It is not necessary to name the vendee in a selling offense where the statute violated forbids such sales irrespective of persons. Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 39 So.2d 479; Wharton, Criminal Law, 11th Edition, Section 1805. The offense of selling an item irrespective of persons, is not, like assault or other offenses injuring person or property of another, directed against an individual, but is, like nuisance, directed against the community, therefore not requiring the naming of the vendee in the indictment.

A statement made by Special Assistant Attorney General in argument was not outside the bounds of legitimate argument, but if considered prejudicial was effectually eradicated. Burkett v. State, 215 Ala. 453, 111 So. 34; Burch v. State, 32 Ala. App. 529, 29 So.2d 422; Elliott v. State, 19 Ala. App. 263, 97 So. 115; Bell v. State, 25 Ala. App. 441, 148 So. 751; Id., 227 Ala. 44, 148 So. 752; Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 30 So.2d 479; Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36, 95 So. 171; Washington v. State, 259 Ala. 104, 65 So.2d 704; Birmingham Ry. Light Power Co. v. Gonzalez, 183 Ala. 273, 61 So. 80; Ball v. State, 252 Ala. 686, 42 So.2d 626; Id., 339 U.S. 929, 70 S.Ct. 625, 94 L.Ed. 1350; Adams v. State, 29 Ala. App. 547, 198 So. 451; Davis v. State, 229 Ala. 674, 159 So. 209; Glover v. State, 25 Ala. App. 423, 148 So. 160; Id., 226 Ala. 578, 148 So. 161; Freeman v. State, 21 Ala. App. 629, 111 So. 188; Skinner v. State, 22 Ala. App. 457, 116 So. 806; McKenzie v. State, 25 Ala. App. 586, 151 So. 619; 7 Ala.Dig., Crim. Law, 935, 1159(2), (3), (4), 1160; 11 Ala.Dig., Homicide, 332(2); Brown v. State, 30 Ala. App. 5, 200 So. 637, 640; Id., 240 Ala. 648, 200 So. 640; Huston v. State, 237 Ala. 222, 186 So. 182; Smith v. State, 23 Ala. App. 488, 128 So. 358; Id., 221 Ala. 217, 128 So. 359. The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence public statements made by deceased during his campaign for Attorney General to the

It is not necessary to name the vendee in a selling offense where the statute violated forbids such sales irrespective of persons. Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 30 So.2d 479; Wharton, Criminal Law, 11th Edition, Section 1805. The offense of selling an item irrespective of persons, is not, like assault or other offenses injuring person or property of another, directed against an individual, but is, like nuisance, directed against the community, therefore not requiring the naming of the vendee in the indictment.

Miscitation of a code section does not void an indictment which otherwise states an offense; and, in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant, reference to the erroneous code section will be treated as mere surplusage. Mays v. City of Prattville, 402 So.2d 1114, 1116 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Coker v. State, 396 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Fitzgerald v. State, 53 Ala. App. 663, 665, 303 So.2d 162 (1974); Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 73, 30 So.2d 479, petition struck, 249 Ala. 201, 30 So.2d 483 (1947); accord, United States v. Kennington, 650 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1981); Theriault v. United States, 434 F.2d 212, 213 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869, 92 S.Ct. 124, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). The record not only fails to show that Defendant was prejudiced by the misciting of the statute, but it affirmatively shows that he was not prejudiced by it.

The statute was passed in aid of the police power of the state, and it is significant that the law, supra, does not use the word 'knowingly,' or other apt words to indicate that knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged. Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 30 So.2d 479 (4); Smith v. State, 223 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270, 271 (4)."Smith v. State, supra, upheld a misdemeanor conviction for giving false weight and measures in the sale of gasoline.

It is not necessary to name the vendee in a selling offense where the statute violated forbids such sales irrespective of persons. Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 30 So.2d 479; Wharton, Criminal Law, 11th Ed., Section 1805. The offense of selling an item irrespective of persons, is not, like assault or other offense injuring person or property of another, directed against an individual, but is, like nuisance, directed against the community, therefore not requiring the naming of the vendee in the indictment.

Such principle is particularly applicable to enactments passed as police measures. Smith v. State, 223 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270; Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 30 So.2d 479."

We now consider some of the cases dealing principally with crimes against the "public" where the indictment did follow the words of the statute. In Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 30 So.2d 479, 481, the accused was indicted for selling adulterated milk which is prohibited by § 188, Title 2, Code of 1940. The indictment charged that the accused " 'did sell an article of food, namely, milk, which was adulterated in that it contained added water, contrary to Title 2, Section 306 of the Code of Alabama 1940.

"A reference to a statutory source in an indictment is a `matter of convenience and not of substance.' Pate v. State, 45 Ala.App. 164, 166, 227 So.2d 583 (1969). `The statement that the facts violate a certain section of the statute is nothing more than the pleader's conclusion, which may or may not be correct, and neither adds nor detracts from the allegation.' Harper v. United States, 27 F.2d 77, 79 ([8]th Cir. 1928); Allen v. State, 33 Ala.App. 70, 73, 30 So.2d 479 (1947). Reference to the statute is treated as surplusage. Fitzgerald v. State, 53 Ala.App. 663, 303 So.2d 162 (1974).

The statement that the facts violate a certain section of the statute is nothing more than the pleader's conclusion, which may or may not be correct, and neither adds nor detracts from the allegation." Harper v. United States, 27 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 1928); Allen v. State, 33 Ala. App. 70, 73, 30 So.2d 479 (1947). Reference to the statute is treated as surplusage. Fitzgerald v. State, 53 Ala. App. 663, 303 So.2d 162 (1974).