Opinion
D071732
11-30-2017
LINDA ALLEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRI-CITY HEALTHCARE DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Steiner and Libo, Neil S. Steiner and Jason D. Carter for Plaintiff and Appellant. Dummit, Buchholz & Trapp, Scott D. Buchholz, Joshua S. Dixon, Frederick C. Bingham for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2016-00009841-CU-PO-NC) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Earl H. Maas, III, Judge. Affirmed. Steiner and Libo, Neil S. Steiner and Jason D. Carter for Plaintiff and Appellant. Dummit, Buchholz & Trapp, Scott D. Buchholz, Joshua S. Dixon, Frederick C. Bingham for Defendant and Respondent.
Linda Allen sued the Tri-City Medical Center (Medical Center) for negligence and premises liability for injuries she sustained after she tripped and fell near the hospital cafeteria. Tri-City Hospital District (the District), moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was a public entity that owned the Medical Center, and Allen had failed to properly present a claim under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq., or (the Act)), as was required to maintain her lawsuit. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for the District.
Further references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.
On appeal, Allen argues the court abused its discretion in overruling her evidentiary objections. She claims there are triable issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To the contrary, however, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Allen did not comply with the express claim presentation requirements of section 915. She did not mail her claim to the District's secretary, clerk, auditor, or governing board, and none of those individuals or entities actually received her claim. (§ 915, subds. (a)(2) & (e)(1).) Under DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983 (DiCampli), this is fatal to her lawsuit, and summary judgment was proper.
Section 915, subdivision (a) provides: "A claim, any amendment thereto, or an application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim shall be presented to a local public entity by either of the following means: [¶] (1) Delivering it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof. [¶] (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to the governing body at its principal office."
Subdivision (e)(1) provides: "A claim, amendment or application shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided in this section if, within the time prescribed for presentation thereof, any of the following apply: [¶] (1) It is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor, or board of the local public entity."
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2014, Linda Allen tripped and fell near the Medical Center cafeteria "when her foot got caught due to the resistance or drag of the floor." Her counsel mailed a claim letter on her behalf in August 2015 (the claim letter). The claim letter was addressed to the Risk Management Department of the District. It described the date and location of the injury and asked that the matter be referred to the District's insurance carrier. It did not request that it be forwarded to the District's secretary, clerk, or governing board.
The District's Risk Management Department received the letter three days later but did not respond.
In March 2016, Allen sued the Medical Center for negligence and premises liability based on injuries sustained during her fall. The District moved for summary judgment on the basis that Allen did not properly present her claim under section 915, which based on DiCampli precluded her lawsuit.
In its answer and summary judgment motion, the District asserted it was "erroneously sued as Tri-City Medical Center," but the trial court apparently treated the mistake as a harmless misnomer.
The trial court agreed, overruled Allen's evidentiary objections, and granted the District's motion.
DISCUSSION
Allen challenges the overruling of her evidentiary objections and the court's decision to grant summary judgment in the District's favor. She claims there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the District owned the Medical Center and whether the District's governing board, secretary, or clerk actually received Allen's claim letter. She also argues that the District waived or is estopped from asserting defenses based on Allen's noncompliance with the Act's claims presentation requirements. As we explain, DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th 983 leads us to conclude that summary judgment was proper.
1. Standard of review
The purpose of summary judgment is to "cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The moving party bears the initial burden to show that there is no triable issue of material fact. (Id. at p. 850.) If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of fact exists. (Id. at pp. 850-851.) Summary judgment is properly granted if the record demonstrates that there is no triable issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).)
Although the trial court does not "try" the case or weigh the evidence, it does consider the competency of evidence presented. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 856; Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 525-526.) A party "cannot avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact." (LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 981.)
"The same rules of evidence that apply at trial also apply to the declarations submitted in support of and in opposition to motions for summary judgment. Declarations must show the declarant's personal knowledge and competency to testify, state facts and not just conclusions, and not include inadmissible hearsay or opinion." (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (Park v. First American Title Co. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1427.) The party challenging an evidentiary ruling bears the burden of establishing that the court exceeded the bounds of reason. (DiCola v. White Bros. Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 679.)
