Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-CV-01162
06-27-2023
FREDERICK ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN DEMORE; TRINITY FOOD SERVICES, INC.; JEN, Dietary Specialist; BUTLER COUNTY PRISON EMPLOYEES, Defendants.
United States District Judge William S. Stickman IV
This case is referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
On August 12, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Frederick Allen, then incarcerated at Butler County Prison, initiated a prisoner civil rights action against named Defendants Warden DeMore; Trinity Food Services, Inc.; Jen, Dietary Specialist; and unnamed Butler County Prison Employees. See Compl. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants for violations of his First Amendment rights and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
On February 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change Address indicating he was transferred to Allegheny County Jail. (ECF No. 24).
The Butler County Prison Employees remain unnamed and unserved.
All named and served Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.), (ECF Nos. 25, 27). Defendants Sowers and Trinity alternatively request the Court to order Plaintiff to file a Motion for a More Definitive Statement under Rule 12(e) of the F.R.C.P, (ECF No. 27). Plaintiff has not responded to these motions or to the Court's Order to Show Cause. (ECF Nos. 29, 35).
In (ECF No. 27), Defendants indicated that Defendant Jennifer Sowers was improperly identified as JEN, DIETARY SPECIALIST. To avoid confusion, the Court will refer to this Defendant using her proper name.
Plaintiff named Trinity Food Services, Inc. as a defendant. However, Defendant refers to itself as Trinity Services, Group. To avoid confusion, the Court will refer to this Defendant as “Trinity.”
After analyzing the applicable Poulis factors, the undersigned recommends that the case be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) (setting forth six factors to consider for proper dismissal).
II. Report
A. Factual and Procedural History
According to the Complaint, from January 27, 2022, until at least June 2022, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at Butler County Prison (the “Prison”). See Compl. at 4 (ECF No. 10). During this time, Plaintiff contends he received Kosher meals but they were often “not nutritionally adequate” and “did not meet Jewish dietary laws.” Id. at 7 (ECF No. 10). According to the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Prison: he alleged, among other things, that the “[Prison] staff recognized the inadequacy of the Kosher meal[s].” Id. at 7 (ECF No. 10).
The Complaint does not explicitly assert that Plaintiff practices Judaism rather it is by inference, e.g., “communicate with [ ] Rabbi” and “denial of religious practice.” See Compl. at 7 (ECF No. 10).
Plaintiff initiated this prisoner civil rights action on August 12, 2022, by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (the “IFP Motion”). (ECF No. 1). The IFP Motion attached a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights. Id. Named defendants include Warden DeMore; Jen, Dietary Specialist; Trinity Food Services, Inc.; and unnamed Butler County Prison Employees. As relief, Plaintiff seeks a court order for a “kosher meal plan and menu for all Jewish inmates that is approved by an Orthodox Rabbi; for [Plaintiff] and any inmate to have the right of freedom to practice religion guaranteed under the First Amendment; and $350,000 punitive damages for violation of [Plaintiff's] First Amendment rights and statutory rights under RULIPA.” See Compl. at 5 (ECF No. 10).
Plaintiff's IFP Motion was granted, and the Complaint officially filed on September 13, 2023. (ECF Nos. 9, 10). Defendant Warden DeMore filed a motion to dismiss and brief in support on February 9, 2023. (ECF Nos. 25, 26). And Defendants Sowers and Trinity filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively a more definite statement and brief in support, on February 13, 2023. (ECF Nos. 27, 28). The Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the motions or file an amended complaint by March 14, 2023. (ECF No. 29). On May 9, 2023, the undersigned filed an Order to Show Cause in which Plaintiff was directed to file a brief in opposition to the motions to dismiss by June 16, 2023, or otherwise show cause why this case should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 35). Plaintiff was advised that if he failed to comply, then it would be recommended that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 35).
To date, Plaintiff neither filed briefs or documents in opposition to the pending motions to dismiss, nor filed an amended complaint or responded to the Show Cause Order. The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff abandoned this action. Moreover, after considering the relevant factors, the Court recommends that the case be dismissed.
B. Discussion
The Court cannot properly control its docket, move the action forward, and adequately protect the rights of all parties if Plaintiff fails to comply with court orders. Accordingly, this constitutes a failure to prosecute to which the Complaint subject to dismissal under F.R.C.P 41(b).
A district court has inherent power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, under F.R.C.P. 41(b) for a plaintiff's failure to comply with an order of court. Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court could dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b).”); Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429 (3d Cir. 1990). Furthermore, a court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is committed to the court's sound discretion. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We review for abuse of discretion a district court's dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).”), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). In exercising that discretion, a district court should, to the extent applicable, consider the six factors identified in Poulis, before it levies the sanction of dismissal of an action for failure to obey discovery schedules, failure to prosecute, or to comply with other procedural rules. Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1330 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit commented that “while pro se litigants may be entitled to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, a pro se litigant's failure to comply with a court order is not the same as “inartful pleading or [a] lack of legal training.” Id. at 110.
In Poulis, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set forth the following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is proper:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d at 868. These factors must be balanced in determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction, although not all need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988). Consideration of these factors follows.
1. The extent of the party's personal responsibility.
A pro se litigant is personally responsible for failure to comply with the court's rules and orders. In this matter, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and thus responsible for his lack of compliance with court orders. Of note, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' motions to dismiss or to file an amended complaint or alternatively show cause why dismissal should not be recommended. Plaintiff, however, did not comply. Furthermore, the Court has no reason to believe that Plaintiff has not received its various orders because no mail returned to the Court marked undeliverable.
2. Prejudice to the adversary.
Prejudice does not simply mean irremediable harm regarding the Poulis analysis. Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). For instance, “the burden imposed by impending a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Id. In this action, Defendants are prejudiced by Plaintiff's failure to litigate because it further delays resolution of the case. Additionally, Defendants retained attorneys who expended time and energy as evidenced by the relevant docket filings. Thus, Plaintiff's failures to respond to Court orders unduly delays disposition of this matter.
3. A history of dilatoriness.
Although Plaintiff filed a change of address on February 3, 2023, (ECF No. 24), he has made no effort otherwise to advance this case since October 2022 when he filed a motion for case status update. (ECF No. 11). Additionally, he failed to respond to several Court orders and failed to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for his failure to comply. Accordingly, sufficient indication exists that Plaintiff does not intend to proceed with this case.
4. Whether the party's conduct was willful or in bad faith.
There is no indication that Plaintiff's failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. Inescapably, Plaintiff's failure to litigate this action is willful.
5. Alternative sanctions.
The IFP Motion was granted and there is no evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Plaintiff would be able to pay monetary sanctions. (ECF No. 9). Accordingly, sanctions imposing costs or fees upon Plaintiff would be wholly ineffective.
6. Meritorious of the claim or defense.
A claim is deemed meritorious when the allegations of the complaint, if established at trial, would support recovery. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. At this early stage of the litigation, there is not enough in the record to determine meritorious of Plaintiff's claim. This factor weighs neither in favor of Defendants nor Plaintiff; however, such is of no consequence wholly considering the Poulis factors. To clarify, “[n]o single Poulis factor is dispositive,” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d at 222, and “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied [ ] to dismiss a complaint.” Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir.1992).
After careful review of the Poulis factors, the Court's conclusion heavily weighs in favor of dismissal. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d at 1373.
III. Conclusion
In accordance with F.R.C.P. 41(b), it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), F.R.C.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, as a non-electronically registered party, must file objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by July 17, 2023, and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by July 12, 2023. Notably, either party's failure to file Objections within this prescribed timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing the standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed: that being a review for plain error).