The Superior Court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied the defendant's motions. See 235 A.2d 261. This appeal followed.

The difference between negligent and fraudulent concealment is that "allegations of scienter and of a positive act of concealment are generally necessary" to establish fraudulent concealment but are not required for negligent concealment.Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261, 264 (Del. Super. 1967).

Other courts do not explicitly distinguish between active and passive concealment, and refer generally to fraudulent concealment as a synonym for nondisclosure requiring an independent duty of disclosure to be actionable. See, e.g., Lone Star Indus. v. Compania Naviera Perez Companc (In re New York Trap Rock Corp.), 42 F.3d 747, 754 (2d Cir. 1994); Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 937-38 n. 33 (D.C. Cir. 1967); City of Rome v. Glanton, 958 F.Supp. 1026, 1038 (E.D.Pa. 1997); Altmayer v. City of Daphne, 613 So.2d 366, 369 (Ala. 1993); Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 965 P.2d 105, 111 (Colo. 1998); Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261, 264 (Del.Super.Ct. 1967); Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296, 528 S.E.2d 777, 780 (2000); DeVoe Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. v. Cartwright, 526 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988); Parker v. Columbia Bank, 91 Md.App. 346, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (1992); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 114 Nev. 1468, 970 P.2d 98, 110-11 (1998). Although the nomenclature used in these latter cases is not as clear as it might be, the cases still offer Colton no support because they do not suggest, let alone hold, that "active concealment," i.e., with the requisite intent and misleading impression, is not actionable in the absence of an independent disclosure duty.

See Aegis Insurance Co. v. Delta Fire Casualty Co., 99 So.2d 767, 782 (La. App. 1957); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 5 Cir., 1963, 314 F.2d 776."Allen, et al, v. Layton, et al., 235 A.2d 261 (Del.Super. 1967), a Delaware suit, involved a malpractice action against a surgeon and a hospital by a patient for injuries resulting from leaving a hemostat in her body during the course of an operation. Therein the court opined:

See Krestich v. Stefanez (1943), 243 Wis. 1, 9 N.W.2d 130, 151 A.L.R. 1022 (malpractice, nondisclosure, fraud by representation). See also: Allen v. Layton (Del. 1967), 235 A.2d 261; Eschenbacher v. Hier (1961), 363 Mich. 676, 110 N.W.2d 731; Rothman v. Silber (1966), 90 N.J. Super. 22, 216 A.2d 18. But see New York view that subsequent concealment of negligence by a physician constitutes at most an aggravation of the injury and does not support a separate action for fraud. Tulloch v. Haselo (1926), 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y. Supp. 139. Failure to disclose a negligent act constitutes an act of malpractice. Kleinman v. Lack (1958), 6 App. Div. 2d 1046, 179 N.Y. Supp. 2d 194.

"The rationale for this doctrine is to disallow a defendant from taking advantage of his own wrong in preventing a plaintiff from a timely suit in the courts." Allen v. Layton , 235 A.2d 261, 265 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967), aff'd , 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968). [I]f one by fraud conceals the fact of a right of action, it is not ingrafting an exception on the statute to say that he is not protected thereby, but it is simply saying that he never was within the statute.

See In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholders Litig., Del. Supr., 669 A.2d 59 (1995).Allen v. Layton, Del. Super., 235 A.2d 261 (1967) (citation omitted) aff'd Del. Supr., 246 A.2d 794 (1968). Id. at 266.

In addition, there appears to be a definite trend toward the discovery rule and away from the strict rule in respect of the time for the accrual of the cause of action for personal injuries. ( Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., supra; Allen v. Layton (Del. 1967) 235 A.2d 261, 265; City of Miami v. Brooks (Fla. 1954) 70 So.2d 306; Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital (1967) 50 Haw. 150 [ 433 P.2d 220, 223]; Billings v. Sisters of Mercy (1964) 86 Idaho 485 [ 389 P.2d 224, 232]; Gahimer v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp. (7th Cir. 1957) 241 F.2d 836, 840; Chrischilles v. Griswold (1967) 260 Iowa 453 [ 150 N.W.2d 94, 99-100]; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson (5th Cir. 1963) 314 F.2d 776, 786; Gracie v. Koppers Co. (1957) 213 Md. 109 [ 130 A.2d 754, 757]; Johnson v. Caldwell (1963) 371 Mich. 368 [ 123 N.W.2d 785, 791]; Grey v. Silver Bow County (1967) 149 Mont. 213 [ 425 P.2d 819, 820-821]; Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital (1966) 148 Mont. 125 [ 417 P.2d 469, 473]; Dryden v. Omaha Steel Works (1947) 148 Neb. 1 [26 N.W.2d 293]; Sylvania Elec. Products v. Barker (1st Cir. 1955) 228 F.2d 842, 848; Fernandi v. Strully (1961) 35 N.J. 434 [ 173 A.2d 277, 285-286]; Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, supra; Berry v. Branner (1966) 245 Or. 307 [ 421 P.2d 996, 998-1000]; Ayers v. Mo