Opinion
CV 076337/09
01-31-2012
All Boro Psychological Services, P.C., A/A/O MARGARITA FRANCO, Plaintiff, v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., Defendant.
Sara Pankowski, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Gary Tsirelman, PC Morgan MacKay, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Law Offices of Teresa M. Spina
Sara Pankowski, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Gary Tsirelman, PC
Morgan MacKay, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Law Offices of Teresa M. Spina
Reginald A. Boddie, J.
In this action, plaintiff seeks to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for psychological services alleged to have been provided to the subject assignor. Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for an initial interview in the amount of $194.58, evaluation of records in the amount of $67.24, five hours of psychological testing in the amount of $696.50, and explanation and interpretation of results in the amount of $103.31 (plaintiff's bill). Plaintiff was paid for the initial interview. The remainder of the services were denied as medically unnecessary (defendant's NF-10).
The case was tried on December 8, 2010. At trial, plaintiff and defendant stipulated in writing to plaintiff's prima facie case, defendant's timely denial, admission of the expert witness disclosure package, which included the peer review report and medical records reviewed, and that the only issue for trial was lack of medical necessity.
Plaintiff rested, relying on the stipulation that it had established its prima facie case.
Defendant's witness was unavailable and defendant moved to adjourn the trial to a later date to call a witness. Since defendant failed to show good cause, the application to adjourn was denied. (NY City Civ Ct Act § 1302 [a]). Plaintiff then moved for a directed verdict on the ground that defendant was not ready to proceed and could not establish its defense (CPLR 4401). Defendant opposed plaintiff's motion and cross-moved for a judgment in its favor, relying on the stipulation that it established timely and proper denials, and that the peer review report and medical records were in evidence. The court reserved decision and the parties submitted post-trial briefs on January 2, 2012 and January 12, 2012. After consideration of the evidence and the parties' arguments, the court denies plaintiff's motion and grants judgment to the defendant for the reasons indicated herein.
Under New York no-fault law, plaintiff must establish its prima facie case by demonstrating submission to the defendant of a claim form, proof of the fact and amount of the loss sustained, and proof either that the defendant failed to pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period, or that the defendant issued a timely denial that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Here, plaintiff did not offer any evidence establishing that the denial was untimely, conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the parties' prima facie stipulation, the burden shifted to defendant to prove the timeliness of its denial and the defense stated therein (Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 18, 2004 NY Slip Op 24527 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). However, because the parties also stipulated that defendant timely denied the bills, the only issue for trial was lack of medical necessity.
Defendant "bears both the burden of production and persuasion" as to its defense of lack of medical necessity (Nir v Allstate Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 544 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2005],citing King's Med. Supply Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 5 Misc 3d 767, 771 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2004]); and the sole evidence presented here by defendant is the peer report and medical records which were stipulated into evidence.
To meet its burden of proof at trial on the defense of lack of medical necessity, at a minimum, defendant must establish a factual basis and medical rationale for the lack of medical necessity for the services for which reimbursement is sought (Nir, 7 Misc 3d at 546-547, [citations omitted]). To establish the factual basis, the defense must be supported by sufficient factual evidence or proof and cannot be conclusory (Nir at 547, citing Inwood Hill Med. v Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 1110[A], 2004 Slip Op 50565[U] [Civ Ct, New York County 2004]). A peer review report may be found to have insufficient factual basis "...if it fails to provide specifics of the claim, is conclusory, or otherwise lacks a basis in the facts of the claim" (Nir at 547, citing Amaze Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 43, 2004 NY Slip Op 24119 [App Term, 2d Dept 2004]).
Furthermore, the medical rationale referenced in a peer review report must be within the generally accepted medical or professional practice. "Generally accepted practice is that range of practice that the profession will follow in the diagnosis and treatment of patients in light of the standards and values that define its calling" (Nir at 547, citing Citywide Social Work & Psychological Serv. PLLC v Travelers Indem. Co., 3 Misc 3d 608, 616 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2004]). A peer review report may be found insufficient when unsupported or controverted by evidence of "generally accepted medical/professional practice" (id.). However, where plaintiff rebuts the defendant's evidence with its own demonstrating that the medical services were consistent with generally accepted medical practice, the defendant's peer report may be accorded less weight, and the court may find that defendant failed to meet its burden (Nir at 547, citing see Elm Med. P.C. v Am. Home Assur. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 51357[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2003]).
