Allen v. Bailey

22 Citing cases

  1. People v. Barron

    677 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 15 times
    Examining a court’s common law power to punish a defendant for criminal contempt

    E.g., Losavio, Jr. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 180, 512 P.2d 266 (1973); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 P. 961 (1892). The power to punish for criminal contempt is an inherent and indispensable power of the court and exists independently of legislative authorization.Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); People ex rel. Attorney General v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906), writ of error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).

  2. Itcaina v. Marble

    56 Nev. 420 (Nev. 1936)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming a district court's grant of an injunction because the defendant had not complied with the necessary requirements to assert a stock water right under, the 1925 stock watering law but the plaintiff had by virtue of his and his predecessors-in-interest's exclusive use of that disputed public land to water cattle

    The language of this court in Re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, 253 P. 671, approving the opinion in Sweet v. Ballentyne, 8 Ida. 431, 69 P. 995, is significant: "This exclusion of sheep owners under certain circumstances does not interfere with any rights of a citizen of the United States." And the case of Allev v. Bailey (Colo.), 14 P.2d 1087, seems to be determinative of the very point raised here. OPINION

  3. Jouflos v. Pitchford

    14 P.2d 1097 (Colo. 1932)

    2. LIVE STOCK — Sheep and Cattle — Public Range. This case controlled by the opinion in Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260. Error to the District Court of Moffat County, Hon. Charles E. Herrick, Judge.

  4. United States v. Boone

    476 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1973)   Cited 4 times

    Colorado statutes on other subjects govern the actions of individuals in this forest, and no reason appears why the United States as a landowner should not avail itself of Colorado statutory provisions which are available to other landowners under like circumstances. See Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 66 S.Ct. 663, 90 L.Ed. 793; Texas Oil Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), considered a boundary dispute which presents some different aspects, but it held that suits by the United States to protect its proprietary interest are local in nature. The same rationale is applicable here.

  5. Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes

    98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938)   Cited 21 times

    Only a few cases in the state courts have considered whether livestock growers may resort to an injunction to protect grazing privileges. Bradshaw v. Burstedt, 50 Idaho 54, 293 P. 330 (1930); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); George v. Chickasaw Land Co., 209 Ala. 648, 96 So. 781 (1923). Bradshaw v. Burstedt involved an Idaho statute which forbade, under criminal penalties, the grazing of sheep upon a range which had customarily been used as a cattle range.

  6. Turner v. Lyon

    189 Colo. 234 (Colo. 1975)   Cited 22 times
    In Turner v. Lyon, 189 Colo. 234, 539 P.2d 1241 (1975), the landlord failed to return the security deposit to the tenants before the tenants filed a demand-notice pursuant to section 38-12-103(3)(a).

    [1,2] There is a well-settled presumption that a statute is constitutional. Gates Rubber Co. v. South Suburban Metropolitan Recreation and Park District, 183 Colo. 222, 516 P.2d 436 (1973); Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932). The landlord, as assailant of the statute, bears the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

  7. People v. Summit

    183 Colo. 421 (Colo. 1974)   Cited 39 times
    Refusing to strike the statutory classification of marijuana as a narcotic because it was "a matter strictly for the legislature"

    [4] Accordingly, the following principles guide our review of constitutional attacks on legislation: Firstly, we presume that a statute is constitutional. Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932). Secondly, one who assails a statute bears the burden of showing it is unconstitutional.

  8. Gates v. So. Suburban Metro

    183 Colo. 222 (Colo. 1973)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that including after-acquired property is not unconstitutional

    Further a presumption in favor of constitutionality exists. Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118 (1970); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932). Absent a demonstration that legislation touches, concerns or infringes a fundamental right — which shifts the onus of proof to the State, Jarmel v. Putnam, 179 Colo. 215, 499 P.2d 603 (1972) — the scope of our review under the equal protection clause is limited to determining whether there is a rational basis for the exercise of legislative power, Wheeler v. Rudolph, 162 Colo. 410, 426 P.2d 762 (1967).

  9. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure

    272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1973)   Cited 85 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Providing that rules supersede procedural statutes

    Practice and procedure pertains to the legal machinery by which substantive law is made effective. Herberle v. P.R.O. Liquidating Co., 186 So.2d 280 (Fla.App. 1st 1966); State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 392 P.2d 775 (1964); Woodward v. Southern Pac. Co., 35 Cal.App.2d 130, 94 P.2d 1028 (1939); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953); Jones v. Erie Railroad Co., 106 Ohio St. 408, 140 N.E. 366 (1922); Jones v. Garrett, 192 Kan. 109, 386 P.2d 194 (1963); King v. Schumacher, 32 Cal.App.2d 172, 89 P.2d 466 (1939); and Heron v. Gaylor, 53 N.M. 44, 201 P.2d 366 (1948). It has also been said that substantive law creates, defines, adopts and regulates rights, while procedural law prescribes the method of enforcing those rights.

  10. O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Prod

    493 P.2d 344 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 39 times
    Construing C.R.S. § 81-9-1, the predecessor Workmen's Compensation Act

    O'Quinn's final argument is that the immunities resulting from 81-9-1 and 81-9-2 constitute special and exclusive legislation contrary to article V. section 25. "A law is not local or special when it is general and uniform in its operation upon all in like situation." McCarty v. Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691; Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087; Rifle Potato Growers Association v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 P. 937; Consumer's League v. Colo. So. Railway Co., 53 Colo. 54, 125 P. 577; People v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 94 P. 294. As noted above, the instant legislation confers an immunity on a general contractor or a real property owner in exchange for a duty which inheres to the benefit of a workman.