Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1990 (RMU), Document Nos. 5, 11.
March 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING THE APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND DENYING THE APPELLEE'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
This case comes before the court on the appellee's motions to dismiss and to strike and dismiss. The pro se appellants are individuals seeking to appeal an adverse ruling from The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia ("Bankruptcy Court"). From the outset, this case has had a tangled history due to the appellants numerous filings and errors in assigning the motions.
On September 5, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court issued its final order denying the appellants' motion for reconsideration of its July 17, 2003 order validating the foreclosure of the appellant's property. On September 15, 2003, the appellants filed a notice of appeal with the Bankruptcy Court. The notice of appeal was subsequently docketed with the Clerk of the District Court on September 25, 2003. Federal Bankruptcy Rule 8009(a)(1) provides that an appellant must serve and file his brief in support of appeal within 15 days of entry of the appeal in the District Court. The same day the appeal was docketed, the appellants filed an "Emergency Motion for an Interim and Permanent Stay of the Bankruptcy Court's September 5, 2003 Final Order." The motion was erroneously assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, and was subsequently again erroneously reassigned to Judge Reggie Walton. Finally, on October 2, 2003, the motion was properly assigned to Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson. On October 9, 2003, Judge Jackson held a status conference to address the appellants' pending motion. At the status conference, Judge Jackson denied the appellants' motion for a stay. Although the appellants asked for a briefing schedule, one was not provided at the status conference. In addition, the appellants also state that they were never provided written notice that their notice of appeal was actually docketed with the Clerk of the District Court on September 25, 2003. Ultimately, the appellants filed their brief on April 7, 2004. In response, the appellee filed motions to dismiss the appeal and to strike the appellants brief. The case was subsequently reassigned to this member of the court. The court now turns to those motions.
II. ANALYSIS
As noted, under the Federal Bankruptcy Rules, an appellant must file a brief in support of his appeal within 15 days after entry of the appeal on the District Court's docket. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 8009(a)(1). Federal Bankruptcy Rule 8001 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 8009-1 authorize district courts to dismiss bankruptcy appeals if an appellant fails to file a brief on time. The English-Speaking Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit has noted that on one hand, "our judicial system reflects a strong presumption in favor of adjudication on the merits." Id. at 1021 (internal quotation omitted). But, on the other hand, "district courts need powerful tools to manage their dockets, prevent undue delay, and sanction those who abuse the system." Id. The D.C. Circuit further instructs that in the context of dismissals of bankruptcy appeals for non-jurisdictional procedural violations, the district court has the power to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution, but must consider the circumstances and explain why its is in the interest of justice to dismiss rather than proceed to the merits. Id. at 1021-22.
In the instant case, the court concludes that the interest of justice is better served by allowing the case to proceed on the merits. First, the court notes that the appellants are proceeding pro se. While a pro se party does not have license to ignore rules, a court may exercise some lenity in overlooking occasional procedural mistakes. Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Moreover, a district court generally should provide notice of a potential dismissal and provide the errant party an opportunity to explain its conduct. English-Speaking Union, 353 F.3d at 1022. While the appellee argues that, at a minimum, the appellants were on notice that their appeal had been docketed as of the October 9, 2003 status hearing, the court did not explicitly provide a briefing schedule at that time. There is no indication that the appellants have proceeded in bad faith, nor has there been a "pattern of negligent or wilful disregard of court orders." Id. Rather, the delay appears to stem from confusion generated from the erroneous assignment of this case to various members of this court and the apparent failure of the appellants to receive written notice of the actual date that the notice of appeal was docketed.
Accordingly, it is this 22nd day of March, 2005
ORDERED that the appellee's motions to dismiss and to strike are DENIED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the appellee shall file its brief by April 25, 2005; and it is ORDERED that the appellant may file a reply brief by May 9, 2005.
SO ORDERED.