Opinion
No. C 01-2 147 TEH (pr)
October 20, 2002
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Charles E. Allen, an inmate currently housed at the California State Prison Sacramento, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The court finds no triable issues of material fact exist and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court therefore will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Allen alleged in his unverified complaint that he had been subjected to the use of excessive force at Pelican Bay State Prison on May 5, 2000. He alleged that correctional officers Gary Flowers and Todd Haak shoved him at the top of a flight of stairs, causing him to fall down the stairs.
The following evidence is undisputed, unless otherwise noted. On May 5, 2000, Allen was housed at Pelican Bay in the administrative segregation unit, which has a very high level of security. Inmates in administrative segregation are not allowed to leave their cells without an escorting officer. When an administrative segregation inmate breaks away from his escort, it poses a safety and security risk to the prison, correctional officers and inmates. In early May 2000, Allen had a history of trying to break away from escorting officers. When warned that a hands-on escort (i.e., one where guards maintained continuous physical contact with the inmate) would be forthcoming if he continued to try to break away, Allen was defiant.
On May 5, 2000, officers Haak and Flowers were selected to escort Allen because they were the larger officers on duty. They escorted him to the exercise yard that morning and he was uncooperative — trying to go down the steps two at a time and telling the officers there was nothing in Title 15 that prohibited him from walking as fast as he wanted to.
Later that morning, officers Haak and Flowers went to Allen's cell to escort him to the law library. Officer Flowers carried Allen's 13 legal-sized envelopes (weighing 29 pounds) because Allen could not carry his legal materials while handcuffed. Allen was handcuffed and taken out on to the tier. Officer Flowers held Allen's left arm with his right hand and had Allen's legal materials under his left arm. Officer Haak walked 1-2 steps behind officer Flowers and Allen. As they walked down the stairway, Allen began to walk faster. Officer Flowers stopped Allen and told him that he could not run down the stairs. Allen said, "I can go as fast as I want." Allen then pulled officer Flowers' right hand closer to Allen's body and took a step down with his right foot and lunged down toward the right. This pulled officer Flowers off balance and Flowers could not catch himself because of the legal materials in his left arm. Officer Haak was worried that Allen's actions might cause officer Flowers to fall down the stairs so he reached out and grabbed Allen's right arm. Allen continued to lunge, pulling both officers down the stairs with him. When they landed at the bottom of the stairs, Allen was lying face down, officer Haak was on top of Allen's back and officer Flowers was beside Allen. Allen then started yelling that he had witnesses that he was pushed and that he wanted a lawyer. Officer Haak called out for a set of leg irons because Allen was thrashing his legs back and forth. The officers held Allen down and then the leg irons were put on Allen. When officers Flowers and Haak tried to stand Allen up to move him to the day room, he refused to move, so officers Haak and Flowers picked him up by the arms, stood him upright, carried him to the day room and laid him on the floor on his stomach. Allen was placed in a litter and taken to the medical clinic for evaluation, where he complained of lower back and knee pain, and had a dime-sized abrasion on his right knee. Officers Flowers and Haak were examined and had minor injuries.
Allen did not oppose the motion for summary judgment. His complaint is not verified, and therefore may not be used as evidence to consider at the summary judgment stage. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 nn. 10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiffs verified complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). The only items of evidence before the court are the various declarations and exhibits filed by defendants in support of their motion.
VENUE AND JURISDICTION
Venue is proper in the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison in Del Norte County, which is located within the Northern District. This court has federal question jurisdiction over this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Where, as here, the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with evidence which would entitle him to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See Houghton v. Smith, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). He must establish the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to his affirmative defense. Id. at 1537; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.") Once the moving party has come forward with this evidence, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the defense.
The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 630-31.
DISCUSSION
The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity "`provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."'Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a particular sequence of questions to be considered in determining whether qualified immunity exists. The court must consider this threshold question: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated if the facts were as alleged, the inquiry ends and defendants prevail. See id. if, however, "a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. . . . `The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
A. A Constitutional Violation Was Alleged
The first step under Saucier is to determine whether a constitutional violation was alleged. The constitutional right at issue when it is alleged that a correctional officer used excessive force on an inmate is the Eighth Amendment right to be free from "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992). "`[T]he question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on `whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."' Id. at 6 (citations omitted); see id. at 8-10 (absence of serious injury to inmate who had been beaten by prison guards while handcuffed and shackled was relevant to but not dispositive of his Eighth Amendment claim). Correctional officers must balance the need to maintain or restore discipline through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Id.
The allegations of the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to Allen, show a violation of his constitutional rights by defendants. Allen's allegations that defendants purposely shoved him down stairs while handcuffed adequately show a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. His allegations imply that he was a cooperative escortee at the time of the incident and provided no cause for any use of force.
B. There Was No Violation of A Clearly Established Right
The next step under Saucier is to consider whether the contours of the right were clearly established, an inquiry that "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The undisputed facts are critical because one must have a specific set of facts in mind to which to apply the law. As evident in the "Background" section above, the undisputed evidence is that correctional officers Haak and Flowers did not shove Allen down the stairs, but instead were carried along with him as he lunged down the stairs and took his escorts off balance, causing all three to fall and tumble down the stairs.
At the time of the incident, the law was clearly established that the gratuitous use of physical force on an inmate violated the Eighth Amendment, but also was clearly established that the good faith use of force to maintain discipline did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5-6.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Allen, the non-moving party, the evidence shows that Allen fell down the stairs or lunged down the stairs, but in either event, did so because he pulled the two escorting officers off balance and all three tumbled down the stairs. No reasonable officer would have thought that being pulled off balance by an inmate who then fell down the stairs was unlawful. Even if defendants were incorrect in their perception that Allen was pulling officer Flowers down the stairs — and Allen was actually falling down the stairs by accident — their perception that he was trying to break free from the escorts was a reasonable interpretation of the situation given that Allen and officers Haak and Flowers were off balance, Allen had a history of breaking away from escorts and the officers had been alerted that morning to Allen's threats to cause a disruption during escorts. When they landed at the bottom of the stairs, officers Flowers and Haak applied only the force necessary to control an inmate who they believed had tried to break away from his escorting officers and could pose a security threat.
Defendants met their burden of proof in their moving papers. Allen did not introduce any evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the defense. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their qualified immunity defense.
Finally, the court notes that it does not base its decision on defendants' argument that Allen's complaint was deficient because he did not put forth nonconclusory allegations of improper motive. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, No. 00-17369, slip op. 1, 5 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2002) (recognizing that Ninth Circuit's heightened pleading standard for constitutional claims in which improper motive is an element has been overruled).
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED (Docket # 11). Judgment will be entered in defendants' favor and against plaintiff.
JUDGMENT
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity has been granted. Judgment is entered in defendants' favor and against plaintiff.