Summary
In Alfred, this court denied a motion to dismiss where the plaintiffs' affidavit supported their allegations of administrative exhaustion.
Summary of this case from Patton v. Fujitsu Technology Solutions, Inc.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2427-G.
September 5, 2001.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The defendants Centex Corporation d/b/a Centex Homes ("Centex Corp."), CTX Mortgage Mortgage Company ("CTX Mortgage"), and Centex Financial Services, Inc. ("Centex Financial") (collectively, "Centex") bring the following motion to dismiss some of the plaintiffs' claims against them for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons discussed below, Centex's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This action was filed by nine individual plaintiffs: Valerie Alfred ("Alfred"), Willie Blanks ("Blanks"), Lola Bynum ("Bynum"), Rhonda Corbray ("Corbray"), Nanette Dial ("Dial"), Danielle Edwards ("Edwards"), Creston Henderson ("Henderson"), Sylvia Porras ("Porras"), and Juanita Velazquez ("Velazquez") (collectively, "plaintiffs"). The plaintiffs allege that Centex discriminated against Black and Hispanic employees on the basis of their race and/or national origin, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("complaint") at 1-2; see also Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") at 2. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Centex engaged in disparate treatment of the plaintiffs, unlawfully retaliated against the plaintiffs, and encouraged a hostile work environment for the plaintiffs to work in. Complaint at 1-18. The complaint delineates allegations of wrongdoing by Centex against Black and Hispanic employees as a group and against each of the plaintiffs individually. Id. at 4-18. The plaintiffs further allege that all conditions precedent have been satisfied, including the exhaustion of Title VII administrative remedies by the timely filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and receipt by them of notices of right to sue. The EEOC charges are alleged to have been filed by the plaintiffs Dial and Alfred individually and by the plaintiff Bynum on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs through a proper third party charge, authorized by 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Id. at 2; see also id., Exhibits 1-3.
II. ANALYSIS A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." However, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs could prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing WRIGHT MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1357 at 598 (1969), for the proposition that "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). In determining whether dismissal should be granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).
B. Centex's Grounds for Dismissal
Centex first contends that all claims asserted by the plaintiffs Alfred, Blanks, Bynum, Dial, Henderson, and Velazquez under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are barred by limitations and must be dismissed. Motion to Dismiss at 4. Next, Centex maintains that all Title VII claims alleged by the plaintiffs Blanks, Corbray, Edwards, Henderson, Porras, and Velazquez are barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. Id. at 5. Finally, Centex argues that the complaint fails to state a valid Title VII claim against the defendants Centex Corp. and Centex Financial. Id. at 14-15; see also Defendants' Reply in Support of Amended Motion to Dismiss ("Reply") at 3-4. These contentions will be examined in turn.
1. Statute of Limitations Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Centex maintains that the claims brought by plaintiffs Alfred, Blanks, Bynum, Dial, Henderson and Velazquez pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are barred by limitations and should be dismissed. Section 1981 claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations period applicable to tort actions under Texas law. See Price v. Digital Equipment Corporation, 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Goodman v. Lukeils Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)). The filing and processing of an EEOC charge pursuant to Title VII does not toll the running of the limitations period under Section 1981. See Taylor v. Bunge Corporation, 775 F.2d 617, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1975)); Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 322, 334 (5th Cir. 1987).
This action was commenced on November 3, 2000. Therefore, limitations bars any claims for relief under Section 1981 for acts of discrimination occurring prior to November 3, 1998. The complaint admits that Alfred, Bynum, Dial, and Velzquez all had their employment with Centex terminated before that date. Complaint ¶¶ 26, 31, 41, 47. Thus, the Section 1981 claims of these plaintiffs are barred. The plaintiff Blanks cites only one instance of discrimination against her, which occurred during the spring of 1997. Id. ¶ 28. Hence, Blanks's claim is also time-barred. Finally, the events on which the plaintiff Henderson bases her claims of discrimination all took place in 1996. Id. ¶ 42. Accordingly, her claims are barred by limitations as well. All claims for relief under Section 1981 asserted by the plaintiffs Alfred, Blanks, Bynum, Dial, Henderson and Velazquez are barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, Centex's motion to dismiss these plaintiffs' Section 1981 claims for failure to state a claim is granted.
Plaintiffs seek permission to amend their complaint to more specifically delineate which plaintiffs are seeking recovery under Section 1981 and to clarify whether any of the plaintiffs' Section 1981 claims are continuing in nature. Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss at 8. The plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint, within fifteen days of this date, for the purpose of making this clarification.
