Opinion
23A-CR-2534
11-14-2024
Thessalonica Allen, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jennifer L. Koethe Wake Forest, North Carolina ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court The Honorable Thomas J. Alevizos, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46C01-2108-MR-10
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jennifer L. Koethe Wake Forest, North Carolina
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ALTICE, CHIEF JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] Thessalonica Allen appeals her conviction for murder, a felony, claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence a copy of an ex parte protective order that involved the victim. Allen also claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction because she acted in self-defense.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] In the summer of 2021, Allen, her husband Randy, and Allen's four children,S.A., D.A., E.W., and T.A., moved to a LaPorte apartment from South Bend. During the summer, Allen would leave fifteen-year-old S.A. and fourteen-year-old D.A. at the apartment while she and Randy were at work. Allen took E.W. and T.A. to daycare during the day.
Randy was not the biological father of any of Allen's children.
[¶4] On July 27, 2021, S.A. and D.A. (collectively, the Children) were at the apartment when Allen and Randy returned home from work late that afternoon. At some point, Randy searched the computer to check the Children's homework. Randy then searched Allen's computer history and became upset because Allen had visited a website that made him believe she was "cheating on him." Transcript Vol. II at 104, 210. Randy told Allen that he was going to "pack up his stuff and leave." Id.
[¶5] The two began arguing, so the Children retreated to their bedrooms. At some point, S.A. heard Randy open a dresser drawer in the main bedroom, and she thought that Allen and Randy were "throwing stuff in the room." Id. at 183, 206. The Children then heard Randy say that he was going "to leave," and Allen respond, "you're not going anywhere." Id. at 106, 185. That exchange was followed by a "big noise" that sounded like a gun. Id. The Children then looked into the main bedroom and saw Randy lying on his stomach on the floor, bleeding from a gunshot wound. Randy was shaking, and he told the Children to call for help, stating that he "did not want to die." Id. at 111. Allen, who was holding a handgun, told the Children not to call 911. Allen then went to the kitchen and returned with a knife and pointed it at Randy.
[¶6] After Randy died, Allen wrapped his body in a blanket and closed the bedroom door. She told the Children not to go into the room and then left to pick up E.W. and T.A. Allen never complained to the Children that she was in pain; nor did they see any injuries on Allen.
[¶7] Later that evening, Allen went to Walmart and purchased a vacuum cleaner. After E.W. and T.A. fell asleep, Allen ordered the Children to help her drag Randy's blanketed body out of the bedroom and place him in her car. Randy's body, however, was too heavy to lift into the car. Allen and the Children then dragged the body back to the apartment and put it in S.A.'s bedroom closet. Allen had S.A. help clean up Randy's blood that had pooled in the other bedroom.
[¶8] The next day, July 28, Allen purchased a maul from Tractor Supply Company. The head of the maul had an axe blade on one end and a sledgehammer on the other. Sometime during the evening of July 29, Allen called E.W.'s father, Rory Walker, and told him that Randy had been abusing E.W. She met Walker at a residence in Benton, Michigan, and Allen drove them back to her LaPorte apartment.
[¶9] When Walker entered the residence, he did not see any visible injuries to E.W. After Walker asked Allen "what was going on," Allen pointed to the closet and stated that "she needed help." Transcript Vol. III at 8, 9. Walker saw Randy's body wrapped in a blanket and refused to assist with disposal of the body. While driving Walker back to Benton Harbor, Allen mentioned the idea of finding a hog pen, buying some boric acid, and maybe "cutting Randy up." Id. at 13. Allen also told Walker that she might put Randy in a car and set it on fire. Before Walker exited the vehicle, Allen tossed a Hi-Point brand handgun into his lap, stating, "you can have it or sell it or whatever." Id. at 13.
[¶10] Allen drove back to her apartment where she and the Children dragged Randy's body into the dining room. Allen chopped Randy's legs off at the knees with the maul, wrapped his body in a blanket, and placed the legs in a white trash bag. Allen and the Children then put Randy's body in a plastic tote and dragged it back to the bedroom closet.
[¶11] The next morning, Walker contacted the LaPorte Police Department and informed detectives about what he had observed and heard. Walker met with the officers and gave them the Hi-Point handgun wrapped in a towel. An investigation ensued, and police officers located Allen at an Ace Hardware Store parking lot. Detective Victor Aguilar approached Allen, and she immediately said, "I'm sorry, I'm sorry. He beats me, he beats me. You don't understand." Id. at 49.
[¶12] Several police officers searched Allen's vehicle and discovered Randy's wallet in the center console. There was a plastic bag on the front passenger floorboard that contained pants, a clothes hamper, and several rags and tennis shoes that were covered in red stains. Subsequent tests revealed that Randy's blood was on those items. Allen's purse also contained a receipt for the purchase of a maul from Tractor Supply.