We apply independent review to the grant of summary judgment, "considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the trial court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports." (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) We apply a three-step analysis to "(1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175.)
2. Any error in overruling Allen's evidentiary objections was harmless
The District submitted six exhibits in support of its motion for summary judgment: (1) Allen's complaint; (2) a declaration of the District's Director of Risk Management, Marcia Cavanaugh; (3) the District's Secretary of State filings, authenticated in Cavanaugh's declaration; (4) Allen's claim letter, authenticated in Cavanaugh's declaration; (5) a declaration of the former Chairman/President of the District's governing board, Larry Schallock; and (6) Allen's responses to the District's interrogatory requests (to show the date she became aware of her claim).
These six exhibits were attached to a "notice of lodgment" filed in support of the motion for summary judgment. The District's attorney, Joshua Dixon, filed a separate declaration stating that the exhibits were "acquired in the ordinary course of business" by his law firm for the litigation.
Allen made several objections to the Dixon, Marcia Cavanaugh, and Larry Schallock declarations, and she challenges the overruling of those objections on appeal. As we explain, the trial court properly overruled all but one of Allen's objections, and any error in not overruling that one objection was harmless.
Allen objected to Dixon's declaration on the basis that he lacked the personal knowledge to authenticate the six exhibits referenced in his attorney declaration. Dixon stated in his declaration that he was "readily familiar with [his] law firm's manner of acquisition, production, and keeping of records" for litigation and that the exhibits were maintained for that purpose. He therefore had personal knowledge to testify that the exhibits were true and correct copies of documents maintained by his firm for purposes of litigation, which is all he purported to do. The trial court reasonably overruled the objections to Dixon's declaration.
Moreover, Dixon only needed to authenticate the complaint and interrogatory responses. The remaining exhibits were signed declarations or documents that were authenticated by Cavanaugh.
Allen's objections to the Schallock declaration were tenuous at best. She claimed Schallock lacked the personal knowledge to testify that: (1) as Chairman/President of the District's governing board, he oversaw the board's day-to-day activities, including its receipt of claims under the Act; (2) the District's board did not receive or actually possess Allen's claim letter; and (3) no other department or individual at the District other than the board or the secretary/clerk was empowered to accept claims under the Act. Such matters were plainly within Schallock's personal knowledge as the head of the District's governing board. Contrary to Allen's argument, none of these statements was a legal conclusion. The trial court reasonably determined that Schallock could "properly testify as to his authority and duties and receipt by the Board of communications and claims."
Allen also objected to Schallock's statement that he "was empowered by the Governing Board and the District's Secretary/Clerk to speak on their behalf on matters involving [the District]," stating that this was a legal conclusion, "hearsay by implication," and "vague to the point of having no evidentiary value, self-serving, and irrelevant." The trial court reasonably rejected those contentions. Schallock was simply setting forth the scope of his authority as chair of the board. His statement fell squarely within his personal knowledge and was not a legal conclusion. (Evid. Code, § 702.) It was not hearsay, as there was no out-of-court statement offered for its truth. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Nor was it devoid of evidentiary value (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352); the statement laid foundation for Shallock's subsequent statement that the District's board and its secretary/clerk had not received Allen's claim.
As to the Cavanaugh declaration, Allen objected that Cavanaugh lacked the personal knowledge to testify that: (1) at all relevant times, the District was a local public hospital district that owns and operates the Medical Center; (2) the website www.tricitymed.org discloses the District's public entity status and includes its Secretary of State filings; (3) only the District's board and secretary/clerk, not the Risk Management Department, are empowered to accept claims under the Act; and (4) the District's board and secretary/clerk had not actually received any claims under the Act.
