"A case is moot, and thus falls outside of the judicial power conferred in Article III, if the outcome will no longer settle an active dispute about the parties' legal rights." Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2014). "The party asserting mootness bears the burden of persuasion."
I. BACKGROUNDIn 2003, after marrying a United States citizen and submitting a naturalization application, Petitioner (a native of Jordan) was examined by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). Although Petitioner signed an oath of allegiance in the presence of an USCIS officer, allegedly, additional documents were needed and a final decision on the application was not made.
Our conclusion on the issue of statutory interpretation presented here is in agreement with each of our sister circuits that have addressed this question. See Aljabri v. Holder , 745 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) ; Bustamante v. Napolitano , 582 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2009) ; Etape v. Chertoff , 497 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Hovsepian , 359 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990 ("the 1990 Act"), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization proceedings rested with federal district courts.
Several circuits have interpreted the language of § 1447(b) to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the district court. See Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2014); Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 2009); Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 385 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1164 (9th Cir. 2004). Those circuits reasoned that Congress gave the district court the power to "determine the matter" once a naturalization petition is properly in front of it, and that it would be illogical to read this unqualified grant of power to give USCIS the prerogative to nullify the court's statutory power.
We begin by noting that even after a litigant has paid a filing fee, district courts have "ample authority" to dismiss "transparently defective" suits. Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (sua sponte dismissal permitted "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid"); see also Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2014). Our review of a dismissal for legal frivolousness is plenary.
Jacobs relies on several immigration cases that addressed a statute with a similar provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), allowing a naturalization applicant to file a petition in federal court if the agency fails to render a decision within 120 days. See Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding the agency loses jurisdiction over an application once the applicant files in federal court); Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 409-10 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 384-85 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same). However, those cases addressed the separate question of whether the agency retained jurisdiction once suit was filed in district court.
These allegations, accepted as true, do not so clearly suggest a standing problem as to require sua sponte action. See Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2018); Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2014).
But when the plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, only frivolousness can justify the sua sponte dismissal without giving notice and the opportunity to respond. Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2014); Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, we are satisfied based on the balance of the order that the court indeed found the complaint frivolous.
For one thing, § 1292(b) does govern the transfer of adjudicatory authority to the courts of appeals; it empowers the court of appeals to review a district-court order, and once that order is on appeal, the district court can no longer modify it. See Aljabri v. Holder , 745 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2014) ("The retained jurisdiction [under § 1292(b) ] allows the district court to proceed with other aspects of the case; it does not mean that the district court can continue to modify the same order that is up on interlocutory appeal."). But in any event, Groves puts far too much weight on Hamer ’s use of the word "transfer."
And since the defendants had not moved to dismiss Bertha's amended complaint, the judge could not dismiss sua sponte without first disclosing his intentions and giving Bertha a chance to respond. See Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2014); Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2005). Here the judge did not even consider the amended complaint, much less disclose any concerns he may have had with the allegations contained in it.