S.E.2d 397 (1982); Hyyti v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.W. 747 (1937); see Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St.2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411 (1978); E.G. Nicholas Const. Co. v. State Indus. Commission, 207 Okla. 428, 250 P.2d 221 (1952); see Arrow Transportation Co. v. Northwest Grocery Co., 258 Or. 363, 482 P.2d 519 (1971); Manning v. Capelli, 270 Pa. Super. 207, 411 A.2d 252 (1979); see McCabe v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 26 R.I. 427, 59 A. 112 (1904); see Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938); see Brickman v. Southern Ry., 74 S.C. 306, 54 S.E. 553 (1906); see Hodkinson v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924 (1944); see Memphis St. Ry. v. Cooper, 203 Tenn. 425, 313 S.W.2d 444 (1958); see Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Jones, 664 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Ct.App. 1984); see also Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co., 506 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D.Tex. 1981); Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943); see Bassett v. Vermont Tax Dept., 135 Vt. 257, 376 A.2d 731 (1977); see also Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 199 A. 257 (1938); Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 266 S.E.2d 104 (1980); Kramer v. Portland Seattle Auto Freight, 43 Wn.2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953); Morris v. Baltimore O.R.R., 107 W. Va. 97, 147 S.E. 547 (1929); see Yeater v. Jennings Oil Co., 75 W. Va. 346, 84 S.E. 904 (1914); Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis.2d 242, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975); see Ashley v. Read Const. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727 (D.Wyo. 1961); see also Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931). Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580 (1983); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 12-611 (1982); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-906 (1979); Cal.C.P. Code § 377 (West 1973); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-202 (1973); see Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co., 26 Cal.App.3d 537, 103 Cal.Rptr. 120 (1972); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.19 (West 1986); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-4-5 (1982); Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 663-3 (1985); Idaho Code § 5-311 (1979 Supp. 1987); Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 70, § 1 (1985); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 411.130 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.tit. 18-A § 2-804 (1964); Md.C.J. Code Ann. § 3-902 (1984); Ma
It is true that in this case the probability of future assistance being given to the parents may not have been as great as was the probability of such assistance being given to the mother in D'Angelo v. Rut. Ry. Lt. P. Co., supra, and a longer time would elapse before the deceased would have attained his majority, but the evidence was of similar character to that in the D'Angelo case and was such, in our opinion, that the jury could find that the parents had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of the life of the deceased beyond his minority. This case is distinguishable from Allen, Admr. v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 199 A 257. In the present case the deceased was much interested in farming and wanted to be a farmer.
Many early cases, reflecting nineteenth-century social conditions when children were valued largely for their capacity to contribute to the family income, resulted in minimal awards representing the monetary loss occasioned by the parents' deprivation of their child's services. See, e.g., Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 409, 199 A. 257, 258 (1938) ($200 verdict for wrongful death of 17-year-old daughter not grossly inadequate); see also Sawyer v. Claar, 115 Idaho 322, 327-28, 766 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing many cases, court compared "notoriously small" wrongful death awards made a half century ago with the more recent trend toward greater recoveries). Nonetheless, early on, this Court approvingly cited language stating that pecuniary damages should include "`all pecuniary loss of every kind which the circumstances of the particular case establish with reasonable certainty will be suffered by the beneficiary of the statute in the future.'"
It is based on Lord Campbell's Act and generally awards damages to the decedent's next of kin only for "pecuniary loss." See Calhoun v. Blakely, 152 Vt. 113, 116, 564 A.2d 590, 592 (1989); Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 407, 199 A. 257, 257 (1938). The pecuniary loss rule has been particularly controversial in cases where the decedent is a child because it often allows no recovery at all.