The trial court reasonably concluded that Cavanaugh could competently testify about her job duties, who could receive tort claims, her receipt or nonreceipt of any claim, and the District's status as a public entity. Cavanaugh laid a sufficient foundation for such testimony by stating:
"In my capacity as Director of Risk Management, I oversee and manage the hospital Risk Management Department. I am tasked by [the District] to interface with [the District's] Governing Board and its Secretary/Clerk regarding service of legal process on the hospital, including service of government claims and summons/ complaints. [The District's] Governing Board and its Secretary/Clerk inform me when they have received a Government Claim or a [Code of Civil Procedure section] 364 notice of intent to commence litigation that are delivered or served to the Governing Board in accordance with California Government Code section 915. I also help ensure and maintain [the District's] status as a local public healthcare district in the County of San Diego, California."Cavanaugh's statements were not "unfounded inadmissible lay opinion and legal conclusion" (Evid. Code, § 702) and instead rested on her personal knowledge.
The trial court reasonably rejected Allen's claim that Cavanaugh could not testify about the District's ownership of the Medical Center without producing a deed. Allen relies on Evidence Code section 412, which provides that "[i]f weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust." However, as the District notes, Cavanaugh was not testifying to the contents of a deed or operating agreement. She was instead providing direct evidence based on her personal knowledge as Director of Risk Management about the relationship between the District and the Medical Center. This was sufficient proof of ownership. (Evid. Code, § 411 ["Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact."].)
We take issue with only one evidentiary ruling—that Cavanaugh was competent to testify about the contents of the website www.tricitymed.org. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (d) requires declarations to affirmatively show that the declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated. "The requirement of this section is not that the declarant recite the conclusion that he can competently testify but that he allege facts showing his competence." (Roy Brothers Drilling Co. v. Jones (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 175, 182.) Cavanaugh did not authenticate screen shots of the webpage, and there were no statements in her declaration suggesting that she maintained, updated, or reviewed the website in her role as Director of Risk Management. Cavanaugh's general statement that she had personal knowledge of the facts in her declaration was insufficient. Where the facts in a declaration do not themselves reveal a basis for personal knowledge, a bare assertion to that effect "has no redeeming value and should be ignored." (Snider v. Snider (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 754.) The court erred in overruling the objection to statements about the website.
Nevertheless, Allen has not met her burden to show prejudice. (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 119.) As we discuss in the following section, whether Allen had notice of where to present her claim was irrelevant to whether she complied with the express claim presentation requirements of section 915. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 983, 988, 991-993.) Her failure to present her claim to the proper recipients under the Act is fatal to her lawsuit. (Ibid.)
In short, the trial court properly overruled all but one of Allen's evidentiary objections. The one objection that should have been sustained did not affect the outcome for reasons that we explain below.
3. Summary judgment was proper
The District offered competent evidence showing that it is a public entity that owns the Medical Center, and that Allen did not present her claim to the correct recipients under section 915. Based on this evidence, there is no triable issue of material fact and summary judgment was proper. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 991-992.)
a. Overview of the Government Claims Act
Lawsuits for money or damages against public entities, including local public entities like the District, fall under the scope of the Act. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 989.) Except in situations not applicable here, "all claims for money or damages against local public entities" must be presented in accordance with the Act's procedural requirements. (§ 905; DiCampli, at p. 990.) The Act seeks to "eliminate confusion and uncertainty," "confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances," and give the public entity sufficient information to adequately investigate and settle claims. (DiCampli, at pp. 990-991.)
A local public entity is "a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State" that does not include the State. (§ 900.4.) The District offered evidence that at all relevant times, it "was and is a local public hospital district."
A litigant must present a written claim to the public entity as a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit for money or damages. (§ 945.4.) Presentation of a claim " 'is therefore an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.' " (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 990.) "Even if the public entity has actual knowledge of facts that might support a claim, the claims statutes must still be satisfied." (Ibid.)
A "claim" does not require the same specificity as a pleading. (Stockett v. Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 447.) It merely requires (1) "[t]he date, place and other circumstance" of the injury, (2) a "general description" of the loss, (3) names of those responsible (if known), (4) if the loss exceeds $10,000, whether the action would be a limited civil case, and (5) a signature. (§§ 910, subds. (c)-(f), 910.2.)
Once it receives a presented claim, a local public entity's board has 20 days to give written notice of any defects or omissions in the claim. (§ 910.8.) "Any defense as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission in the claim as presented is waived by failure to give notice of insufficiency with respect to the defect or omission as provided in Section 910.8." (§ 911.)
