She was not entitled to it as a matter of course." Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 (3) ( 7 S.E.2d 278); Davis v. Davis, 134 Ga. 804 ( 68 S.E. 594, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 20); Simmons v. Simmons, 194 Ga. 649, 654 ( 22 S.E.2d 399); Lanier v. Lanier, 194 Ga. 799, 801 ( 22 S.E.2d 651). ( a) In such a case, where some permanent alimony is allowed under correct instructions as to the basis for determining the amount, since the jury is the final arbiter as to facts touching on issues relative to the earning capacity and financial ability of the husband to pay, an award of $200 will not be set aside as contrary to law and without evidence to support it. Brock v. Brock, 183 Ga. 860, 863 ( 190 S.E. 30); Wilson v. Wilson, 174 Ga. 238, 243 ( 162 S.E. 540); Simmons v. Simmons, 194 Ga. 649, 654.

Attorney's fees are an intrinsic part of temporary alimony awarded for the purpose of enabling the wife to contest the issues between herself and her husband. Harrison v. Harrison, 208 Ga. 70 (2) ( 65 S.E.2d 173); Coleman v. Coleman, 205 Ga. 92 ( 52 S.E.2d 438); Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 (7) ( 7 S.E.2d 278); Luke v. Luke, 154 Ga. 800 (2) ( 115 S.E. 666); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 125 Ga. 491, 493 ( 54 S.E. 537). Attorney's fees and the expenses of litigation are allowed to the wife as a part of temporary alimony. Walton v. Walton, 223 Ga. 85 (5) ( 153 S.E.2d 554); Roehrman v. Roehrman, 219 Ga. 52 ( 131 S.E.2d 558); Lewis v. Lewis, 215 Ga. 7 ( 108 S.E.2d 812); Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630, supra; Thomas v. Smith, 185 Ga. 243 ( 194 S.E. 502). "In a suit for divorce and alimony, where temporary alimony is awarded, so long as the litigation is pending the trial judge is authorized to exercise his discretion in continuing his order granting temporary alimony.

When the verdict in a divorce case alleging these grounds is in favor of the husband, the wife has no standing to complain that the alimony awarded her is not proportionate to her needs and the husband's ability to pay since she is not entitled to alimony as a matter of course in that situation. Wells v. Wells, 226 Ga. 282 ( 174 S.E.2d 407); Singleton v. Singleton, 202 Ga. 269 ( 42 S.E.2d 737); Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 ( 7 S.E.2d 278); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 197 Ga. 767 ( 30 S.E.2d 480). 2.

Since the verdict was in favor of the husband, the wife has no standing to complain that the alimony awarded to her "was disproportionate to [her] — necessities — and the husband's ability to pay" because she was not entitled to alimony as a matter of course. Singleton v. Singleton, 202 Ga. 269 ( 42 S.E.2d 737); Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 ( 7 S.E.2d 278). 3. The evidence supports the verdict and the court properly overruled the motion for new trial.

See Code § 30-109; Moon v. Moon, 216 Ga. 627 (3) ( 118 S.E.2d 473); Childs v. Childs, 223 Ga. 435 ( 156 S.E.2d 21). Both parties in this divorce action charged the other with cruel treatment and a verdict in favor of both had to find these allegations to be true. Hence, under the law, neither one was entitled to a divorce, but we cannot decide that question since it is not before us. The wife might be lawfully awarded temporary alimony in the form of attorney fees to enable her to prosecute her case even though she ultimately loses it. Code § 30-202; Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 (7) ( 7 S.E.2d 278). This is founded upon the law that requires the husband to support his wife. 2.

These allegations were sufficient to withstand the motion. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 217 Ga. 590 ( 123 S.E.2d 915); Cramer v. Cramer, 217 Ga. 414 ( 122 S.E.2d 729); Allen v. Allen, 194 Ga. 591 ( 22 S.E.2d 136); Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 ( 7 S.E.2d 278). 2.

We are of the opinion that these allegations are sufficient, as against a general demurrer, to charge cruel treatment. In Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630, 632 ( 7 S.E.2d 278), Justice Warren Grice, in a full-bench decision, in discussing the quantity and quality of nagging as constituting cruel treatment said: "There are certain matters which when wilfully done amount to cruelty on account of the very fact that they are repeated from time to time. It is this constant repetition that makes them unbearable.

We take cognizance of the fact that a separate award was properly made for counsel fees and expenses. Code § 30-202; Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 ( 7 S.E.2d 278). Since temporary alimony continues when awarded (unless revised by the court) until the final termination of the cause ( Aud v. Aud, 199 Ga. 714, 35 S.E.2d 198), the trial court should revise the award in the present case more reasonably in accord with the testimony in the case.

The evidence shows, rather, that the alleged cruel treatment on the part of the defendant was continuous and steadily grew worse until it became unbearable, and that the separation took place because of such continuous treatment. Where, as here, neither the pleadings nor the evidence demands a charge on condonation, it is not error to fail to charge on that question. Day v. Day, 210 Ga. 454 (2, 3) ( 81 S.E.2d 6); Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 (2, 5) ( 7 S.E.2d 278); Seagraves v. Seagraves, 193 Ga. 280(2) ( 18 S.E.2d 460). 2.

Armour v. Lunsford, 192 Ga. 598 ( 15 S.E.2d 886); Carver v. Carver, 199 Ga. 352 ( 34 S.E.2d 509); Sells v. Sells, 206 Ga. 650 ( 58 S.E.2d 186). "`Under the statutes of this State, when a husband obtains a divorce from his wife upon the ground of cruel treatment, it is for the jury to say whether they will allow the divorced wife permanent alimony.' Lowry v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 349, 351 ( 153 S.E. 11, 70 A.L.R. 488); Alford v. Alford, 189 Ga. 630 (3) ( 7 S.E.2d 278); Brock v. Brock, 183 Ga. 860 ( 190 S.E. 30)." Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 197 Ga. 767, 768 ( 30 S.E.2d 480).