[¶13] After executing a waiver of rights form, Allen agreed to speak with Detective Aguilar. Allen stated that she shot Randy because she feared that he would attack her during their argument in the bedroom. Allen also told Detective Aguilar that Randy beat and had sexually assaulted her in the past. Allen then admitted that she amputated Randy's legs before placing his body in the bedroom closet. When Allen permitted Detective Aguilar to examine her for injuries, he noticed only a faint bruise on Allen's arm where Randy had allegedly hit her days prior to the shooting.
[¶14] When executing a search warrant at Allen's apartment, police officers discovered Randy's body in the plastic tote and the white trash bag that contained Randy's legs. They also found the maul in the closet that was tested for DNA. The results showed that it was one trillion times more likely that the DNA was Randy's rather than an unknown, unrelated individual. Police officers also observed red stains on a pair of jeans, on a dresser in the main bedroom, on the carpeting, and on the walls in the main bedroom closet. The officers also seized a knife with what appeared to be human biological matter in a plastic bag on a dresser. A vacuum and carpet cleaner found in the apartment both tested positive for blood.
[¶15] The officers also located three handwritten notes under S.A.'s bedroom pillow. Two of the notes described a plan to kill Randy, and the third appeared to be a list instructing about how to "frame" Randy for drug possession. State's Exhibit 113. A forensic handwriting expert examined the notes and determined that it was "highly probable" that Allen had written them. Transcript Vol. III at 242.
[¶16] The police learned that Allen and Randy were the owners of the Hi-Point handgun that Allen had given to Walker. An autopsy determined that Randy had died from a single gunshot wound. The bullet struck Randy's right arm, entered his chest, and lodged in his spinal column. The cause of death was determined to be "exsanguination from bleeding out." Transcript Vol. II at 157.
The autopsy indicated that the gun was fired at least three feet from Randy in a downward trajectory, indicating that Randy could have been ducking or squatting when he was shot.
[¶17] Allen was arrested, and on August 2, 2021, the State charged her with murder, two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Level 5 felony, abuse of a corpse, a Level 6 felony, alteration of a death scene, a Level 6 felony, interference with the reporting of a crime, a Class A misdemeanor, and two counts of neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony.
[¶18] Prior to the commencement of Allen's jury trial on July 24, 2023, the trial court initially determined that Allen could admit into evidence an ex parte protective order she had obtained against Randy when they lived in South Bend. Allen alleged in her petition that she was the victim of domestic violence, and that Randy had stalked and harassed her. When Allen sought to admit this evidence at trial, however, the trial court excluded it. Because no judicial determination had been made as to the truth of Allen's allegations, the trial court ruled that admitting the order would have misled the jury.
[¶19] Later during the trial, Allen again raised the issue as to the protective order's admissibility. The trial court excluded the order but allowed the admission of Allen's petition. Detective Aguilar testified that Randy was charged with "a Level 6 felony" pursuant to Allen's allegations in the petition. The State then admitted into evidence a letter that Allen had written to the LaPorte Police Department, where she denied the allegations and requested that the charges against Randy be dismissed.
[¶20] Following the presentation of evidence, Allen offered final jury instructions for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, but it refused Allen's instruction on involuntary manslaughter that tracked the language of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-4.
[¶21] The State dismissed the interference with the reporting of a crime charge, and at the conclusion of a three-day jury trial, Allen was found guilty as charged on all remaining counts. At a sentencing hearing on September 29, 2023, the trial court sentenced Allen to an aggregate term of 63 years in the Indiana Department of Correction.
[¶22] Allen now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Jury Instructions
[¶23] Allen argues that her conviction must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give her proposed involuntary manslaughter instruction. Allen maintains that the instruction was warranted because it correctly stated the law and the jury "could conclude that [she] shot Randy with the intent to commit battery, not murder." Appellant's Brief at 18.
[¶24] The denial of a proposed jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 267 (Ind. 2023). In considering whether the denial of an instruction is an abuse of discretion, we determine: "(1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions that are given." Id. at 267-68. We will reverse "only if the appellant demonstrates that the instruction error prejudices his substantial rights." Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015).
[¶25] Additionally, a trial court's denial of a defendant's request for jury instructions of a lesser included offense is reviewed under a three-part test. "First, a trial court must compare the statute defining the crime charged with the statute defining the alleged lesser included offense." Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind. 1995). The trial court then determines whether the alleged lesser included offense is inherently or factually included in the charged crime. Id. at 567. Third, if the trial court finds that the lesser included offense is either factually or inherently included, it must then look at the evidence presented by the parties to determine if there is a serious evidentiary dispute "about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater." Id.