"Claims for personal injury and property damage must be presented within six months after accrual; all other claims must be presented within a year." (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738; see § 911.2, subd. (a).)
"Code of Civil Procedure section 364 requires that a plaintiff give notice of an intent to sue to a health care provider 90 days before filing a negligence action." (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 987.) This mandate is separate from claims requirements under the Act. (Id. at p. 987, fn. 2.)
There are two ways to present a late claim. The first is to simply present the late claim without making an application for leave. (§ 911.3, subd. (a).) The public entity's board or its designee must give written notice within 45 days that the claim was untimely or it waives the limitations defense. (§ 911.3, subds. (a)-(b).)
The second method is to file a written application for leave to present a late claim with the public entity within one year from the date that the injury accrues. (§ 911.4, subds. (a)-(b).) If the board takes no action, the application is deemed denied in 45 days. (§ 911.6, subd. (c).) A plaintiff then has six months to petition the superior court for an order relieving her from the bar of section 945.4. (§ 946.6, subds. (a)-(b).)
Section 915 sets forth the exclusive means to present a claim. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 992-993.) A claim must be presented to a local public entity in one of two ways: (1) delivering the claim to the clerk, secretary, or auditor of the local public entity, or (2) mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to the governing body at its principal office. (§ 915, subd, (a).) Alternatively, "actual receipt of the misdirected claim" by the "clerk, secretary, auditor, or board of the local public entity" satisfies the claims presentation requirement. (DiCampli, at p. 992; § 915, subd. (e)(1).)
"The claimant bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the appropriate public entity." (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 991.) Summary judgment to the public entity is proper if a plaintiff fails to timely present a claim to the proper recipients under section 915. (Id. at pp. 991-993.)
b. Summary judgment was proper because Allen did not present her claim in accordance with the express presentation requirements of section 915
Allen was injured on October 13, 2014. Ten months later, her attorney sent a letter that largely complied with the requirements for a claim, setting forth the date and location of the injury, a general description of the claim, and a signature. (§§ 910, 910.2.) It did not indicate if damages exceeded $10,000 or if the action would be a limited civil case. (Cf. § 910, subd. (f).) However, the District did not give written notice of any defects, waiving its defenses as to the contents of the claim. (§§ 910.8, 911.)
Allen's claim accrued on the date of her injury; the District offered as evidence her discovery response that she became aware of the basis of her complaint at the time of her injury, when she noticed that the "flooring appeared to be lesser quality than those elsewhere at [the Medical Center]." Thus, her claim for personal injury was presented four months late. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) It is undisputed that Allen did not file anything labeled as an application for leave to present a late claim. (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) Nevertheless, her attorney's letter could be construed as a late claim under section 911.3, to which the District waived its limitations defense by failing to respond within 45 days. (§ 911.3, subd. (b).)
The insurmountable hurdle for Allen is that she presented her claim to the wrong recipient. Her attorney sent a claim letter to the "Risk Management Department" at "Tri-City Healthcare District." There is no evidence showing that Allen mailed or delivered a claim to the District's clerk, secretary, auditor, or governing board under section 915, subdivision (a). Nor is there any evidence that those designees actually received a claim to satisfy section 915, subdivision (e)(1). Under DiCampli, summary judgment was proper because Allen did not strictly comply with section 915 in presenting her claim.
In DiCampli, our Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff could maintain her medical malpractice lawsuit against a county-owned hospital when she presented her claim to the wrong recipient. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 991.) The facts closely parallel this case. Instead of presenting her claim to the clerk, secretary, or auditor of the county, or to the county's governing board, the plaintiff mailed her claim letter to the risk management department. (Id. at p. 988 & fn. 4.) Her claim was never actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor, or board. (Id. at p. 991.) Applying the plain language of section 915, subdivisions (a) and (e)(1), the court held that the plaintiff failed to meet the Act's express presentation requirements, making summary judgment proper. (DiCampli, at pp. 989, 991-992.)
