When a shipment of 200 pounds or less includes both low- and high-rated commodities — i. e., if it is a so-called "mixed shipment" — the applicable class-determined charge is determined by separately calculating such charge for each category of goods shipped (applying the Class 50 Rate to all articles rated lower than Class 110). Of course, if the resulting charge is lower than the appropriate minimum charge for the weight bracket in question, the minimum charge will apply. While both sides press All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, N. H. H. R. R., 379 U.S. 343, 85 S.Ct. 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964), upon us, its precise holding, that the Commission had erred in determining that all-commodity rates established to meet competition violated § 1(6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(6), the railroad equivalent of § 216(b), does not materially aid us. What is useful to us in that opinion is the discussion, 379 U.S. at 348-350, 85 S.Ct. 419, of the approach the Commission and Congress have taken to classification and the importance they have attached to it. As shown by analysis of the list of fifteen characteristics generally considered in determining the class to which a commodity should be assigned, 379 U.S. at 345 n. 2, 85 S.Ct. 419, classification has served two major purposes, in addition to its practical utility, when used in conjunction with a class tariff, of making it "possible for carriers to publish reasonable charges for transporting all articles of commerce between all points in the United States without the necessity of publishing billions of separate and dist
It is a rate "made specifically applicable for the carriage of a particular commodity or group of commodities from one designated point to another." All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, New Haven Hartford Railroad Co., 379 U.S. 343, 345, 85 S.Ct. 419, 420, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964). Commodity rates are distinguished from class rates which are rates "which appl[y] on any one or more of various articles according to the class or rating to which they are assigned. . . ."
Thus, although they are distinct elements, both classification and rate play a part in establishing the ultimate cost of shipping a commodity. In All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, New Haven Hartford R.R., 379 U.S. 343, 85 S.Ct. 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964), the Supreme Court noted: "The characteristics of a commodity which are generally considered in determining the classification to which it should be assigned are: 1. Shipping weight per cubic foot. 2. Liability to damage.
Section 1(6) (printed in full supra, page 4, footnote 6) requires carriers to "establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable classifications of property for transportation, with reference to which rates, tariffs, regulations, or practices are or may be made or prescribed, and just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting classifications, rates or tariffs. . . ." Citing All States Freight v. New York, N.H. H.R.R., 379 U.S. 343, 85 S.Ct. 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964), plaintiffs contend that § 1(6) applies only where "class" rates are in issue. The Court in All States was called upon to determine whether § 1(6) applied to "all commodity" freight rates and the Court ruled that it did not, and limited its applicability to "class" rates.
A specific commodity rate may be established to cover a specific, narrowly-defined product and is usually less expensive than a class rate which covers broad, general classes of commodities. See All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, New Haven Hartford Railroad Co., 379 U.S. 343, 345, 85 S.Ct. 419, 420, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964). Because a carrier is required to follow strictly its published tariffs, see 49 U.S.C. § 11916 (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 41(2)), a commodity rate may be applied only if the product shipped fits the description in the tariff schedule exactly. If there is no commodity rate, the applicable class rate then applies.
15. Competition with other commodities transported. All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, New Haven Hartford R.R., 379 U.S. 343, 345 n. 2, 85 S.Ct. 419, 421 n. 2, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964); accord Motor Carrier Rates in New England, 47 M.C.C. 657, 660-61 (1948). The fact that all characteristics should be considered, however, does not mean that all will be relevant in determining the ultimate classification for a particular item.
This concern did not extend to commodity rates because they "were competitively compelled reductions from whatever class rate would otherwise be applicable, and because standardization of commodity rates would have been completely inconsistent with their basic function of accommodating specific particularized competitive conditions." 379 U.S. 343, 85 S.Ct. 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964).Id. at 344, 85 S.Ct. at 420, 13 L.Ed.2d at 325-326.
Thus the voluntary reduction of a rate is not per se proof that the prior rate was unreasonably high. Atmospheric Nitrogen Corp. v. N. W.Ry. Co., 195 I.C.C. 747, 748 (1933). Class rates are ordinarily the maximum permissible level, and a commodity rate in excess of class rates would be an anomaly to be viewed with suspicion. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. P.R.R. Co., 323 I.C.C. 503, 507 (1964); All States Freight v. N.Y., N.H. H.R.R. Co., 379 U.S. 343, 345-346, 353, 85 S.Ct. 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964). Cf. Director General v. Viscose Co., 245 U.S. 498, 502, 41 S.Ct. 151, 65 L.Ed. 372 (1921).
In determining the proper classification for an item, many factors are considered. In All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, N Y H. RR., 379 U.S. 343, 85 S.Ct. 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 324, the United States Supreme Court stated: The characteristics of a commodity which are generally considered in determining the classification to which it should be assigned are:
In the face of this settled interpretation of the Act by the Commission itself as well as the courts, the deference ordinarily due to the construction of the Act by the administrative agency responsible for its enforcement is not called for. See All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, New Haven Hartford Railroad, 379 U.S. 343, 85 S.Ct. 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 324 (1964); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 35, 41-42 (N.D.Ill. 1962); United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383, 396, 76 S.Ct. 416, 100 L.Ed. 441 (1956). I.C.C. v. Baltimore Ohio R.R., 225 U.S. 326, 32 S.Ct. 742, 56 L.Ed. 1107 (1912).