Opinion
5:21-CV-232-FL
06-30-2022
DELONE ALFORD, Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Brian S. Meyers United States Magistrate Judge
This pro se case is before the court on the motion by plaintiff Delone Alford (“plaintiff” or “Alford”) to proceed in forma pauperis [D.E. 3] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The motion was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) for a memorandum and recommendation, and for a frivolity review. The court finds that plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of his inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis will be ALLOWED. However, based on the court's frivolity review and for the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff's complaint [D.E. 3-1] be DISMISSED.
ORDER ON IN FORMA PAUPERIS MOTION
Based on the information in the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the court finds that plaintiff has adequately demonstrated his inability to prepay the required court costs. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [D.E. 3] is therefore ALLOWED.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION ON FRIVOLITY REVIEW
I. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff filed his complaint as an attachment to his motion to proceed in forma pauperis filed on June 21, 2021. [D.E. 3-1]. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) is improperly denying payments to him due to the fact that he is incarcerated. Id. He states that he “do[es] not agree with [the] SSA determination and request[s] reconsideration.” Id. at 1. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he is currently “67 years old and ha[s] pay [sic] into [his] SS account all [his] life . . . .” Id. And, that “the SSA never stipulated [he] had to lead a particular life style in order to receive the money [he] paid into [his] SS account . . . .” Id. He alleges that a “federal court recently ruled the [SSA's] position is likely unlawful to stop denying payments to people because they are incarcerated . . . .” Id.
The relief sought by plaintiff is “that [his] SS Social Security check be reinstated and sent to” he or his representative. Id. at 2.
II. Applicable Legal Standards for Frivolity Review
After allowing a party to proceed in forma pauperis, as here, the court must conduct a frivolity review of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In such a review, the court must determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant, and is thereby subject to dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992) (standard for frivolousness). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
In evaluating frivolity specifically, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are held to “less stringent standards” than those drafted by attorneys. White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The court is permitted to “pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Such baseless claims include those that describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 328. Provided that a plaintiff's claims are not clearly baseless, the court must weigh the factual allegations in plaintiff's favor in its frivolity analysis. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The court must read the complaint carefully to determine if a plaintiff has alleged specific facts sufficient to support the claims asserted. White, 886 F.2d at 724.
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . [and] a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), (2). Case law explains that the factual allegations in the complaint must “‘state[ ] a plausible claim for relief' that ‘permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct' based upon ‘its judicial experience and common sense.'” Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Likewise, a complaint is insufficient if it offers merely “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A court may also consider subject matter jurisdiction as part of the frivolity review. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[d]etermining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure”); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 3:06-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL 397449, at *2-4 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007) (discussing the lack of diversity jurisdiction during frivolity review as a basis for dismissal). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in those specific situations authorized by Congress.” Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968). The presumption is that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particular case unless it is demonstrated that jurisdiction exists. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336 (1895). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party invoking jurisdiction, here the plaintiff. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction . . . is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction.”). The complaint must affirmatively allege the grounds for jurisdiction. Bowman, 388 F.2d at 760. If the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
III. Analysis of Plaintiff's Complaint
Having found that plaintiff is financially eligible to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must now undertake a frivolity review of this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court shall dismiss a case if the action is: “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Based upon the court's review and for the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed in its entirety.
A. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
“The Social Security Act provides the exclusive remedy for claims relating to the review of Social Security [] benefits.” Reath v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 5:19-CV-289-H, 2019 WL 7169113, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 14, 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). To obtain judicial review of the denial of Social Security benefits, a plaintiff must comply with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Reath, 2019 WL 7169113, at *2 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 327 (1976) (“explaining ‘the only avenue for judicial review [of the denial of social security benefits] ¶ 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'”)). In relevant part, § 405(g) provides:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced
within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Amongst the requirements of § 405(g), is the requirement that a plaintiff obtain a final decision from the SSA. See id.; Lightfoot v. Soc. Sec., No. 5:18-CV-368-BO, 2018 WL 4624852, at *1 (E.D. N.C. July 27, 2018) (“In order for this court to exercise jurisdiction over a decision of the Commissioner, that decision must be considered the Commissioner's ‘final decision.'”). “To obtain a judicially reviewable ‘final decision,' the [plaintiff] must complete an administrative review process” and exhaust administrative remedies. Biggs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:11-CV-172-FL, 2011 WL 3664430, at *3 (E.D. N.C. July 11, 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(a)(1)-(4), 416.1400(a)(1)-(4). “A claim for benefits brought without exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Lucas v. United States, No. 2:18-CV-FL, 2020 WL 3889444, at *3-4 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 3, 2020) (citing Cano v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:10-2400-JFA-BHH, 2010 WL 4780056, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2010)).
Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional requirements of § 405(g). Although plaintiff states that he “do[es] not agree with SSA determination and request reconsideration” ([D.E. 3-1] at 1), he fails to allege that he exhausted administrative remedies and received a final decision from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration prior to filing his complaint. Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to establish that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claim, IT IS RECOMMENDED that his claim be DISMISSED.
B. Failure to state a claim
Even if plaintiff were able to supplement his complaint and demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction, the undersigned would still recommend dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In support of his allegation that the SSA has improperly withheld benefits from him, plaintiff states: “Federal court recently ruled the position is likely unlawful to stop denying payments to people because they are incarcerated.” [D.E. 3-1] at 1. However, plaintiff fails to identify any specific case or decision in which the court has determined that it was unlawful for the SSA to withhold benefits due to incarceration. Plaintiff also fails to assert any other grounds upon which the the SSA's decision here should be overturned. Thus, plaintiff fails to include “a short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[,]” as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Furthermore, plaintiff's broad claim that his SSA benefits are being improperly withheld is also without merit. In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 402(x), titled “Limitation on payments to prisoners, certain other inmates of publicly funded institutions, fugitives, probationers, and parolees,” provides that:
(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, no monthly benefits shall be paid under this section or under section 423 of this title to any individual for any month ending with or during or beginning with or during a period of more than 30 days throughout all of which such individual--
(i) is confined in a jail, prison, or other penal institution or correctional facility pursuant to his conviction of a criminal offense . . .42 U.S.C. § 402(x). “The Commissioner's interpretation of § 402(x) ‘effectively suspends retirement . . . benefits for all otherwise qualified prisoners.'” Knight v. Saul, No. 1:20-cv-00408, 2021 WL 3506515, at *4 (S.D.W.Va. July 9, 2021) (quoting Davis v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 799, 801(4th Cir. 1987)), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2021 WL 3500963.
Contrary to plaintiff's allegation, courts have consistently held this suspension of benefits during incarceration pursuant to § 402(x) to be permissible. See, e.g., Knight, 2021 WL 3506515 (recommending dismissal of a plaintiff's claim that the SSA improperly suspended her benefits while she was incarcerated, finding that the suspension was appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)); Treece v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-1077, 2016 WL 225698 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 19, 2016) (recommending dismissal of a plaintiff's claim for past Social Security benefits that had been suspended while he was incarcerated, finding that § 402(x) “unequivocally prohibits the SSA from paying Retirement Benefits to an individual while he is incarcerated for more than 30 continuous days following conviction of a crime”), mem. & recomm. adopted, 2016 WL 1181704, aff'd, 670 Fed.Appx. 89 (4th Cir. 2016); Noe v. Dir. of Soc. Sec., No. 5:06-CT-3072-BO, 2007 WL 4955107 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 19, 2007) (dismissing as frivolous an incarcerated plaintiff's claim that 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) violates the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, constitutes an ex post facto law, and a taking violation). The Fourth Circuit has also stated that “[t]his blanket suspension is consistent with the statutory grant of discretion and rationally promotes the legitimate underlying congressional policy goal of conserving scarce social security resources where a prisoner's basic economic needs are provided from other public sources.” Davis, 825 F.2d at 801.
The court therefore concludes that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and RECOMMENDS that this case also be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's complaint [D.E. 3-1] be DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on plaintiff or, if represented, his counsel. Plaintiff shall have until July 21, 2022 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If plaintiff does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, plaintiff will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, plaintiffs failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar plaintiff from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).