See Demps v. Hogan, 57 Fla. 60, 48 So. 998 (1909); Byrd v. Culver, 376 So.2d 41, 42 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). A present right to possession may be established in two ways: by demonstrating an enforceable legal title or by showing prior possession (actual or constructive) of the land. See Blitch v. Sapp, 142 Fla. 166, 194 So. 328, 329 (1940); Alford v. Sinclair, 55 So.2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1951). When attempting to show enforceable legal title to a particular parcel, a plaintiff may recover only upon the strength of his own title, not the weaknesses of the defendant's title.

This case has been adjudicated on two previous occasions. Alford v. Moore, Fla., 48 So.2d 754, and Alford v. Sinclair, Fla., 55 So.2d 727. The instant appeal proposes three questions but we are convinced that the second question is the only one that requires exploration at this time. What is said in respect to this question will in effect dispose of the other questions.

Under the circumstances, the jury verdict was correct. Berlack v. Halle, 22 Fla. 236 (1886); Alford v. Sinclair, 55 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1951). The judgment appealed is affirmed.

It is fundamental that in actions in ejectment the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the title of the defendant. Alford v. Sinclair, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 727; Crowder v. Miami Beach First National Bank, Fla. 1951, 50 So.2d 174; Akin v. Godwin, Fla. 1950, 49 So.2d 604; 11 Fla.Jur., Ejectment, § 8. Applying the above rules I conclude there was sufficient-competent-substantial evidence to adequately support the findings and conclusions of the trial judge.

The fundamental rule in actions of ejectment is applicable here that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant's title or even the lack of record title of the defendant in possession. Alford v. Sinclair, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 727. Adams v. Orange Realty Sales, 1938, 134 Fla. 175, 183 So. 621; 136 Fla. 844, 187 So. 625. No error having been made to appear on this appeal, the final judgment appealed from must be and it is affirmed.

On the first question, in urging that the deed of conveyance of the property to the plaintiffs by the estate as it relates to the right of way is champertous and void and so bars an action against the corporation, the defendant relies upon the common law doctrine which obtains in the Florida jurisdiction, that a deed of conveyance to lands executed by a person out of possession when the lands are adversely possessed by another is champertous and void as against the adverse possessor. See Alford v. Sinclair, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 727; Addis v. Hoagland, 1942, 150 Fla. 694, 8 So.2d 655; and 5 Fla.Jur., Champerty and Maintenance, section 9, pp. 558-559. This common law principle was founded partially upon considerations of public policy and partially upon the peculiar nature of livery of seisin, which could not lawfully be made if at the time of execution of the deed the lands were adversely possessed.