Allen v. Moore

7 Citing cases

  1. Tatum v. Schering Corp.

    523 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. 1988)   Cited 49 times
    In Tatum, I realized that it was impossible to apply legal reasoning to our judicially construed wrongful death statute, and, in my dissent, I begged for a return to bedrock in interpreting the wrongful death statute.

    S.E.2d 397 (1982); Hyyti v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.W. 747 (1937); see Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St.2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411 (1978); E.G. Nicholas Const. Co. v. State Indus. Commission, 207 Okla. 428, 250 P.2d 221 (1952); see Arrow Transportation Co. v. Northwest Grocery Co., 258 Or. 363, 482 P.2d 519 (1971); Manning v. Capelli, 270 Pa. Super. 207, 411 A.2d 252 (1979); see McCabe v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 26 R.I. 427, 59 A. 112 (1904); see Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938); see Brickman v. Southern Ry., 74 S.C. 306, 54 S.E. 553 (1906); see Hodkinson v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924 (1944); see Memphis St. Ry. v. Cooper, 203 Tenn. 425, 313 S.W.2d 444 (1958); see Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Jones, 664 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Ct.App. 1984); see also Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co., 506 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D.Tex. 1981); Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943); see Bassett v. Vermont Tax Dept., 135 Vt. 257, 376 A.2d 731 (1977); see also Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 199 A. 257 (1938); Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 266 S.E.2d 104 (1980); Kramer v. Portland Seattle Auto Freight, 43 Wn.2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953); Morris v. Baltimore O.R.R., 107 W. Va. 97, 147 S.E. 547 (1929); see Yeater v. Jennings Oil Co., 75 W. Va. 346, 84 S.E. 904 (1914); Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis.2d 242, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975); see Ashley v. Read Const. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727 (D.Wyo. 1961); see also Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931). Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580 (1983); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 12-611 (1982); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-906 (1979); Cal.C.P. Code § 377 (West 1973); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-202 (1973); see Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co., 26 Cal.App.3d 537, 103 Cal.Rptr. 120 (1972); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.19 (West 1986); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-4-5 (1982); Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 663-3 (1985); Idaho Code § 5-311 (1979 Supp. 1987); Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 70, § 1 (1985); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 411.130 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.tit. 18-A § 2-804 (1964); Md.C.J. Code Ann. § 3-902 (1984); Ma

  2. Butterfield Est. v. Com. L. P. Co.

    49 A.2d 415 (Vt. 1946)   Cited 11 times
    Adopting prudent-person standard for abutters

    It is true that in this case the probability of future assistance being given to the parents may not have been as great as was the probability of such assistance being given to the mother in D'Angelo v. Rut. Ry. Lt. P. Co., supra, and a longer time would elapse before the deceased would have attained his majority, but the evidence was of similar character to that in the D'Angelo case and was such, in our opinion, that the jury could find that the parents had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of the life of the deceased beyond his minority. This case is distinguishable from Allen, Admr. v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 199 A 257. In the present case the deceased was much interested in farming and wanted to be a farmer.

  3. Collins v. Fogg

    8 A.2d 684 (Vt. 1939)   Cited 19 times

    However, the jury were not bound to accept the testimony of witness Krupp as to his opinion on the amount of damages. Allen, Admr. v. Moore et al., 109 Vt. 405, 408, 199 A. 257. Having failed to accept Krupp's testimony on this matter, they were at liberty to determine the amount of damages from such inferences as might legitimately be drawn from the testimony. Allen, Admr. v. Moore, supra, at 408, 199 A. 257. But with the evidence standing as it did, not showing with reasonable clearness what parts of the car were damaged and to what extent, there was no sufficient evidence from which such inferences might reasonably be drawn. That is, having failed to accept Krupp's opinion as to damages, there was no sufficient evidence left upon which damages could reasonably be determined. As to what the situation would be if there were in this case sufficient evidence showing with reasonable certainty what parts of the car in question were damaged in the accident and to what extent, without further evidence as to value of such damaged parts or cost of replacing same, we are not here called upon to determine.

  4. Clymer v. Webster

    156 Vt. 614 (Vt. 1991)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that parents of adult child may recover for loss of comfort and companionship of adult child where they were next of kin under WDA

    Many early cases, reflecting nineteenth-century social conditions when children were valued largely for their capacity to contribute to the family income, resulted in minimal awards representing the monetary loss occasioned by the parents' deprivation of their child's services. See, e.g., Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 409, 199 A. 257, 258 (1938) ($200 verdict for wrongful death of 17-year-old daughter not grossly inadequate); see also Sawyer v. Claar, 115 Idaho 322, 327-28, 766 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing many cases, court compared "notoriously small" wrongful death awards made a half century ago with the more recent trend toward greater recoveries). Nonetheless, early on, this Court approvingly cited language stating that pecuniary damages should include "`all pecuniary loss of every kind which the circumstances of the particular case establish with reasonable certainty will be suffered by the beneficiary of the statute in the future.'"

  5. Hartnett v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

    153 Vt. 152 (Vt. 1989)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that destruction of the parent-child relationship includes grief and mental anguish

    It is based on Lord Campbell's Act and generally awards damages to the decedent's next of kin only for "pecuniary loss." See Calhoun v. Blakely, 152 Vt. 113, 116, 564 A.2d 590, 592 (1989); Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 407, 199 A. 257, 257 (1938). The pecuniary loss rule has been particularly controversial in cases where the decedent is a child because it often allows no recovery at all.

  6. Mitchell v. Buchheit

    559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1977)   Cited 15 times
    In Mitchell v. Buchheit, 559 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. filed December 19, 1977), the Supreme Court said, "Parents, seeking to recover for the death of a minor child, should not be prohibited from trying to establish a reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of said child beyond the age of minority.

    VERMONT — (Stat.Ann. Title 14 § 1491-92) Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 199 A. 257[1] (1938); Butterfield v. Community Light and Power Co., 115 Vt. 23, 49 A.2d 415[7-9] (1946) (on proper showing damages would include loss of reasonably expected pecuniary benefits accruing after minority). WISCONSIN — (Stat.Ann. § 895.04) Johnson v. Chicago N.W. R. Co., 64 Wis. 425, 25 N.W. 223[1] (1885) (damages include reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits even beyond majority age).

  7. Glass v. Bosworth

    113 Vt. 303 (Vt. 1943)   Cited 7 times

    The circumstances, together with the character and subject matter of the testimony, may be considered before effect is given to a witness' statement. Valenti v. Imperial Assur. Co., 107 Vt. 65, 69, 176 A 413. See also Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 113 Vt. 86, 92, 30 A.2d 75; Collins v. Fogg, 110 Vt. 465, 469, 8 A.2d 684; Allen v. Moore, 109 Vt. 405, 408, 199 A 257. Among circumstances that might be so considered in this case were the fact that the plaintiff felt no need for a doctor and did not call one until the second night after the accident; that the claimed connection was in its nature a matter of opinion and not of demonstrable fact, and the intermittent character of the plaintiff's ailment extending over a period of many years. It appeared that she had been hospitalized and seriously ill therefrom for fourteen months commencing in 1937 and again for some seven weeks commencing December, 1939. No error appears in connection with this exception. Before the jury was drawn the plaintiff's counsel in chambers offered to show that the defendant was insured in a certain named mutual insurance company, and that that company was conducting the defense in this case.