Opinion
Case No. CIV-20-197-F
03-11-2020
DWIGHT L. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action is brought by Plaintiff, Dwight L. Allen, a Georgia state prisoner appearing pro se. See generally Doc. No. 1 ("Comp."). The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having reviewed the sufficiency of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the undersigned finds the case should be dismissed without prejudice based upon the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. Background Information
Plaintiff contends that he is a descendant of grandparents who were enslaved by the Chickasaw Indian Nation. Comp. at 1-2. Plaintiff asserts the United States breached obligations under the 1866 Treaty between the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations and the United States by failing to remove enslaved people from the Chickasaw Nation and provide them with allotted land and money. Id. at 2-5. Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief to "force all parties involved in this civil action to the negotiation table for a real conversation pertaining to the outstanding violations of the terms and conditions of the above-stated treaty's [sic] between the Federal Government and the Chickasaw Indian Nation pertaining to the rights, the removal, money and land allotments for the ex-slaves/freedmen." Id. at 5. He further indicates the ex-slaves/freedmen would prefer that land allotted by the federal government be recognized as a free foriegn state, known as "Free Town." Id. at 6. Finally, Plaintiff is also seeking "[a]ccountability" to the living descendants of the freedmen. Id.
Plaintiff previously brought a similar action in this Court, see Allen v. The Chickasaw Indian Nation, et. al., Case No. CIV-19-958-F. In said case, he asserted similar claims as asserted herein, however, the case was dismissed because Plaintiff failed to articulate the specific treaty, or treaties, upon which he relied in arguing that the federal government had violated treaty obligations. Order, Allen v. The Chickasaw Indian Nation, Case No. CIV-19-958 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2019), Doc. No. 8. In his current Complaint, Plaintiff cures this deficiency by relying primarily upon the 1866 Treaty between the Chickasaw Nation and the United States to assert his claims. See generally Comp. As explained below, however, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising out of the 1866 Treaty.
II. Screening of Prisoner Complaints
A federal district court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). After conducting an initial review, the court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it presenting claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In so doing, the reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), "[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to frame a 'complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The allegations in a complaint must present "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, a claim is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact" or is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).
III. Analysis
Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter that a court must determine at the outset of a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., 484 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). The parties or the court may sua sponte challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so. Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994). Further, the party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction sustains the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction is proper. Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas System, Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
In the present matter, Plaintiff explains that he is a descendant of great-great-great grandparents who were unlawfully enslaved by the Chickasaw Indian Nation. Comp. at 1-2. He relies primarily on the 1866 Treaty between the United States and the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations to argue the United States breached its treaty obligations with regard to the Chickasaw Nation's enslaved individuals. Id. at 2-5. Plaintiff asserts that land and money should have been allotted to his ancestors by the federal government in accordance with the 1866 Treaty. Id.
Determining the court that enjoys subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims requires extensive discussion regarding the treaties implicated by Plaintiff's claims. In United States v. Choctaw Nation and Chickasaw Nation, 193 U.S. 115 (1904) ("Chickasaw Freedmen") and Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, et. al., 318 U.S. 423 (1943), the Supreme Court essentially ruled on the claims Plaintiff attempts to set forth herein. In doing so, the Court discussed in detail the history and interaction of multiple treaties and agreements between the United States and the Chickasaw Nation, including an agreement that the Federal Claims Court would have subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising from the same. Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. at 121. The agreement regarding the Federal Claims Court's jurisdiction was later codified into federal law. See 43 Stat. 537 ("Conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, examine, adjudicate, and enter judgment in any claims which the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians may have against the United States, and for other purposes.").
As explained by the Supreme Court, at the time of the Civil War, "the Chickasaws and the Choctaws were slave-owning tribes holding their lands in common, their respective interests being one-fourth and three-fourths" and each fought on the side of the Confederacy. Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 424. In 1866, a treaty was agreed upon between the United States and both Nations, that provided, inter alia, "The Choctaws and Chickasaws hereby covenant and agree that henceforth neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, other than in punishment of crime . . . shall ever exist in said nations." Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. at 117. It also provided for a "fund of $300,000 which was to be held in trust for the two nations and paid to them (one-fourth to the Chickasaws and three-fourths to the Choctaws) when they conferred tribal rights and privileges upon their former African slaves and gave them each forty acres of the common lands. If such laws were not adopted within two years, the fund was to be held for the benefit of those former slaves whom the United States should remove from the territory, instead of for the two nations." Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 424-25. By 1882, the Indian Nations had not conferred rights upon their slaves, although the Chickasaws "took an abortive step in that direction in 1873," and the United States had not removed the freedmen. Id. at 425; Choctaw Nation, 193 U.S. at 117-19.