[¶26] Involuntary manslaughter is not an inherently included offense of murder. Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1081 (Ind. 2000). Involuntary manslaughter is, however, a "factually included" lesser offense of murder "if the charging instrument alleges that a battery accomplished the killing." Id. Here, the State alleged that "[Allen] did knowingly or intentionally kill . . . Randy Allen." Appellant's Appendix Vol. III at 137. Because the State did not charge Allen with having murdered Randy by touching him-thus committing a battery- involuntary manslaughter was not factually included in the charging information. See Evans, 727 N.E.2d at 1081. Indeed, the State "through its drafting can foreclose as to the defendant, the tactical opportunity to seek a conviction for a lesser offense. The point is that absolute discretion rests in the State to determine the crime(s) with which a defendant will be charged." Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 568 (quoting Jones v. State, 438 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind. 1982)). As involuntary manslaughter was neither inherently nor factually included in the offense as charged in this instance, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing Allen's instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
II. Admissibility of Protective Order
[¶27] Allen argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the ex parte protective order against Randy into evidence. Allen claims that the protective order should have been admitted because it was "highly probative and relevant to her [claim] of self-defense." Appellant's Brief at 21.
[¶28] A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will reverse a determination on the admissibility of evidence where the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024). We consider only evidence that is either favorable to the ruling or unrefuted and favorable to the defendant. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264 (Ind. 2015). We will uphold the trial court's ruling on any legal theory supported by the record, even if the parties and the trial court did not rely on that theory. Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1266-67 (Ind. 2008).
[¶29] At the outset, we note that Allen has failed to cite to the record and authorities in support of her contention. Thus, the issue is waived for appellate review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring each contention of error in the argument section of appellant's brief to contain citations to authorities and parts of the record relied upon).
[¶30] Waiver notwithstanding, we observe that even relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . [or] misleading the jury...." Ind. Evid. R. 403. The analysis under Evid. R. 403 turns on whether the prejudicial impact of the evidence will cause the jury to "substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury." Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 73 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied. The trial court balances the probative value of the evidence against the evidence's potential to cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997).
[¶31] In this case, Allen's defense strategy was "about an abused woman." Transcript Vol. II at 76. The ex parte protective order posed the potential to unfairly mislead the jury that a court had determined that Allen's allegations in her petition for the protective were true. To be sure, the trial court had only determined that Allen's allegations-if true as stated-warranted a protective order at that time. See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b) (affording trial courts authority to issue certain relief without the requirement of notice and hearing in an ex parte order for protection).
[¶32] Although the ex parte protective order was valid, Randy never challenged the order, and a hearing was never held to determine the truthfulness of Allen's allegations. Even more compelling, Allen subsequently contradicted her allegations in a letter that she sent to the LaPorte Police Department. Thus, admitting the order had the potential to mislead the jury as to what had occurred, and we therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the ex parte protective order from the evidence.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶33] Allen claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for murder because the evidence established that she acted in self-defense when she shot Randy. Challenges to the adequacy of the State's evidence rebutting a defendant's self-defense claim are reviewed like any other sufficiency of the evidence claim. Brown v. State, 738 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 2000). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). Rather, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, examining whether a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. So long as there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense, we will affirm. Lehman v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1097, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), trans. denied. When this court is confronted with conflicting evidence, we must consider it "most favorably to the [factfinder's] ruling." Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005).
[¶34] To convict Allen of murder, the State was required to prove that she knowingly or intentionally killed Randy. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. Allen claimed at trial that she acted in self-defense, which is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2; Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021). To prevail on a claim of self-defense, Allen was bound to prove that: (1) she acted without fault; (2) she was in a place where she had a right to be; and (3) she had a reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm. See Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). Once a defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of the three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 738 N.E.2d at 273. The State may satisfy this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying on the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). Whether the State has satisfied its burden in disproving a claim of self-defense is a question of fact for the fact-finder. Id. We will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable person could say the State overcame the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670.
[¶35] In this case, the evidence established that it was Allen who escalated the argument to violence. Prior to being shot, Randy told Allen that he was going to leave and began packing his clothes. At that point, Randy no longer posed a threat to Allen. Moreover, Allen told Detective Aguilar that Randy had "stepped away from her" before she shot him, and she told Randy that she was not going to let him leave. State's Exhibit 29. Allen did not call 911 for help, and she told the Children to let Randy "bleed out." Transcript Vol. II at 189.
[¶36] Allen did not complain of any physical pain that Randy had allegedly inflicted on her during the argument, and there was no evidence of any immediate injuries or bruises. To be sure, the sole injury that Allen complained of was a faint bruise on her arm that Randy had allegedly inflicted upon her several days before the shooting. In short, there was no evidence that Randy was in the process of attacking Allen or that he was going to attack her when she shot him, other than the self-serving statements that she made to Detective Aguilar. The jury considered Allen's statements and rejected her version of the events.
[¶37] In sum, the evidence most favorable to the fact-finder's ruling is that Allen's conduct did not constitute self-defense because she was the one who initiated the physical violence without any threat from Randy. The State therefore disproved Allen's claim of self-defense, and her arguments to the contrary are impermissible requests for us to reweigh the evidence.
[¶38] Judgment affirmed.
Bailey, J. and Mathias, J., concur.