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dismissing constitutional tort claims against private actor for want of state action
Summary of this case from Toomer v. Cellco P'shipOpinion
06 Civ. 508 (JSR).
May 18, 2006
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Morris Algarin, a former officer with the New York City Department of Corrections ("DOC"), brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law, alleging claims of false imprisonment against two hospitals where he was involuntarily committed and against the doctors who allegedly participated in his commitment. Presently pending before the Court are the motions of two of the defendants, Holliswood Hospital and Dr. Vladimir Milstein, to dismiss the claims against them.
The facts pertinent to the instant motions, as alleged in the Amended Complaint, are as follows. After suffering a mental breakdown at work in September 2004, Algarin was put on sick leave and, pursuant to DOC sick leave regulations, began periodically meeting with staff at a unit of the DOC responsible for treating sick corrections officers. During one such visit on January 27, 2005, Algarin was involuntarily detained and taken to Elmhurst Hospital, where he was evaluated and discharged approximately 12 hours later. On Algarin's next visit on February 7, 2005, he was again involuntarily taken to Elmhurst Hospital; on this occasion, moreover, the doctors determined that Algarin should be involuntarily admitted. The following day, Algarin was transferred to Holliswood Hospital, where he was seen by Dr. Milstein, who continued his confinement for an additional six days.
Defendant Milstein moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims under § 1983 and the New York State Constitution on the ground that he is not a state actor. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160 (1978). Dr. Milstein, a private citizen employed by a private hospital, may be considered a state actor in the circumstances of this case only if (a) the state "exercised coercive power or . . . provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State," Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), or (b) he was a "willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents," Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). The only allegation in the Amended Complaint that is suggestive of either possibility is the allegation that Dr. Milstein acted "at the behest of Dr. Barouche [a state actor] and possibly other state actors." See Amended Complaint ¶ 40. This is far too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss. See Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997). Nor, given that this is already an Amended Complaint, is leave to re-plead appropriate. Moreover, plaintiff has not suggested that there are any further facts he could plead as to this aspect. Accordingly, defendant Milstein's motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2 of the Amended Complaint as to him must be granted with prejudice.
Although the test of state action under the New York state constitution is somewhat more "flexible" than under the federal constitution, see, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160 (1978), the basic inquiry is the same.
Plaintiff's only other allegation of a connection between Dr. Milstein and a state actor, i.e., Dr. Milstein's alleged statement that he and Dr. Barouche were "good friends" who had known each other for "many years," Amended Complaint ¶ 40, does not suggest the existence of either state compulsion or a conspiracy.
Although this removes the federal claim against Dr. Milstein, the Court will continue to exercise pendent jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining claim against Dr. Milstein.
Defendants Milstein and Holliswood Hospital also move to dismiss plaintiff's claim of false imprisonment for failing to state a claim. Under New York law, to establish a cause of action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975). Both Holliswood Hospital and Dr. Milstein argue that plaintiff fails to state a claim for false imprisonment because confinement pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law is privileged. However, confinement under the Mental Hygiene Law is only privileged in the absence of medical malpractice, see, e.g., Higgins v. City of Oneonta, 617 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App.Div. 1994);Ferretti v. Town of Greenburgh, 595 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (App. Div. 1993), and the essence of plaintiff's complaint is that Dr. Milstein did not provide an appropriate standard of care because he did not meaningfully evaluate Algarin's condition but, instead, automatically admitted him. Amended Complaint ¶ 40. Thus, plaintiff has stated a claim for false imprisonment under New York law.
The Court has considered the parties' other arguments but finds them without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, defendant Milstein's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and N.Y. State Constitution Art. 1, § 6 is hereby granted with prejudice, and defendants' motions are in all other respects denied.
SO ORDERED.