Opinion
24A-CR-1826
12-18-2024
William D. Alfke, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT EUGENE A. KRESS ANDERSON, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA MEGAN M. SMITH DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable William J. Hughes, Judge The Honorable Christopher Evans, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 29D03-2306-F6-4643
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT EUGENE A. KRESS ANDERSON, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA MEGAN M. SMITH DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge
[¶1] William D. Alfke appeals his conviction of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Alfke argues the State failed to prove he disrupted a "lawful assembly of people" as charged. (See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 13) (charging information). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On the morning of June 24, 2023, Alfke and his girlfriend, R.B., went to the neighborhood pool with Alfke's teenage son and R.B.'s coworker. While at the pool, Alfke became so intoxicated that, at some point in the afternoon, neighbors who were also at the pool had to help Alfke get home and into his bed. Alfke and R.B. both fell asleep. When R.B. awoke that evening, she was hungry, so she went to the kitchen, made a salad, and began to eat. Alfke woke to find R.B. eating the salad and, in his still intoxicated state, began screaming at her in anger. R.B. raised her voice in response to Alfke.
[¶3] As Alfke and R.B. argued, Todd Robbins, one of their neighbors and an off-duty police officer, was on his patio grilling dinner, and he heard "screaming and yelling" coming from inside Alfke's house. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 46.) At some point, Robbins saw R.B. walk out the patio door of Alfke's kitchen onto the patio, and Alfke followed her, as the two continued to argue "off and on" for a while. (Id.) After grilling, Robbins and his wife went out behind their house to visit with neighbors - two adults and two children - who were outside behind their house. Robbins's wife was talking with the neighbors when Robbins noticed R.B. walking on the berm of grass between Robbins's townhome and Alfke's home. Alfke was "chasing" R.B., and R.B. was saying "get away from me[.]" (Id. at 47-48.) R.B. approached Robbins for assistance. As Alkfe approached, Robbins noted Alfke was "[v]ery angry and aggressive[,]" his speech was slurred, he "had difficulty maintaining his balance[,]" and he was "very agitated." (Id. at 49.) Robbins told his wife and the neighbors to go inside, and he called 911. Robbins encouraged Alfke to go home, and Alfke retreated home before police arrived. When police arrived, Robbins and R.B. both gave reports, and then police arrested Alfke.
[¶4] On June 29, 2023, the State charged Alfke with Level 6 felony domestic battery, Class B misdemeanor public intoxication, and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. After the State's presentation of evidence at trial, the trial court granted Alfke's motion to dismiss the charge of domestic battery. The jury found Alfke guilty of disorderly conduct but not guilty of public intoxication. The trial court entered a conviction of disorderly conduct, imposed a 180-day sentence, gave Alfke credit for four days based on the two days he served prior to sentencing, and suspended the remaining 176 days to probation.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] Alfke challenges whether the State proved he committed disorderly conduct. When faced with challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a "well settled" standard of review that leaves determinations of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). "We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will affirm a defendant's conviction unless 'no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).
[¶6] The State alleged Alfke committed disorderly conduct by "knowingly or intentionally disrupt[ing] a lawful assembly of persons[.]" (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 13.) See also Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(3) ("A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . . (3) disrupts a lawful assembly of persons . . . commits disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor."). Alfke argues: "Here there was no lawful assembly of persons." (Appellant's Br. at 7.)
[¶7] As we noted nearly twenty-five years ago, "the phrase 'a lawful assembly of persons' has not been defined by the legislature." D.R. v. State, 729 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). Accordingly, we "turn[ed] to our rules of statutory interpretation[,]" id., and held an assembly is "an assembled group, especially of people meeting for a specific purpose." Id. (quoting Oxford Am. Dictionary 36 (1980)). Alfke argues there was no group assembled for a specific purpose in this case because Robbins and his wife were cooking dinner on their balcony patio while the family of four was in their own driveway - and neither a family of two nor a family of four should be considered an assembled group for purposes of the disorderly conduct statute. However, we need not determine whether a single family of two or four constitutes an assembled group because the facts most favorable to the judgment are that Robbins's wife was with the neighbor family in their driveway as Alfke approached. We have no hesitation holding a group of neighbors congregated in a driveway to pass time in conversation as children play constitutes "a lawful assembly of persons" for the purposes of the disorderly conduct statute. Cf. id. (holding one teacher was not an assembly of persons for purposes of disorderly conduct statute).
When asked where his wife was when he called 911, Robbins testified, "I don't recall if she was standing directly with me or if she was over at our neighbor's driveway." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 48.) The inference most favorable to the judgment - which is what our standard of review requires us to consider - is that Robbins's wife was standing in the neighbor's driveway with the neighbors. Thus, we rely on that inference as we conduct our analysis.
[¶8] Robbins described Alfke as very angry, agitated, and aggressive. Alfke was sufficiently intoxicated to have slurred speech and difficulty maintaining his balance. Robbins told his wife and neighbors to disperse by going inside their houses as Alfke approached because Robbins "was trying to keep everybody safe, my family, my friends[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 49.) We thus hold Alfke's approach - as he chased R.B. in his very angry and obviously intoxicated state - disrupted the lawful assembly, and we affirm his conviction of disorderly conduct based thereon.
Conclusion
[¶9] A group of five people who are friendly neighbors assembled in a driveway on a summer evening constitutes an "assembly of persons" for purposes of the disorderly conduct statute. Alfke disrupted their lawful assembly when he approached them in such an aggressive and angry manner that they were required to disassemble for their own safety. We accordingly affirm his conviction of disorderly conduct.
[¶10] Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.