The leading case interpreting and applying this Code section and the cases decided under it is West v. State, 232 Ga. 861 (2) ( 209 S.E.2d 195) (1974), which should be considered in full and which we quote in part (pp. 864, 865): "The law is settled in Georgia that the corroborating facts or circumstances must connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and that such corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 ( 111 S.E.2d 70); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253)... "When an accomplice's testimony is corroborated in material part, other uncorroborated testimony may be believed by the jury, with one important exception. Under § 38-121, testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice.
" In Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 (1) ( 111 S.E.2d 70), the single complaint was the failure of the bailiffs to remain with the jury. There, the jurors were placed in at least six different rooms of a motel.
The State must corroborate the accomplice's testimony by evidence, independent of the accomplice testimony, which establishes or infers direct participation in the offense charged, and is more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 ( 111 SE2d 70) (1959). Accord Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 654-655 ( 256 SE2d 341) (1979); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565 ( 228 SE2d 741) (1976).
As was pointed out in Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695, 696 (3a) ( 69 S.E.2d 253), the applicable rule is that to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances, which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime charged, or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and more than sufficient merely to cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. See Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 (2) ( 111 S.E.2d 70) and cits. It is true that the testimony of another accomplice can be used to corroborate testimony of one accomplice.
A host of cases can be found in support of this decision. See Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455(2) ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959), and cases cited. Thus, regarding sufficiency (as opposed to admissibility) the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity and participation of the accused which tends to connect the accused with the crime or leads to the inference that he is guilty. As stated in Allen v. State, supra, the corroborating facts and circumstances must do more than merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt.
"The rule is well established that, to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances, which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt." Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 (3a) ( 69 S.E.2d 253); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 (2) ( 111 S.E.2d 70); Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 778 ( 164 S.E.2d 808).Slocum v. State, 230 Ga. 762, 764 (2) ( 199 S.E.2d 202) (1973).
The corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony and it must connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959). "However, the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged.
"The law is settled in Georgia that the corroborating facts or circumstances must connect the defendant to crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and that such corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455 ( 111 S.E.2d 70); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253). . . . Under § 38-121, testimony which concerns the identity of other participants must be corroborated by some means independent of the testimony of the accomplice. One who is guilty of a crime in which he participated will always be able to relate the facts of the case and if the corroboration goes only to the truth of that history, without identifying the person accused, it is really no corroboration at all.
As we have recently stated in Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542 ( 250 S.E.2d 376) (1978): "The rule is well settled in this state that to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crimes or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and which are more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. Code § 38-121; Carter v. State, 237 Ga. 617 ( 229 S.E.2d 411) (1976); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 15-16 ( 222 S.E.2d 308) (1976); West v. State, 232 Ga. 861, 864 ( 209 S.E.2d 195) (1974); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253) (1952). However, the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged.
The rule is well settled in this state that to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crimes or lead to the inference that he is guilty, and which are more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. Code § 38-121; Carter v. State, 237 Ga. 617 ( 229 S.E.2d 411) (1976); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 15-16 ( 222 S.E.2d 308) (1976); West v. State, 232 Ga. 861, 864 ( 209 S.E.2d 195) (1974); Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 ( 111 S.E.2d 70) (1959); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 ( 69 S.E.2d 253) (1952). However, the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged.