Aller v. Aller

2 Citing cases

  1. Renault v. L. N. Renaults&sSons

    90 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Pa. 1950)   Cited 6 times

    Distinction must be made between lack of consideration and a failure of consideration. See 1 Williston op.cit., supra. § 109, p. 373, Note 5; id. Sec. 217, p. 657; Wilson v. Stevens, 105 N.J.Eq. 377, 148 A. 392; Aller v. Aller, 40 N.J.L. 446; United & Globe Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Conrad, 80 N.J.L. 286, 78 A. 203, at page 205, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 412. See also Willston id., Sec. 174, p. 566; 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 321, p. 423 et seq.; 34 Am.Jur.id. § 333, p. 262; Randolph v. General Investors Co., 96 N.J.Eq. 227, 124 A. 765.

  2. Trustees of Williams Hospital v. Nisbet

    189 Ga. 807 (Ga. 1940)   Cited 47 times
    In Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807 (7 S.E.2d 737), it was said that a contract of a foreign State which constituted one of the thirteen original colonies, or of a State which was derived from territory included in one of the colonies, would be construed under the rules of the common law, but that these rules would have no application to the contract of a State that was never a part of English territory.

    ( c) As to what sealed instruments with formal delivery, besides promissory notes, should be excluded as not coming within the definition of a single-bond specialty, it is not necessary to decide, and it is not here decided; nor is it necessary, under the facts of this case, to formulate what sealed instruments with formal delivery should be included within the definition of a single-bond specialty, other than to observe that the rule relating to such specialty bonds has been recognized as applying to instruments creating and establishing "a gift of money [payable] in futuro." Lacey v. Hutchinson, 5 Ga. App. 874 (supra); Aller v. Aller, 40 N.J.L. 446, 450, 451; Page v. Trufant, 2 Mass. 158, 161; 26 L.R.A. 308, notes; 63 A.L.R. 540, 542, and cit.; 12 R. C. L. 937, § 14; 28 C. J. 637, § 26. ( d) Accordingly, an instrument such as is here sued on, which is not a mere unconditional promise to pay a certain sum at a definite date, but which by its terms creates and establishes a gratuity payable in futuro, and which obligates the promisor, her "estate, heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns," as was formerly stated in common-law bonds (1 Cooley's Blackstone, 4th ed., 705, 677), to pay the gratuity as thus created in specified amounts at times provided, and which obligation is executed under seal, recites delivery and acceptance by the promisee, can not be construed as a mere sealed promissory note, but measures up to the standard and contains all of the earmarks and requirements of a common-law bond or like instrument recognized at common law as a specialty, and creating a gift payable in futuro.