Allen v. State

45 Citing cases

  1. Birt v. State

    236 Ga. 815 (Ga. 1976)   Cited 131 times
    In Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 827, supra, this court held: "Although the state sufficiently established the taking of the money, the state was unable to show in this case from which victim the money was taken.

    The leading case interpreting and applying this Code section and the cases decided under it is West v. State, 232 Ga. 861 (2) ( 209 S.E.2d 195) (1974), which should be considered in full and which we quote in part (pp. 864, 865): "The law is settled in Georgia that the corroborating facts or circumstances must connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and that such corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 ( 111 S.E.2d 70); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253)... "When an accomplice's testimony is corroborated in material part, other uncorroborated testimony may be believed by the jury, with one important exception. Under § 38-121, testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice.

  2. Smith v. State

    218 Ga. 216 (Ga. 1962)   Cited 36 times

    " In Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 (1) ( 111 S.E.2d 70), the single complaint was the failure of the bailiffs to remain with the jury. There, the jurors were placed in at least six different rooms of a motel.

  3. Lewis v. State

    602 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    The State must corroborate the accomplice's testimony by evidence, independent of the accomplice testimony, which establishes or infers direct participation in the offense charged, and is more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 ( 111 SE2d 70) (1959). Accord Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 654-655 ( 256 SE2d 341) (1979); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565 ( 228 SE2d 741) (1976).

  4. Vaughn v. State

    228 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 9 times

    As was pointed out in Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695, 696 (3a) ( 69 S.E.2d 253), the applicable rule is that to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances, which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime charged, or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and more than sufficient merely to cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. See Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 (2) ( 111 S.E.2d 70) and cits. It is true that the testimony of another accomplice can be used to corroborate testimony of one accomplice.

  5. Gaddis v. Kemp

    638 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ga. 1986)   Cited 1 times
    In Gaddis v. Kemp, 638 F. Supp. 819, 823 (S.D.Ga. 1986), this Court applied the tests to two separate enumerations of error by a habeas corpus petitioner.

    A host of cases can be found in support of this decision. See Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455(2) ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959), and cases cited. Thus, regarding sufficiency (as opposed to admissibility) the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity and participation of the accused which tends to connect the accused with the crime or leads to the inference that he is guilty. As stated in Allen v. State, supra, the corroborating facts and circumstances must do more than merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt.

  6. Harrison v. State

    384 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. 1989)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that prosecutor properly impeached defense witness for bias by showing "criminal charges surrounding his incarceration"

    "The rule is well established that, to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances, which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt." Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 (3a) ( 69 S.E.2d 253); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 (2) ( 111 S.E.2d 70); Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 778 ( 164 S.E.2d 808).Slocum v. State, 230 Ga. 762, 764 (2) ( 199 S.E.2d 202) (1973).

  7. Castell v. State

    250 Ga. 776 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 141 times
    In Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 783, 301 S.E.2d 234, 243 (1983), the court rejected certain voir dire questions in a capital case because they "might require [jurors] to prejudge the case."

    The corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony and it must connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959). "However, the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged.

  8. Milton v. State

    248 Ga. 192 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 17 times
    In Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 196 (282 S.E.2d 90) (1981), the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he fact that a witness was jointly indicted with the defendant on trial does not of itself render such witness an accomplice.

    "The law is settled in Georgia that the corroborating facts or circumstances must connect the defendant to crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and that such corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 ( 111 S.E.2d 70); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253). . . . Under § 38-121, testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice. One who is guilty of a crime in which he participated will always be able to relate the facts of the case and if the corroboration goes only to the truth of that history, without identifying the person accused, it is really no corroboration at all.

  9. Gunter v. State

    243 Ga. 651 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 83 times
    In Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 656 (256 S.E.2d 341) (1979), we said: "In a murder prosecution, evidence of prior quarrels and difficulties between the defendant and the victim, which persist until the time of the killing, thereby shedding light upon the motive of the killing and explaining conduct, is admissible. [Cits.

    As we have recently stated in Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542 ( 250 S.E.2d 376) (1978): "The rule is well settled in this state that to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crimes or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and which are more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. Code § 38-121; Carter v. State, 237 Ga. 617 ( 229 S.E.2d 411) (1976); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 15-16 ( 222 S.E.2d 308) (1976); West v. State, 232 Ga. 861, 864 ( 209 S.E.2d 195) (1974); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253) (1952). However, the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged.

  10. Reaves v. State

    242 Ga. 542 (Ga. 1978)   Cited 60 times

    The rule is well settled in this state that to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crimes or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and which are more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. Code § 38-121; Carter v. State, 237 Ga. 617 ( 229 S.E.2d 411) (1976); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 15-16 ( 222 S.E.2d 308) (1976); West v. State, 232 Ga. 861, 864 ( 209 S.E.2d 195) (1974); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253) (1952). However, the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged.