(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 201, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). The legislature, thus, may enact legislation that causes an involuntary change in the position of litigants, such as providing for the effects of a merger or consolidation of stock corporations; All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, supra, 213 Conn. 184; or for deeming the attorney general a party to a paternity proceeding even though he or she does not appear or participate in court proceedings.
We are mindful that it has been the legislature's goal to place the burden of preventing harm to the public that results from the sale of alcoholic liquor on those that profit from its sale. See Pierce v. Albanese, supra, 144 Conn. at 249–50, 129 A.2d 606 (citing protection of public as one purpose of act); see also All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 198, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989) (“[w]e have recognized the pervasiveness of the state's control over the liquor business ... [b]ecause of the danger to the public health and welfare inherent in ... liquor traffic” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Nonetheless, there is good cause to question the fairness and incremental gains to public safety of a construction under which a purveyor will be liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated patron even if it has taken every reasonable precaution to avoid selling alcohol to patrons who appear to have reached a point of intoxication.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 208-209, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). "[T]hese principles require that a [party] have . . . an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally."
. . . Long ago, the United States Supreme Court added emphasis to the principle that the law subsisting at the time the contract is made governs as if expressly referred to in the agreement when it held that `[t]his principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement' VonHoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550, 18 L. Ed. 403 (1866); see Cislo v. Shelton, 35 Conn. Sup. 645, 652, 405 A.2d 84 (1978)." All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 199, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989); accord 17A Am. Jur. 2d 357-59, Contracts § 371 (2004) ("Contracting parties are presumed to contract in reference to the existing law, and to have in mind all the existing laws relating to the contract, or to the subject matter thereof. All existing applicable or relevant and valid statutes, ordinances, regulations, and settled law of the land at the time a contract is made become a part of it and must be read into it just as if an express provision to that effect were inserted therein, except where the contract discloses a contrary intention.").
Consequently, the Court's function in reviewing the factual questions is not to retry the case. Ottochian v. Freedom of Info. Comm., 221 Conn. 393, 397 (1992); All Brand Importers v. Dep't. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 192-93 (1989). The question is not whether this Court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the agency supports the action taken.
1 et seq. "Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature and there is no need for statutory construction or a review of the legislative history." All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 195, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). "The words used in a statue must be given their commonly approved meaning, unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed."
Our function is to interpret statutes as they are written and not to read into a statute a provision that is not clearly stated. All Brand Importers v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 195, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989). The function of the commissioner, in carrying out the legislative mandate of imposing a succession tax on the privilege of receiving property from a decedent at death, is to compute and assess the taxes due the state.
Since the defendant [department] is not listed as exempt in any of these sections, it is therefore nonexempt and is subject to the provisions of the UAPA." Hartford v. Powers, 183 Conn. 76, 81, 438 A.2d 824 (1981); see All Brand Importers v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 211, 211 n. 15, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989) ("The provisions of the UAPA apply to the department of liquor control . . ."); Crescimanni v. Liquor Control Commission, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain, No. CV 94 536961 (Oct. 6, 1994), affirmed, 41 Conn. App. 83, 674 A.2d 851 (1996) ("The plaintiffs appeal is authorized by [General Statutes] §§ 30-60 and 4-183"); cf. Bendell v. Johnson, 153 Conn. 48, 50-51, 212 A.2d 199 (1965); Kiska v. Skrensky, 145 Conn. 28, 34, 138 A.2d 523 (1958); Newington v. Mazzoccoli, 133 Conn. 146, 156, 48 A.2d 729 (1946). "It is a well-settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling.
In addition, "the law subsisting at the time the contract is made governs as if expressly referred to in the agreement . . . [and] . . . `[t]his principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement.'" All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 199, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989) (quoting Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866)). At the time of the Agreement, as now, neither Connecticut nor federal law permitted an unqualified private right of action for employment discrimination; both required exhaustion of administrative remedies first.
" The statute immediately vests the predecessor corporation's rights in the successor corporation "without further act or deed," and its "language is to be construed broadly." All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 199, 200 (1989) (construing earlier statute). That familiar principle extends to non-compete agreements.