2. Exhaustion of Remedies Under Title VII
Title VII affords a private right of action to individuals aggrieved by unlawful discrimination in the workplace but, to preserve their statutory rights, employees must file a charge of discrimination ("charge") with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). "Timely filing is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action, and the failure to file within the statutory period will ordinarily operate as a bar to suit." Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 n. 4 (1977)). Filing a charge with the EEOC is a condition precedent to seeking judicial relief. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 398 F.2d 496, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1968).
Centex contends that all Title VII claims asserted by the plaintiffs Blanks, Corbray, Edwards, Henderson, Porras, and Velazquez (the "non-filing plaintiffs") are barred due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Motion to Dismiss at 5. Centex argues that the non-filing plaintiffs do not allege (1) that Bynum completed the third party certification of charge, (2) that the charge was filed on their behalf, or (3) that any of the non-filing plaintiffs was ever issued an EEOC right to sue letter. Id. at 6.
The plaintiffs allege that EEOC charges were timely filed on behalf of all plaintiffs, and they attach copies of the charge of discrimination for Alfred, Dial, and Bynum, et al. Complaint, Exhibit 1; see also Motion to Dismiss at 6. The plaintiffs allege that the non-filing plaintiffs were included in the third party certification of charge filed in connection with Charge No. 310 97 2407, styled Lola Bynum et al. ("the Bynum Charge"). Complaint at 2, Exhibits 1-3; see also Motion to Dismiss at 6. The third party certification specifically names the other six plaintiffs. Complaint, Exhibit 1. The complaint includes three EEOC right to sue letters, in the names of Alfred, Dial, and Bynum, et al. Id. Additionally, the plaintiffs have included the sworn affidavit of Janet V. Elizondo ("Elizondo") to support their allegations. Complaint, Exhibit 3. Elizondo is one of the Enforcement Managers in the Dallas District Office of the EEOC. Id. at 1. She oversees two of the investigative units in the EEOC's Dallas office. Id. at 1. According to Elizondo, the investigative charge file for the Bynum, et al. charge has been misplaced by the EEOC. Id. at 1-2. Elizondo states that (1) the third party certification for the Bynum, et al. charge is valid and proper, (2) the non-filing plaintiffs did authorize the charge to be filed on their behalf, and (3) the nonfiling plaintiffs were sent notices of right to sue on August 7, 2000, which Elizondo herself personally signed. Id. at 2-3. In sum, Elizondo avers that all of the plaintiffs have properly exhausted their administrative remedies under Title VII. Id. at 4.
Because Centex brings this motion to dismiss under the deferential standard of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must treat as true all material factual assertions in the complaint. See Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc., 677 F.2d at 1047. In other words, the court must accept as true the plaintiffs' assertion that all conditions precedent were satisfied, including the proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Complaint ¶ 5. Accordingly, Centex's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied.
In the alternative, Centex seeks leave of court to submit a preliminary motion for summary judgment solely on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Reply at 7. In the interest of judicial economy, such leave is granted. Centex may file, within thirty days of this date, a motion for summary judgment limited to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Centex also requests that the court limit discovery at this time solely to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This request, however, is denied.
3. Failure to State Title VII Claims Against Defendants Centex Corp. and Centex Financial
Centex seeks dismissal of the Title VII claims against Centex Corp. and Centex Financial because the plaintiffs filed EEOC charges only against CTX Mortgage, Centex Financial. Motion to Dismiss at 14-15; Reply at 3. It is undisputed that the EEOC charges identify only CTX Mortgage. Complaint, Exhibit 1 (the EEOC charges filed against CTX Mortgage); see also Motion to Dismiss at 14-15; Reply at 3. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs allege that "[u]pon information and belief," all three defendants "constitute a single employer and/or an integrated enterprise for the purpose of action under Title VII," and that there exists substantial identity among the parties. Complaint at 6; see also Motion to Dismiss at 14. Such broad conclusory assertions are insufficient, however, to avoid dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against Centex Corp. and Centex Financial. To prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiffs must plead specific facts, not merely conclusions. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs have not pled any facts to support their allegation that Centex Corp., Centex Financial, and CTX Mortgage constitute either a single employer or have a substantial identity. Under Title VII, the plaintiffs' right to sue is limited to "the respondent named in the charge," which in this case is CTX Mortgage. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Crawford v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 614 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 1980); Complaint, Exhibit 1. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' Title VII claims against Centex Corp. and Centex Financial are dismissed.
The plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint, within fifteen days of this date, to include sufficient factual allegations showing that the defendants are either one employer or have substantially the same identity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Centex's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.