Opinion
No. 1335 C.D. 2013
06-18-2014
The Allegheny West Civic Council, Inc. and John DeSantis, Appellants v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh and City of Pittsburgh and PPG Public Parking, Inc.
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT
The Allegheny West Civic Council, Inc. and John DeSantis (collectively, Objectors) appeal an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that affirmed a decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh. Specifically, the Zoning Board held that the North Side Commercial Parking Area Overlay District did not prohibit a plan by PPG Public Parking, Inc. (Landowner) to use two existing parking lots for special events parking. Accordingly, Landowner did not need a variance to pursue its plan. Objectors contend that the trial court erred because the only issue raised in Landowner's appeal was whether it was entitled to a variance. We affirm the trial court.
Civic Council is a neighborhood organization representing the interests of the Allegheny West neighborhood of the City of Pittsburgh.
Landowner is the lessee of properties located at 1320-1330 (the 1320 property) and 1424 Western Avenue (the 1424 property), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The 1320 property is currently used for commercial businesses and a 52-space parking lot. The 1424 property is currently used for offices, a warehouse and a 34-space parking lot. Both properties are located in the North Side Commercial Parking Area Overlay District (Overlay District). Landowner seeks to use the parking lots for parking on nights and weekends, when the businesses are closed, for events at Heinz Field and PNC Park. To that end, Landowner filed two occupancy permit applications with the Zoning Administrator.
The Zoning Administrator denied the permits for the stated reason that commercial event parking was not permitted in the Overlay District by reason of Section 907.03.B of the Zoning Code. The Zoning Administrator advised Landowner that it needed a variance to pursue its plan. In accordance with the Zoning Administrator's instruction, Landowner appealed the Zoning Administrator's decisions, requesting a variance. The appeals were consolidated before the Zoning Board.
ZONING CODE OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA (1999).
At the hearing before the Zoning Board, Landowner presented evidence about the existing parking lots and how they would be used. Glenn Porter, an agent of Landowner, explained that under its lease of the properties, Landowner will use the properties from 18 to 22 days a year for the event parking. Porter stated that currently people park on the street illegally and people in the neighborhood sell spaces illegally.
Charles Latus, the landlord of one of the properties, also testified. He testified that people in the neighborhood supported the proposal because it will help control illegal parking in the area. He also noted that the proposal will generate additional tax revenue for the City.
DeSantis, an Objector in his own right and as a representative of the Allegheny West Civic Council, testified in opposition to Landowner's plan. He opined that the purpose of the Overlay District was to eliminate stadium event parking in North Side Neighborhoods and encourage those attending events at the stadium to park in downtown garages built by the taxpayers. He contended that a variance for event parking would directly violate Section 907.03.B of the Zoning Code. Section 907.03 states as follows:
907.03. NSCPO, North Side Commercial Parking Area Overlay District.ZONING CODE, ARTICLE III, §907.03 (internal footnote added).
907.03.A Intent
The intent of the NSCPO District is to prohibit the installation of commercial parking areas as defined under Sec. 911.02 on vacant lots.
907.03.B Application
When an Occupancy Permit Application is filed for zoning approval of a commercial parking area on property located within a NSCPO District, the Zoning Administrator shall disapprove the application.
Section 911.02 of the Zoning Code is a use table. Therein, the definition of commercial parking is listed as "an area used or intended to be used for the off-street parking of operable motor vehicles on a temporary basis, other than as accessory parking to a principal use, and excluding parking structures." Id. at 911-17.
The Zoning Board rejected Objectors' construction of Section 907.03.B and held that Landowner did not need a variance. It explained that Section 907.03.B directs the Zoning Administrator to deny occupancy permits for commercial parking, but this directive must be read in conjunction with Section 907.03.A, which states that the purpose of the Overlay District is to prohibit the "installation" of commercial parking areas on "vacant" lots. In other words, Section 907.03 was not intended to address or in any way proscribe stadium event parking in existing parking lots located in the Overlay District. Accordingly, Landowner did not need a variance from Section 907.03.B to operate commercial event parking on existing and actively used parking lots, which are accessory to the existing commercial uses of the properties.
Objectors appealed to the trial court. Noting that the Zoning Board's job was, inter alia, to interpret the Zoning Code, the trial court concluded that the Zoning Board's interpretation of Section 907.03 of the Zoning Code was correct. Accordingly, it affirmed. Objectors appealed to this Court.
Where the trial court takes no additional evidence, our scope of review is limited to determining whether the zoning board abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Blancett-Maddock v. City of Pittsburgh Zoning Board of Adjustment, 6 A.3d 595, 600 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs where the zoning board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence of record. Id.
On appeal, Objectors raise a number of issues. First, they argue that Landowner waived the issue that a variance was not needed under the Zoning Code and, thus, the Zoning Board erred in so holding. Second, they argue that the Zoning Board erred in its interpretation of the Zoning Code. Third, they argue that the Zoning Board erred because Landowner has not submitted a plan for its events parking lot.
For purposes of clarity, we have restated Objectors' six issues as three. Objectors argue that Landowner did not prove the hardship necessary for a variance. However, we do not address that issue because we conclude that a variance was not needed.
We begin with Objectors' assertion that the Zoning Board should never have even considered Section 907.03.A of the Zoning Code when Landowner did not raise that provision in its appeal. Landowner's application requested a variance and that was the only issue before the Zoning Board. Landowner responds that the Zoning Administrator directed it to seek a variance when he denied Landowner's permit applications. In any case, the meaning of Section 907.03 of the Zoning Code was squarely before the Zoning Board because it was raised by Objectors.
In support of its position that the Zoning Board erred in reaching the meaning of Section 907.03.A, Objectors rely upon Orange Stones Company v. Borough of Hamburg Zoning Hearing Board, 991 A.2d 996 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In Orange Stones, the landowner appealed the denial of a permit to build a rehabilitation center for drug users, which the zoning officer found to be a hospital, a use not permitted in the zoning district. Before the zoning board, the landowner produced evidence to show that the center was not a hospital. The zoning board found that the center was a hospital or, alternatively, a jail, which also was not a permitted use. The trial court affirmed the zoning board on the grounds that the proposed center was a jail, a use not permitted in the zoning district.
Objectors also cite Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB) v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City and County of Philadelphia, 682 A.2d 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), but without explanation of its significance. In SCRUB, the trial court sua sponte raised the issue of the objector's standing to appeal. Finding the objector lacked standing, the trial court quashed the appeal. This Court reversed, explaining that the issue of standing was not raised before the zoning board, and is not jurisdictional. As such, the trial court did not have authority to raise an issue not preserved.
On appeal to this Court, the landowner argued that the zoning board erred by raising an issue not identified by the zoning officer or by the parties to the hearing. We agreed. The landowner came to the hearing to present evidence on why the center was not a hospital. It had no advance warning that it had also to present evidence on why the center was not a jail. We explained that the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) gives the zoning board appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the zoning officer, who acts as a gate-keeper. Accordingly, the zoning board may clarify the issues, but it may not raise a new issue. Orange Stones is distinguishable.
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§10101-11202.
First, we decided Orange Stones on the basis of Section 909.1(a)(3) of the MPC. The MPC does not apply to second class cities, i.e., the City of Pittsburgh. Broussard v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 907 A.2d 494, 499 n.7 (Pa. 2006).
Section 909.1 was added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329. Section 909.1(a)(3) states:
(a) The zoning hearing board shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and render final adjudications in the following matters:
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(3) Appeals from the determination of the zoning officer, including, but not limited to, the granting or denial of any permit, or failure to act on the application therefor, the issuance of any cease and desist order or the registration or refusal to register any nonconforming use, structure or lot.
Second, Orange Stones turned on a factual question. The landowner in Orange Stones was deprived of its ability to present evidence relevant to whether its proposed center was a jail. Here, the question is purely legal. The Zoning Administrator's action placed the meaning of Section 907.03.B before the Zoning Board. Indeed, DeSantis did as well. He repeatedly asserted that Section 907.03.B of the Zoning Code was intended to eliminate any commercial parking in the Overlay District, without exception.
Third, Objectors place far too much emphasis on the appeal forms that were filled out by Landowner. Landowner checked the box for "variance" from Section 907.03.B because it was advised to do so by the Zoning Administrator. The appeal form is not a pleading, but an informal document that gets a landowner's challenge to a decision of the Zoning Administrator on the Zoning Board agenda. Reproduced Record at 6a, 9a. See, e.g., Reyes v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Amtec), 967 A.2d 1071, 1079 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (noting that waiver rules applicable to pleadings filed in judicial proceedings do not apply in administrative proceedings).
The Zoning Board acted within its scope of authority in reversing the Zoning Administrator. That is the point of the hearing. Section 923.02.B of the Zoning Code grants the Zoning Board the following powers:
1. To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is error in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by the Zoning Administrator or the Chief of the Bureau of Building Inspection in the administration of this Code, and, upon appeal, to interpret any provision of this Code where its meaning or application is in question;
2. To authorize upon appeal, in specific cases, variances from the terms of this Code in accordance with Sec. 922.09;
3. To hear and decide, upon appeal from the grant or denial of zoning approval with respect to a specific application, issues of the validity of any provision of this Code; and
4. To hear and decide special exceptions authorized by specific provisions of this Code, in accordance with Sec. 922.07 and other provisions of this Code that prescribe standards for the respective special exceptions authorized.ZONING CODE, ARTICLE VII, §923.02.B (emphasis added). On appeal, the Zoning Board stepped into the shoes of the Zoning Administrator with authority to act with "all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal has been taken." ZONING CODE, ARTICLE VII, §923.02.B.5. It acted de novo in holding that Landowner did not need a variance from Section 907.03.B, as had been decided by the Zoning Administrator.
5. The Board, in conformity with this Code, may affirm or reverse or modify, wholly or partly, any order, requirement, decision or determination appealed, and may make such order as it finds to be proper, as if acting with all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal has been taken.
In their second issue, Objectors argue that the Zoning Board erred in its interpretation of Section 907.03.B of the Zoning Code. Objectors argue that the Zoning Board erred by focusing on Section 907.03.A when it should have focused exclusively on Section 907.03.B. Objectors claim that Section 907.03.B unambiguously forbids the issuance of a permit for any commercial parking lot located in the Overlay District and, thus, is dispositive of Landowner's request for a permit.
Objectors argue that the Zoning Board did not give proper deference to the Zoning Administrator's interpretation of the Zoning Code. As stated above, the Zoning Board has the authority "upon appeal, to interpret any provision of this Code where its meaning or application is in question." ZONING CODE, ARTICLE VII, §923.02.B.1. Its review is de novo. --------
The principles of statutory construction are generally followed when construing local ordinances. Reaman v. Allentown Power Center, L.P., 74 A.3d 371, 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). The basic principles are as follows:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
1 Pa. C.S. §1921.(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
The Zoning Code prohibits "the installation of commercial parking areas ... on vacant lots." ZONING CODE, ARTICLE III, §907.03.A. Landowner has no plans to "install" a new parking area on a vacant lot. Landowner will use its existing parking lot. Objectors offer an interpretation of the Zoning Code that gives full weight to Section 907.03.B and none at all to Section 907.03.A. We hold that the Zoning Board correctly construed Section 907.03.B in context by reading it together with Section 907.03.A. These two provisions must be read together. 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(a).
Finally, Objectors contend that the Zoning Board erred because Landowner did not submit a plan for its commercial parking lots, as required by the Zoning Code. Objectors have attached addenda to their brief setting forth site development and review plans required for the North Side Overlay District.
The Zoning Board dismissed Landowner's requests for a variance because it concluded that a variance was not needed to operate a special event parking lot on an existing and active parking lot. The issue of a site plan was not raised before the Zoning Board or the trial court. Issues not raised before the trial court are waived on appeal to this Court. Pennsylvania Bankers Association v. Pennsylvania Department of Banking, 962 A.2d 609, 621 (Pa. 2008). Whether Landowner needs to submit a site plan is an issue not preserved and not before this Court.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's order.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 18th day of June, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dated July 10, 2013 is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
53 P.S. §10909.1(a)(3). We concluded that the General Assembly's intent in enacting the MPC was that where the zoning board acted in its appellate jurisdiction it could not raise an issue that was not before the zoning officer. Orange Stones, 991 A.2d at 998-99.