In trying to distinguish DiCampli, Allen argues that the plaintiff in that medical malpractice case only presented her claim to the risk management department of the treating hospital, rather than the risk management department of the county that owned the hospital. This is a distinction without a difference. The DiCampli plaintiff indeed addressed her letter to the risk management department of the treating hospital, but her letter was actually received by the risk management department of the county. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 987-988 & fn. 4.) Ultimately, what mattered was not which risk management department received it, but that it was not mailed to or received by the county's secretary, clerk, auditor, or board. (Id. at pp. 991-993.)
As DiCampli explains, section 915, subdivision (a) "reflects the Legislature's intent to precisely identify those who may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity." (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 992.) Under section 915, subdivision (e)(1), "a misdirected claim will satisfy the presentation requirement if the claim is 'actually received' by a statutorily designated recipient." (DiCampli, at p. 992.) "If an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute." (Ibid.) Actual receipt satisfies the goals of the claims statutes, which are "to provide entities with sufficient information to investigate and appropriately resolve claims and to plan for potential liabilities." (Id. at p. 994.)
DiCampli cautions that it remains within the Legislature's purview to determine who must receive the claim. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 994.) A court of appeal "cannot override that determination simply because it concludes receipt by others should be considered sufficient." (Ibid.)
Allen's counsel addressed and mailed the claim letter to the District's "Risk Management Department." Because the District is a local public entity that owns the Medical Center, Allen was required to comply with the express presentation requirements of section 915. As the District's Risk Management Department director, Cavanaugh was not authorized to receive claim letters; only the District's governing board and its secretary/clerk were. Larry Schallock was the chair of the governing board. Depending on the period, the secretary/clerk was Julianne Nygaard or Ramona Finnila; there was no auditor. The District offered competent evidence showing that none of those individuals or the governing board actually received Allen's claim letter.
Accordingly, the District met its burden on summary judgment to establish that there was no triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.) Allen's claim letter was never delivered to the District's "clerk, secretary, or auditor" nor mailed to the "clerk, secretary, auditor, or to the governing body." (§ 915, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) Her misdirected claim to the Risk Management Department was not "actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor, or board." (§ 915, subd. (e)(1).) Allen's failure to properly present a claim is fatal to her lawsuit. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 991-992; § 945.4.)
With the burden shifted to her, Allen did not respond with other evidence that created a triable issue of material fact. Claiming a triable issue as to the District's relationship with the Medical Center, Allen pointed to a medical bill that named "Tri-City Medical Center" in the header. However, this bill did not create a triable issue as to whether the District owned the Medical Center or contradict Cavanaugh's statement that it did.
Indeed, Allen's own submission contradicted her argument that the District might not have owned the Medical Center. Allen requested judicial notice of Secretary of State records and Westlaw business profile records for various Tri-City entities. Only one of these records, Exhibit 7, pertained to the Medical Center. That document listed the District as the "Legal/Ultimate Parent" of the Medical Center and indicated that the Medical Center was a "Government Entity." Allen argues the District did not offer any admissible evidence showing it was "one and the same" as the Medical Center. But the District never claimed it was "the same" as the Medical Center. Instead, it introduced sufficient competent evidence to show that it owned and operated the Medical Center, a fact Allen's own exhibit confirms.
The other Tri-City entities named in the documents were: Tri-City Medical Center Ambulatory Surgery Center Operators, LLC; Tri-City Medical Center Cardiovascular Health Institute, LLC; Tri-City Medical Center Orthopedic Institute, LLC; Tri-City Real Estate Holding and Management Company, LLC; Tri-City Wellness, LLC; and Tri-City Hospital Foundation. Allen suggests, without any support, that each of these businesses is somehow involved in the ownership of the Medical Center. We need not dwell on this unsupported statement (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)) and simply note that Exhibit 7 lists only the District as the Medical Center's "Legal/Ultimate Parent."
Next, Allen claimed there was a triable issue as to whether the proper designees actually received her claim letter, so as to satisfy section 915, subdivision (e)(1). She pointed to Cavanaugh's statement that her role as Risk Management Director was "to interface with [the District's] Governing Board and its Secretary/Clerk" regarding claims under the Act. Allen contends that because Cavanaugh served as a go-between, there remained a factual dispute as to whether the proper recipients actually received her claim. The contention lacks merit given the unrebutted evidence in the Cavanaugh and Schallock declarations that the proper recipients did not actually receive the claim.
