Opinion
# 2021-032-018 Claim No. 134489 Motion No. M-95610
01-22-2021
CARL ALLEN v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Carl Allen, Pro Se Hon. Letitia James, Attorney General By: Elizabeth A. Gavin, AAG
Synopsis
Motion to dismiss granted. Decision governing the transport of inmates is protected by government immunity.
Case information
| UID: | 2021-032-018 |
| Claimant(s): | CARL ALLEN |
| Claimant short name: | ALLEN |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 134489 |
| Motion number(s): | M-95610 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | JUDITH A. HARD |
| Claimant's attorney: | Carl Allen, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Letitia James, Attorney General By: Elizabeth A. Gavin, AAG |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | January 22, 2021 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
The Court amends the caption sua sponte to reflect the only properly named defendant.
The Court amends the caption sua sponte to reflect the only properly named defendant.
Decision
Claimant, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed the instant claim on February 19, 2020 seeking damages for injuries sustained as the result of an allegedly wrongful confinement during his bus transfer between correctional facilities. The claim alleges that, on October 29, 2019, an unnamed corrections officer confined claimant for additional time during the transfer. Claimant alleges that he was confined to the bus for an additional thirty minutes on the Five Points Correctional Facility shuttle bus and for an additional thirty minutes in Elmira Correctional Facility's draft/processing room, causing injury to his lower back, upper back, ankle and neck due to mechanical restraints. Claimant asserts that the corrections officer violated several provisions of the Penal Law by stealing time from his employer while on the clock.
Here, defendant argues that the claim should be dismissed because actions taken while transporting inmates between correctional facilities implicate discretionary determinations which are shielded by governmental function immunity and that claimant failed to allege a special duty owed to him.
The State is generally immune from negligence claims arising from activities that are purely governmental functions, absent a special relationship between the State and the injured party (see Drever v State of New York, 134 AD3d 19, 21 [3d Dept. 2015]). In contrast, the State is subject to suit under ordinary negligence principles applicable to non-governmental entities where the conduct at issue constitutes a proprietary function (id. at 22). The transport of inmates to appropriate facilities implicates the police protection of society, which "is a uniquely governmental function" (Leonido v State of New York, 5 Misc 3d 932, 935 [Ct Cl 2004]). "A [claimant] generally must first establish the existence of a special duty before it becomes necessary for the court to address whether the governmental function immunity defense applies (see Metz v State of New York, 20 NY3d 175, 179 [2012]; Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69, 80 [2011]), but the special relationship issue is irrelevant where the government action in question is discretionary" (DiMeo v Rotterdam Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 110 AD3d 1423, 1424 [3d Dept. 2013], citing McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 203 [2009]). Under McLean, the State may only be held liable for the negligent performance of a ministerial act if a special duty exists between claimant and the State. " '[D]iscretionary . . . acts involve the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result' " (Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990], citing Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 41 [1983]).
Here, the Court finds that the action complained of is a discretionary act. As stated above, a discretionary act "involve[s] the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results" (Haddock v City of New York, supra). Defendant is entitled to immunity because its decisions as to when and how to transport inmates between facilities and when to apply mechanical restraints are discretionary in nature (see 7 NYCRR § 250.2 [j] [allowing the use of mechanical restraints when transporting inmates outside correctional facilities]; Lamage v State of New York, UID No. 2007-015-565 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Nov. 5, 2007] [use of mechanical restraints during transport is a discretionary act]). Therefore, to the extent that claimant alleges a cause of action for wrongful confinement based on defendant's transport schedule and use of mechanical restraints, such a cause of action is dismissed.
Unpublished decisions and selected orders of the Court of Claims are available at http://www.nyscourtofclaims.state.ny.us. --------
Next, claimant alleges that the correction officer involved in his transport violated several provisions of the New York Penal Law during the transport of claimant on the shuttle bus. The Court of Claims does not have the authority to prosecute violations of the Penal Law (see Leonichev v NYC Civil Housing Court (Kings County), et al., UID No. 2016-049-044 [Ct Cl, Weinstein, J., Dec. 2, 2016]). This Court has jurisdiction only to hear and decide claims that involve money damages against the State of New York or certain public authorities specified by statute (NY Const Art VI; Court of Claims Act § 9). Therefore, these claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Lastly, defendant argues that claimant's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be maintained against the State. It is well-settled that for public policy reasons, the maintenance of lawsuits against the State for intentional infliction of emotional distress is prohibited (see Ellison v City of New Rochelle, 62 AD3d 830 [2d Dept. 2009]; Augat v State of New York, 244 AD2d 835 [3d Dept. 1997]). Therefore, claimant's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed.
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion to dismiss the claim (M-95610) is GRANTED and claim number 134489 is DISMISSED.
January 22, 2021
Albany, New York
JUDITH A. HARD
Judge of the Court of Claims Papers Considered: 1. Notice of Motion, dated April 3, 2020; and Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss, affirmed by Elizabeth A. Gavin, AAG on April 3, 2020 with Exhibits 1-2 annexed thereto. 2. Reply to Motion to Dismiss, signed by claimant on May 5, 2020.