As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the peer review report of Michael H. Rosenfeld, Psy.D. was electronically signed and not notarized (see Rogy Medical, P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Radiology Today, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 70, 71-72 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; CPLR 2106). Despite this omission, the court is compelled to consider the report as direct evidence of defendant's defense since the document was admitted pursuant to the parties' stipulation; and a court may not cast aside an open-court stipulation absent proof it was entered into by "fraud, collusion, mistake, accident or other such ground" (Matinzi v Joy, 60 NY2d 835, 836 [1983]; In re Frutiger's Estate, 29 NY2d 143 [1971]; Gage v Jay Bee Photographer, Inc.,222 AD2d 648, 649 [2d Dept 1995]). Here, no such proof was alleged or demonstrated.
The subject assignor, a thirty-seven year old female, was involved in a motor vehicle accident on January 8, 2008, and was alleged to have suffered head, neck and lower back pain, and gone home after the accident (Narrative Report at 2). The psychologist allegedly interviewed the assignor and gave her a mental status examination along with a series of self- administered checklist tests, including a Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), a Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), Neuropsychological Symptom (NSC), Patient Pain Profile (P-3), and Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) (id. at 4).
The peer review doctor, Michael H. Rosenfeld, Psy.D., a New York State Licensed Psychologist, whose report and resume were admitted into evidence, stated that he reviewed the patient's records concerning the services provided by John R. Braun, Ph.D., as well as the reports and recommendations related thereto. In the report, he indicated:
Claimant is a 37-year-old female who alleges she was involved in a motor vehicle accident on January 8, 2008 and was evaluated by John R. Braun, Ph.D. from All Boro Psychological Services, P.C. from January 16, 2008 to January 23, 2008. The claimant received a diagnostic interview, a review of medical records, five hours of psychological testing and an explanation of results (Peer Report at 1). Claimant was the driver of a vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident on 1/08/08 reportedly resulting in head, neck and lower back pain. There was no loss of consciousness, fractures or lacerations (id. at 2). "...[T]he initial subjective complaints included: increased general nervousness, fear of driving or riding in cars, nightmares, headaches, dizziness, irritability, etc." (id.).
Dr. Rosenfeld stated, "Given the complaints, the initial intake was appropriate, the psychological testing was excessive, clinically unnecessary, and deviates from accepted standard practice in psychology" (id. at 2). Citing psychological reference material, Dr. Rosenfeld explained, such tests "should not be used routinely, but to address specific questions, the answer to which may alter the patient's treatment." He then set forth three basic criteria which, when met, establish the necessity of psychological testing within the profession, as follows:
1. The reason for testing must be based on a specific referral question or questions from the treating provider and related directly to the psychiatric or psychological treatment of the patient 2. The specific referral question or questions cannot be answered by means of diagnostic interview 3. The specific referral question or questions and testing results will have a meaningful impact on the rendering of a diagnosis and the course or outcome of treatment (id.)He stated, in this case, none of the criteria were met and elaborated on the reasons why the administration of these tests was inappropriate; namely, that the testing would not alter the diagnosis or treatment of the patient in any meaningful way. He also stated review of the records is normally part of the initial interview and the explanation was unnecessary since the tests were not warranted (id. at 3).
Accordingly, the court finds that Dr. Rosenfeld's peer review report sets forth a sufficient factual basis and medical rationale for the lack of medical necessity asserted in the denial. The court notes plaintiff has failed to rebut defendant's evidence with its own testimonial or other documentary evidence (see Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 137[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 5232[U][App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009], citing see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Additionally, the court acknowledges there are circumstances where a live witness would be required to embellish defendant's position. However, on these facts, the court finds defendant was not required to present an expert witness to provide live testimony at trial, particularly since plaintiff did not offer a witness or any evidence whatsoever on rebuttal.
Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict is denied. Defendant is granted a judgment in its favor, and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.
Dated: January 31, 2012
Brooklyn, NY
_______________________
Hon. Reginald A. Boddie
Judge, Civil Court