For the first time on appeal, Allen argues that a change in verb tense in Cavanaugh's declaration somehow creates a triable issue as to when the District owned the Medical Center. Her argument is flimsy at best. Cavanaugh stated, "[a]t all relevant times, [the District] was and is a local public hospital district" that "owns and operates" the Medical Center. Her declaration cannot reasonably be read to create a factual dispute as to whether the District owned the Medical Center when Allen sent her claim letter.
Finally, Allen tries to make an argument that DiCampli expressly rejects. She contends that her counsel's letter placed the District "on notice of the claim" and states it "defies logic as to how the claim letter would have provided better notice . . . if it had been addressed to 'secretary' or 'clerk', Tri-City Healthcare District." But DiCampli rejected the notion that "actual receipt of notice by a proper recipient" could satisfy the express presentation requirements of section 915. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 991-993.) The question is not notice but whether there was "actual receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the designated recipients." (Id. at p. 992, italics added.) We may not override the express presentation requirements of section 915 by determining that "receipt by others should be considered sufficient." (DiCampli, at p. 994.)
In short, Allen did not offer sufficient competent evidence to create a triable issue of material fact, and summary judgment was proper.
c. Waiver does not apply
As she did before the trial court, Allen argues that the District waived its defenses under the Act when it "intentionally refused to respond in writing to [her] August 7, 2015 claim letter." The trial court properly rejected her waiver argument.
A public entity waives defenses as to the "sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission in the claim as presented" if it fails to provide written notice of defects or omissions within a claim in 20 days. (§§ 910.8, 911.) It also waives the untimeliness defense if, after a later claim is presented without application for leave, the public entity does not give written notice in 45 days that the claim was untimely and is being returned without further action. (§ 911.3.) Allen cites these statutes to claim that the District waived its defense as to her noncompliance with the Act.
We adhere to the plain language of the claims statutes in determining their scope. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 992-993.) By their plain language, sections 911 and 911.3 state that a public entity waives a defense as to the "sufficiency of the claim . . . as presented" or "the time limit for presenting a claim . . . after the claim is presented" (§§ 911; 911.3, subd. (b).) The trial court was correct that waiver pursuant to those sections "arises only where a claim is properly presented."
Allen's main problem is not that her claim was defective (e.g., because it omitted necessary information under sections 910 and 910.2) or that it was untimely. The fatal defect in Alan's claim is that it was not presented to the correct recipients, and those recipients did not actually receive her claim. (§ 915, subds. (a) & (e)(1).) There is no comparable waiver provision to that found in sections 911 and 911.3 for the presentation requirements. That makes sense given section 915's purpose to expressly delineate who must receive a claim and eliminate confusion arising from misdirected claims. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 997.) The trial court correctly determined that the District did not waive its defense that Allen failed to properly present her claim.
The authorities Allen cites are not on point. In Phillips v. Desert Hospital District (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, the Supreme Court held that a presented claim that does not substantially comply with section 910 may nonetheless qualify as a " 'claim as presented' . . . if it discloses the existence of a 'claim' which, if not satisfactorily resolved, will result in a lawsuit against the entity." (Phillips, at p. 709.) The remaining cases rely on Phillips to address whether a letter qualified as a "claim as presented." (See Alliance Financial v. City and County of San Francisco (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 635, 649 [letter requesting payment for services to avoid litigation qualified as a "claim as presented"]; Green v. State Center Community College District (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1358-1359 [letter that merely stated that plaintiff had retained counsel did not qualify as a "claim as presented"].) These cases address whether the contents or form of a claim was adequate to be deemed as a claim, not whether a misdirected claim might suffice.
As DiCampli makes clear, Allen's noncompliance with the express presentation requirements of section 915 is fatal to her lawsuit. DiCampli rejected the very argument Allen makes, that a plaintiff may substantially comply with section 915 if she presents a claim letter to someone other than the designated recipients. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 989, 994, 996.)
d. Estoppel does not apply
Allen contends that the District acted in an "intentionally obtuse" manner and "concealed that it was a public entity." She argues these actions estop it from asserting any defenses as to her noncompliance with Act. Alternatively, she argues there is a triable issue as to whether estoppel applies.
