"Any agreement or conveyance of any kind or character violative of any of the provisions of this paragraph shall be absolutely void and not susceptible of ratification in any manner, and no rule of estoppel shall ever prevent the assertion of its invalidity" — such deeds are absolutely void. Bragdon v. McShea, 26 Okla. 31, 107 P. 916; Jefferson v. Winkler, 26 Okla. 653, 110 P. 755; Tirey v. Darneal, 37 Okla. 606, 133 P. 614 (also 37 Okla. 611, 132 P. 1087); Stevens v. Elliott, 30 Okla. 41, 118 P. 407; Collins Inv. Co. v. Beard, 46 Okla. 310, 148 P. 846; Alfrey v. Colbert, 168 Fed. 231, 93 C. C. A. 517; Priddy v. Thompson, 204 Fed. 955, 123 C. C. A. 277. Attempted conveyances of this character being absolutely void, the question then arises as to whether or not the grantees of the allottee are estopped to assert their invalidity by reason of fraudulent representations made by the allottee, to O.F. Parks, grantee, that he was of age at the time he executed the deeds, executed during minority.

And to that end the second deed was made, executed, and delivered, whereupon the parties grantee therein paid off the $1,700 note made payable that day to plaintiff, which made up, with the $300 already paid her, the $2,000 cash payment recited in the second deed, and executed their note, payable to her for $1,600, as therein recited, which was afterwards paid. From all of which it appears that, being evidence of or part of one and the same transaction, the taint of illegality in the first was carried over and entered into the making of the second deed, and that both must fall for the reason that for their making a contract or agreement was entered into before the removal of the plaintiff's restrictions. This is in keeping with Alfrey v. Colbert, 7 Ind. T. 338, 104 S.W. 638, which was quoted approvingly on another point in International Land Co. v. Marshall, 22 Okla. at page 709, 98 P. 951, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056. In the Alfrey Case, for a consideration of $550, a minor executed a deed to 120 acres of his land, which was void on account of his minority.

(4) The next objection is that the court erred in not ordering a return of the money paid on the land. The evidence showing, and the court having found as a fact, that the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the execution of the deeds in this case, under the doctrine of Blakemore v. Johnson, 24 Okla. 544, 103 P. 554, the instruments were absolutely void. Colbert v. Alfrey, 93 C. C. A. 517, 168 Fed. 231; Bragdon v. McShea, 26 Okla. 35, 107 P. 916; Stevens v. Elliott et al., 30 Okla. 41, 118 P. 407. The Blakemore case, supra, was a case almost identical with the case at bar, and the question of return of consideration was involved as in this, and in that case the court stated the question before it as follows:

"The treaty provisions were, as to a minor Creek freedman, in force at the time of the execution of the deed by Myrtle McIntosh to appellant, and said deed was, therefore, absolutely null and void, and incapable of ratification" — citing Blakemore v. Johnson, 24 Okla. 544, 103 P. 554; Colbert v. Alfrey et al., 168 Fed. 231, 93 C. C. A. 517. In this case the court, in adopting the language of Mr. Bigelow, declares that the essential elements of an equitable estoppel are: (1) That there must exist a false representation or concealment of material facts. (2) It must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts.

In any event, the most that can be said is that the decisions upon that subject are conflicting and to some degree in confusion. The doctrine of the Everhardt case, however, was followed in MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 696, and has been made the basis of decisions in several of the lower federal courts, Bartlett v. Okla. Oil Co., 218 F. 380, 391; Alfrey v. Colbert, 168 F. 231, 235; Sanger v. Hibbard, 104 F. 455, 457; and has become the established federal rule. Likewise it has been accepted and followed by many of the state courts.

And therefore the judgment in that case is not conclusive here, either as res judicata or estoppel. Alfrey v. Colbert, 44 Okla. 246, 144 P. 179; Crowe v. Warnarkee, supra; Cox v. Colbert, 135 Okla. 218, 275 P. 317; Hogue v. Stephens, 159 Okla. 29, 14 P.2d 220. We come to the question of laches.

On the other hand it is equally well settled, that a judgment in a former action does not operate as a bar to a subsequent action, where the cause of action is not the same, although each action relates to the same subject matter. In Alfrey v. Colbert, 44 Okla. 246, 144 P. 179, this court held that the following elements should be apparent to constitute a good plea of res judicata; first, the parties or their privies must be the same; second, the subject-matter of the action must be the same; third, the issues must be the same, and must relate to the same subject-matter; fourth, the capacities of the persons must be the same in reference to the subject-matter and to the issues between them. Where these elements are clearly apparent, the plea should be sustained. See, also, Cox v. Colbert, 135 Okla. 218, 275 P. 317; Johnson v. Whelan, 186 Okla. 511, 98 P.2d 1103, 1104.

Even if the two-year limitation does apply, the decree of the Lower Court is based upon a finding of fact that the ordinance in question does not contain the same land as that encompassed by the ordinance in the earlier case and that such extension is a reasonable one and required by the public convenience and necessity. Hence, the decree should not be disturbed unless it is, and we submit that it is not, manifestly wrong. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. 1167, 1170; Alfrey v. Colbert, 7 Ind. 338, 104 S.W. 638, 646; Forbes v. City of Meridian, 86 Miss. 243, 38 So. 676; Sec. 3379, Code 1942; Chap. 491, Laws 1950; Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1948, word "act." McGEHEE, C.J.

"There is no privity where plaintiff is suing in different rights, as where an administrator is suing in one action for the benefit of those interested in the estate, and in the other for the benefit of the next of kin." 34 C. J. 1012; Alfrey v. Colbert et al., 44 Okla. 246, 144 P. 179. It is admitted in the case at bar that the action terminating in the agreed judgment now urged to be conclusive was bottomed on the wrongful claim of a mere purported beneficiary.

1. While there is controversy between the parties as to whether the title to the pipe in question ever passed to Blankenship at the foreclosure sale, we will consider this issue favorably to the plaintiff and assume, without deciding, that the title to the pipe in question properly passed to Blankenship, and will consider the correctness of the trial court's ruling on the basis of the plea of res judicata. In Alfrey v. Colbert (1914) 44 Okla. 246, 144 P. 179, we held that the following elements should be apparent to constitute a good plea of res judicata: First, the parties or their privies must be the same; second, the subject matter of the action must be the same; third, the issues must be the same, and must relate to the same subject matter; fourth, the capacities of the persons must be the same in reference to the subject matter and to the issues between them. Where these elements are clearly apparent, the plea should be sustained. See, also, Cox v. Colbert (1929) 135 Okla. 218, 275 P. 317.