardley v. Albu, 826 So.2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Florida Water Services. Corp. v. Blue Stone Real Estate Constr., 747 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); citing, Watkins v. Colonial Life Accident Ins. Co., 719 So.2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Specifically, the court failed to set forth facts to support each element that a moving party must establish to be entitled to the issuance of a temporary injunction: (1) irreparable harm; (2) no adequate remedy at law; (3) a clear legal right to the relief; (4) that the injunction will serve the public interest. See Coscia v. Old Florida Plantation, Ltd., 828 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Yardley; Ksaibati v. Ksaibati, 824 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Florida Water; Watkins. Further, the trial court erred in not setting and requiring a bond, as is mandated by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(b).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Alliant Capital v. Singleton

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District
Jan 24, 2003
835 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

reversing trial court's injunction order because the court failed to set forth facts to support each element that a moving party must establish to be entitled to the issuance of a temporary injunction and erred in not setting and requiring a bond

Summary of this case from Reserve at v. Dixon
Case details for

Alliant Capital v. Singleton

Case Details

Full title:ALLIANT CAPITAL, LTD., et al., Appellants, v. Z. CLIFF SINGLETON, et al.…

Court:District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District

Date published: Jan 24, 2003

Citations

835 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

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