The trial court rejected Allen's estoppel argument. It found that District employees' alleged failure to advise Allen of the entity's legal status did not constitute the requisite affirmative act under John R. v. Oakland Unified School District (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438 (John R.) for equitable estoppel to apply. We agree that estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
In John R., equitable estoppel prevented the public school district from asserting a limitations defense under the Act, where a teacher threatened to retaliate against the student if he reported the sexual abuse. (48 Cal.3d at p. 445.) The court stated, "[i]t is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act." (Ibid.)
Allen cites three factual bases for estoppel. First, the letterhead on her medical bills stated "Tri-City Medical Center" and did not identify the District. Second, the Medical Center did not identify itself as a public entity, provide Allen with a claim form, or instruct her where to present her claim. Third, the District engaged in efforts to conceal its legal status and mislead her.
Allen's estoppel claim relies on the following evidence. In her own declaration, Allen authenticated her medical bill and stated, "I was unaware and received no information from anyone at Tri-City Medical Center disclosing, stating, indicating, implying or otherwise from which I was made aware that TriCity Medical Center was a public entity of any form." Allen's attorney, Neil Steiner, submitted a declaration stating that in September 2015 (after the claim letter was sent), risk management department employees represented that the Medical Center was a division of the State of California. They did not provide him with a claim form or state that the Medical Center was a local public entity. A year later, Cavanaugh left Steiner a voicemail message stating that Allen's claim against the Medical Center would have to be brought under the Government Claims Act, and that neither she nor the administration of the Medical Center could accept service. Cavanaugh did not mention the District in that voicemail message, state that the Medical Center was part of a hospital district, or identify the proper recipients of a claim against the Medical Center. Steiner presented a late claim on Allen's behalf to the State of California, but it was rejected in October 2016 with the explanation that the Medical Center was not a state entity.
The court did not rule on the District's evidentiary objections to Steiner's declaration, deeming them moot. Even if we assume for argument's sake that the evidence was admissible, it does not show estoppel.
"Estoppel requires, inter alia, a representation or concealment of material facts to a party ignorant, 'actually and permissibly,' of the truth." (Life v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 894, 902 (Life); see Shank v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 152, 158 (Shank) [" 'estoppel requires some affirmative representation or acts by the public agency or its representatives inducing reliance by the claimant' "].) As the trial court found, the District did not misrepresent or conceal material facts. Its filings with the California Secretary of State were publicly available and indicated its legal status as a public entity. That District employees did not provide more information that might have been helpful does not excuse Allen's noncompliance with section 915. (Shank, at p. 158 [no estoppel because "[t]he burden was upon plaintiff to ascertain the public status of the hospital and the consequent necessity of filing a claim; Olive View was not required to tell plaintiff to file a claim."].)
DiCampli is again instructive. In phone conversations, the head of the public entity's risk management department never told the plaintiff that her claim was untimely or that it had been presented to the wrong recipient. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 988.) Nor was the plaintiff ever informed of these facts in writing. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court nonetheless determined that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the express presentation requirements of section 915 barred her lawsuit. (DiCampli, at pp. 991-993.)
Moreover, Allen's own submissions suggest she was not ignorant of the critical fact. (Life, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 902.) Her attorney addressed and mailed the claim letter to the District's Risk Management Department, notwithstanding the letterhead on a medical bill that named only the Medical Center. She requested judicial notice of a Westlaw Business Profile record that indicated both that the District owned the Medical Center and that the Medical Center was a government entity.
The trial court properly ruled that estoppel does not apply.
Ultimately, this case falls squarely within DiCampli, which compels the conclusion that summary judgment was proper. Submitting a claim in accordance with the express presentation requirements of section 915 is a condition precedent to maintaining a lawsuit against a public entity. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 990-993.) The District offered competent evidence that it is a public entity and that the correct recipients never received her claim letter. With the burden shifted to her, Allen did not produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether she satisfied the express presentation requirements of section 915.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Tri-City Healthcare District is entitled to its costs on appeal.
DATO, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. NARES, J.