"In 1883[,] the Choctaws adopted their freedmen and declared them each entitled to forty acres of the nation's lands, but no allotments were actually made. Congress thereupon appropriated for the Choctaws their share of the balance of the $300,000 fund." Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 425 (footnote omitted).
Several years of legal disputes and subsequent related agreements between the parties followed. Casey-El v. U.S., No. 91-5076, 1991 WL 263714, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 425-28; Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. at 117-23. Significant to the present case, in 1902, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations entered into another agreement providing for "the allotment of land to each member of the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes of 320 acres, and to each freedman land equal in value to 40 acres of the average allottable land of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations." Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. at 121 (quotations omitted). The agreement further provided:
. . . Authority is hereby conferred upon the court of claims to determine the existing controversy respecting the relations of the Chickasaw freedmen to the Chickasaw Nation and the rights of such freedmen in the lands of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations under the third article of the treaty of eighteen hundred and sixty-six between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations and under any and all laws subsequently enacted by the Chickasaw legislature or by Congress.Id. As previously referenced, this provision was later codified in the Jurisdictional Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 537, and remains in effect today.
The Jurisdictional Act "[c]onfers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, examine, adjudicate, and enter judgment in any claims which the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians may have against the United States, and for other purposes." 43 Stat. 537. Each of the three lawsuits arising out of the 1866 Treaty, including two filed after 1924, were initially filed in the Federal Claims Court. See Casey-El, Choctaw Nation, and Chickasaw Freedmen, supra. Further, in Choctaw Nation, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the lawsuit, which was on appeal from the Federal Claims Court, was filed under the Jurisdictional Act of 1924. Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 423 (citing 43 Stat. 537).
It is clear from the 1902 agreement between the Chickasaw Nation and the United States, as well as the Jurisdictional Act of 1924, that subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims based upon the 1866 Treaty is enjoyed by the Federal Claims Court, rather than this Court. Thus, this Court must either dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, "if it is in the interest of justice," transfer it to the Federal Claims Court for consideration. 28 U.S.C. § 1631; Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006).
The undersigned concludes that it is not in the interest of justice to transfer this matter. Plaintiff's claims have previously been adjudicated in cases initially filed in the Federal Claims Court and eventually resolved by the Supreme Court. In Casey-El, the plaintiff sought land and money under the terms of the 1866 Treaty as a descendant of Chickasaw freedmen. Casey-El, 1991 WL 263714, at *1. The court ruled the plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata because the Supreme Court had previously ruled said descendants were not entitled to either land or money under the 1866 Treaty. Id. at *2.
Neither the Chickasaw tribe nor the United States satisfied the 1866 Treaty. After several decades of legal dispute, the Supreme Court considered the 1866 Treaty and the rights of the freedmen and tribes. The Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. 115 (1904). The Court held that the Chickasaw tribe had not adopted the freedmen. Id. at 126. The freedmen, therefore, did not qualify for the 1866 Treaty benefits. However, the Court determined the United States owed the Chickasaw freedmen and their descendants 40 acres of land. The Government,
therefore, prepared a final roll of eligible freedmen.Id. at *1-2.
Casey-El seeks land and money under the terms of the 1866 Treaty. The Supreme Court, however, rejected those claims. The 1866 Treaty promised benefits to these freedmen adopted into the tribe. Specifically, adopted freedmen would get either land and political rights within the Chickasaw-Choctaws territory or $100 if they relocated. The Supreme Court, however, determined that "the freedmen were not adopted into the Chickasaw tribe and necessarily did not acquire the rights dependent upon adoption." Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. at 126.
Moreover Casey-El cannot claim a share of the $300,000 trust fund. The Supreme Court clarified that the Treaty only provided freedmen a share in the fund if the United States removed them from the tribes' territory. Id. at 127. In the words of the Supreme Court, "Congress did not choose and has not chosen to remove them." Id. Therefore, the freedmen did not qualify for a share of the tribes' trust fund.
The doctrine of res judicata bars Casey-El from relitigating these claims to land or money under the 1866 Treaty. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). The Supreme Court adjudicated the rights of Chickasaw Freedmen as a class. Casey-El's ancestors were bound by the results of the Supreme Court case. Casey-El stands in the position of his ancestor. Therefore, the Claims Court properly dismissed Casey-El's claim.
Based on the same reasoning set forth in the Casey-El decision, the undersigned finds that transferring this case to the Federal Claims Court does not serve the interests of justice. As the Federal Claims Court has previously concluded, and as affirmed by the Federal Circuit, Plaintiff's claims have already been adjudicated by the Supreme Court and are thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. Accordingly, this matter should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended Plaintiff's action be dismissed without prejudice based on this Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by March 30th , 2020, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.").
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2020.
/s/_________
GARY M. PURCELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE