Opinion
CIVIL 1:20-cv-00933
02-25-2022
ANDREW ALLAM, SR., Plaintiff, v. SUPERINTENDENT MCGINLEY, et al., Defendants.
Brann, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Andrew Allam, Sr. (“Allam”) filed a motion for preliminary injunction on October 29, 2021, claiming that he is being denied “j-pays” and that his mail is being interfered with by the SCI Coal Township (“SCI Coal Twp.”) staff. Doc. 34. Because Allam's request for injunctive relief does not relate to his complaint, we recommend that the court deny his motion for a preliminary injunction.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Allam commenced this action pro se on June 9, 2020, by filing a complaint. Doc. 1. We screened Allam's complaint, and on January 26, 2021, we granted Allam leave to file an amended complaint. Doc. 13. On February 22, 2021, Allam filed his amended complaint. Doc. 15. In his amended complaint, Allam names Superintendent McGinley (“McGinley”), SCI-Coal Township Security Office (“Security Office”), Lieutenant Drucis (“Drucis”), Sergeant Cohoon (“Cohoon”), Sergeant Gordner (“Gordner”), Lieutenant Neitz (“Neitz”), and John Wetzel (“Wetzel”), Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, as Defendants (collectively “Defendants”). Id.
Allam alleges that his custody and confinement at SCI Coal Twp. is not safe. In his amended complaint, he claims that he is in danger because other inmates have labeled him a snitch. Doc. 15 at 3, 5, 6, 8. Additionally, Allam alleges that other inmates know about his child sex offender status and have threatened him because of it. Id. at 5, 6, 8, 10, 12. Per Allam, he has informed the SCI Coal Twp. staff regarding various threats and incidents; however, he claims they have demonstrated a deliberate indifference to this danger. Id. at 8, 10, 12, 14.
On October 29, 2021, Allam filed a motion for injunction regarding issues with his “j-pays” and mail. Doc. 34. On that same day, Allam filed a brief in support of his motion for preliminary injunction. Doc. 35. In his brief, Allam claims that the SCI Coal Twp. staff has failed to provide him with notice as to when his legal mail is returned. Id. at 1-2. Additionally, Allam alleges that the SCI Coal Twp. staff failed to notify him regarding legal mail that was returned by the “N.Y. Dist. Court.” Id. at 2. Per Allam, the SCI Coal Twp. staff has interfered with his “j-pays” and has prevented him from receiving them from various individuals. Id. at 3. Allam claims that the SCI Coal Twp. is interfering with his legal mail and “j-pays” because of his underlying action against the SCI Coal Twp. staff. Id. at 4-5.
On November 11, 2016, the defendants filed a brief in opposition to Allam's motion for preliminary injunction. Accordingly, this matter is fully briefed and is ripe for decision. For the reasons discussed below, we recommend that the court deny Allam's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Filed concurrently with this Report and Recommendation is another Report and Recommendation regarding the defendants' motion to dismiss Allam's amended complaint. We recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.
III. Discussion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. The standard for deciding motions for temporary restraining orders and motions for preliminary injunctions are generally the same. “The difference is that a TRO may be issued with little or no notice and may dissolve on its own accord.” Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Koenig, No. CIV.A. 11-6140-NLH, 2012 WL 379940, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2012); Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b) (providing that the court may issue a temporary restraining order “without written or oral notice to the adverse party” if certain conditions are met). Here, because the Defendants have received notice of and have responded to Allam's motion, we will treat Allam's motion as a motion for a preliminary injunction.
A motion for a preliminary injunction is judged against exacting legal standards. Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). Rather, it “is an ‘extraordinary remedy.'” Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)). A motion for such is properly granted only if such relief is the “only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937).
“When evaluating a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a court considers four factors: (1) has the moving party established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits (which need not be more likely than not); (2) is the movant more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) does the balance of equities tip in its favor; and (4) is an injunction in the public interest?” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2019). “The first two factors are prerequisites for a movant to prevail.” Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 2018). “If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017).
In his motion for preliminary injunction and in his brief, Allam contends that he is being denied “j-pays” and that his legal mail from New York is being returned. Allam argues that Defendants are retaliating against him for filing his amended complaint. The Defendants contend that the court should deny Allam's motion as it concerns issues that are not raised in Allam's amended complaint.
As the first two factors necessary for a preliminary injunction “suggest, there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). Thus, it is inappropriate to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction when the relief requested in the motion is unrelated to the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 838; see also Moneyham v. Ebbert, 723 Fed.Appx. 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that the District Court correctly denied a “requested injunction because it involved allegations unrelated to the complaint”).
Here, Allam is seeking a preliminary injunction, requesting that we stop the Defendants from allegedly interfering with his “j-pays” and legal mail. But the claims in Allam's amended complaint have nothing to do with his “j-pays” or legal mail. Rather, the claims in Allam's amended complaint concern Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims and concerns about the conditions of SCI Coal Twp., particularly regarding COVID-19. The nature of the preliminary injunctive relief that Allam seeks has no nexus to the claims he raises in his amended complaint. Thus, Allam cannot show that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction in this case, and we recommend denying his motion for such.
IV. Recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the court deny Allam's motion (doc. 34) for a preliminary injunction.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to
which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.