"A party who opposes a motion for summary judgment by seeking additional discovery under [Rule 56(d)], however, `has not absolute right to additional time for discovery . . . The nonmoving party must show how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him to rebut the motion for summary judgment." Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 775 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 409 (6th Cir. 1998). Thus, if the discovery sought by the nonmoving party has no bearing on the determinative legal issue presented by the motion for summary judgment, it is not necessary to afford the nonmoving party additional time for discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment.

Rather, Plaintiff "must show how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him to rebut the motion for summary judgment." Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 775 (6th Cir. 2003). He must explain what additional discovery is sought and how it would affect the outcome.

This evidence, being legally irrelevant, does not bear on a “material” issue of fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). It thus cannot be the basis to reverse the district court's judgment on this issue. Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 775–76 (6th Cir.2003); see Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 422–23 (6th Cir.1998). Second, the district court could have “deem[ed] as too vague the affidavits submitted in support of the motion.”

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant summary judgment. Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

To succeed on a motion under section 1292(b), a movant must show (1) a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, (2) that the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, and (3) that exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after entry of a final judgment. Karanik v. Cape Fear Acad., No. 7:21-CV-169-D, 2022 WL 16556774, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 31, 2022) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978), superseded in part on other grounds by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(f)); see also Fannin v. CSX Transp., Inc., 873 F.2d 1438 (Table), 1989 WL 42583, at *1-2 (4th Cir. 1989). Exceptional circumstances exist when an “interlocutory appeal[] . . . would avoid

A union-member plaintiff wishing to pursue a cause of action for breach of a union's duty of fair representation has the burden of showing that the union's action was “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 2003) (punctuation modified). Par argues that Pedder cannot establish the second element because “Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff's union breached its duty of fair representation.”

As indicated, the district court should grant leave for an interlocutory appeal when, among other things, the order in issue involves a controlling question of law. Notably, "[a]n order involves a controlling question of law when reversal of the bankruptcy court's order would be dispositive of the case as either a legal or practical matter and determination of the issue on appeal will materially affect the outcome." In re Minh Vu Hoang, 2011 WL 6296839, at *2; accord In re Rood, 2010 WL 4923336, at *4; In re Pawlak, 520 B.R. at 183; See also KPMG Peat Marwick, 250 B.R. at 78 (stating that a controlling question of law is "a narrow question of pure law whose resolution will be completely dispositive of the litigation, either as a legal or practical matter, whichever way it goes.") (citing Fannin v. CSX Transp. Inc, 873 F.2d. 1438 (table), 1989 WL 42583, at *5 (4th Cir. 1989)). "Factual determinations and appeals presenting a question of law and fact are not appropriate for interlocutory review."

ally advance the ultimate termination of the litigation . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also Virginia ex rel. Integra Rec., L.L.C. v. Countrywide Secs. Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71944, 2015 WL 3540473, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2015) (citing Cooke-Bates v. Bayer Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121255, 2010 WL 4789838, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010)). A decision to certify a non-final order for interlocutory review lies within the discretion of the reviewing court, Terry v. June, 368 F.Supp.2d 538, 539 (W.D. Va. 2005); however, such discretion is to be used sparingly, Myles v. Laffitte, 881 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1989), and motions requesting a court to certify a non-final order for interlocutory appeal should only be granted under "exceptional circumstances" involving a "narrow question of pure law whose resolution will be completely dispositive of the litigation, either as a legal or practical matter," Difelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 907, 908 (E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Fannin v. CSX Transp., Inc., 873 F.2d 1438 [reported in full at 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 20859], at *5 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (unpublished)). Importantly, a moving party must satisfy all three § 1292(b) criteria before a district court can decide, in its discretion, to certify a non-final order for interlocutory appeal.

Plaintiff "must show how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him to rebut the motion for summary judgment." Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 775 (6th Cir.2003). "He must explain what additional discovery is sought and how it would affect the outcome." See id.; see also Lewis, 135 F.3d at 409.

However, '§ 1292(b) should be used sparingly and . . . its requirements must be strictly construed.' . . . '[T]he kind of question best adapted to discretionary interlocutory review is a narrow question of pure law whose resolution will be completely dispositive of the litigation[.]'" Lynn, 953 F.Supp.2d at 623 (quoting Myles v. Laffitte, 881 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1989); Fannin v. CSX Transp., Inc., 873 F.2d 1438 (Table), 1989 WL 42583, at *5 (4th Cir. 1989)). Summary Judgment