Opinion
September 8, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cerrato, J., Gurahian, J.).
Order affirmed, insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the plaintiff tenants' contentions on this appeal, we cannot conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that Special Term abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment even though more than one year had passed since the defendant receiver's attorney was served with notice of its entry. As we previously stated, the one-year limitation period set forth in CPLR 5015 (a) (1) is not necessarily a Statute of Limitations (Levine v Berlin, 46 A.D.2d 902, 903). In the sound exercise of their discretion, the courts are free "to extend this time period and grant such relief on motions made after the expiration of one year" (Levine v Berlin, supra, at p 903). Also, in the furtherance of justice and the policy of determining actions on the merits, there exists an inherent power of the courts not limited by this statute to relieve an aggrieved party from a judgment entered upon his default (see, Michaud v Loblaws, Inc., 36 A.D.2d 1013; Rawson v Austin, 49 A.D.2d 803).
The record indicates that the defendant receiver presented a reasonable excuse for the delay and a meritorious defense to the action should be fully explored at trial.
In concluding that Special Term properly exercised its discretion, we note that the court properly considered the effect of the defendant receiver's delay upon the plaintiff tenants by directing that the defendant receiver pay to the plaintiffs "$500, to cover, in part, the expenses incurred in taking the default". The court further protected the plaintiffs' interests by providing that "[t]he judgment previously entered shall stand as security". Brown, J.P., Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.