This is indicated by the fact that the accountant fails to cite a single authority in its support. Without going into an extended examination of the subject of resulting trusts, it will suffice to note their general description as stated by the chancellor of New Jersey in Aller v. Crouter ( 64 N.J. Eq. 381; 54 A. 426, 429): "Resulting trusts have been considered, since the decision of LORD HARDWICKE in Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. 148, to fall naturally within one of three classes, and the distinction has frequently been recognized by our courts. One class of such trusts arises when title to lands purchased, in whole or in part, with the money of one is taken in the name of another. * * * Another class of such trusts arises when a trust is declared in respect to a portion of the title of lands, and nothing is declared with respect to the remainder. * * * The remaining class * * * is that where title to lands is acquired by fraud.
The case seems in principle and fact parallel to this one. In Allen v. Crouter, 54 A. 426, there was deed from A to B, who then made a lease to a third person, demising the property "as trustee for A." It was held, by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, that an express trust was created.
The case seems in principle and fact parallel to this one. In Allen v. Crouter, 54 Atl. 426, there was deed from A to B, who then made a lease to a third person, demising the property ‘as trustee for A.‘ It was held, by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, that an express trust was created. The statute there, of course, only required that writing prove the trust.
The proof may be found and deduced from one or more writings, if they bear a relation to each other and import a trust, and such proof need not be contemporaneous with the creation of the trust, but will suffice if made after long intervals. The writing need not be of a formal character, but a trust may be imported and proved by letters, deeds and other writings signed by the party to be charged. Aller v. Crouter,64 N.J. Eq. 381. It is true that the trust must not only be manifested and proved in writing, it must be signed by the party to be charged with the trust. But, as heretofore stated, it is not essential that the agreement or trust be contained in one writing, and while it is true that Exhibit C-2, though in the handwriting of Friedberg, is not signed by him, still it will be sufficient to satisfy the statute if Friedberg signed other papers that, taken in connection with his written statement ( Exhibit C-2), is a signature in acknowledgment of the trust, the subject and terms of which are set forth in Exhibit C-2.Johnson Miller v. Buck, 35 N.J. Law 338; Newkirk v. Place,supra; Aller v. Crouter, supra. A letter from Friedberg to Willig, signed by Friedberg, dated June 1st, 1926 ( Exhibit C-5), requests Willig to deposit for him, Friedberg, $3,000 in the Southwark bank as he is "overdrawn" and in need of funds for the "Imperial."
Therefore any declaration in a letter, pleading or other writing, made by the grantee or assignee of property, at any time after the conveyance, is competent proof that the property was to be held in trust according to the terms of such declaration." Note to Holmes v. Holmes et al., Ann. Cas. 1913B 1021, 1023; Ranney v. Byers, 219 P. 332, 123 Am. St. Rep. 660, 68 A. 971; Insurance Co. of Tennessee v. Waller, 116 Tenn. 1, 115 Am. St. Rep. 763, and note at page 774, 7 Ann. Cas. 1078, 95 S.W. 811; Wiggs v. Winn, 127 Ala. 621, 29 So. 96; McArthur v. Gordon, 126 N.Y. 597, 12 L.R.A. 667, 27 N.E. 1033; Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 Ill. 310, 11 Am. Rep. 67; Renz v. Stoll, 94 Mich. 377, 34 Am. St. Rep. 358, 54 N.W. 276; Stratton et al. v. Edwards et al., 174 Mass. 374, 54 N.E. 886; Ellison et al. v. Ganiard, 167 Ind. 471, 79 N.E. 450; Hall et al. v. Farmers' Merchants' Bank et al., 145 Mo. 418, 46 S.W. 1000; Neal v. Bryant, 291 Mo. 81, 235 S.W. 1075; Aller v. Crouter et al., 64 N.J. Eq. 381, 54 A. 426. In 1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees, sixth edition, paragraph 82, we find this language:
Its payment is without effect upon the present controversy. Counsel for defendants lay stress upon a line of cases in which it is held that a trust in land will not result to the grantor, if the conveyance purport to be given for a valuable consideration, upon parol proof that nothing was in fact paid and that the conveyance was wholly voluntary. Aller v. Crouter, 64 N. J. Eq. 381, 54 Atl. 426; Holton v. Holton, 72 N. J. Eq. 312, 65 Atl. 481; Coffey v. Sullivan, 63 N. J. Eq. 296, 49 Atl. 520. These cases have no application here.
The characterization of the grantee as "trustee for James Nash, Jr.," in the premises of the deed of gift, impressed the equitable estate upon the title and was notice thereof, which the complainant cannot escape. Gaston v. American Exchange National Bank, 29 N. J. Eq. 98; Aller v. Crouter, 64 N. J. Eq. 381, 54 Atl. 426. The effort of the trustee to convey the land to the complainant was abortive, and the deed, as a cloud on the title, may be set aside upon equitable terms at the instance of the cestui que trust.
" The text above quoted, and the cases of this state here cited, except from their operation, as already pointed out, instances in which property is purchased by one person and title is taken by him in the name of another. The text above quoted from Pomeroy is supported by the following cases in this state: Baldwin v. Campfield, 8 N. J. Eq. 891, 903; Smith v. Howell, 11 N. J. Eq. 349, 359; Whyte v. Arthur, 17 N. J. Eq. 521, 523; Hogan v. Jaques, 19 N. J. Eq. 123, 97 Am. Dec. 644; Osborn v. Osborn, 29 N. J. Eq. 385; Stucky v. Stucky, 30 N. J. Eq. 546, 554; Lovett v. Taylor, 54 N. J. Eq. 311, 34 Atl. 896; Coffey v. Sullivan, 63 N. J. Eq. 296, 303, 49 Atl. 520; Aller v. Crouter, 64 N. J. Eq. 381, 54 Atl. 426; Holton v. Holton, 72 N. J. Eq. 312, 65 Atl. 481; Ashby v. Yetter, 81 Atl. 730. But it will be observed that the deed now under consideration was not made by cross-complainant to his wife directly, but through an intermediary to whom cross-complainant had first conveyed the property; the deed immediately in question is not, therefore, a deed in fact executed by cross-complainant.
If objection be taken that the theory upon which the bill was framed and that upon which relief is granted vary, and it be found that such is the case, the court will still sustain the bill and grant the relief, if the relief granted be within the scope of the bill, and the evidence justifies it; even if it be found necessary to amend the bill and prayer. Aller v. Crouter (N. J. Ch.) 54 Atl. 426, at page 428 (Magie, Chan., 1903); Archer v. American Water Works Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 33, at page 48, 24 Atl. 508. at page 513 (McGill, Ch., 1892). I have determined to exercise the discretion vested in the court by not allowing either party costs as against the other.
These collateral agreements of the individual parties certainly cannot be permitted to alter the terms of the corporate contracts executed with all the formalities pursuant to written resolutions of the contracting companies. In Aller v. Crouter (N. J. Ch.) 54 Atl. 420, Chancellor Magie declared that reformation of a conveyance will not be decreed except on clear proof that by mutual mistake of the parties thereto the conveyance expresses something which they did not intend, or omits to express something which they did intend. In the present case there is scarcely a pretense that there was any mutuality in the alleged mistake.