Summary
granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Mandamus Act where the plaintiffs had pending I-130 petitions
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CASE NO. 21-CV-61735-RS
2022-07-11
Avyatar ALFASSI and Naomi Tanami, Plaintiffs, v. Merrick GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States, et al., Defendants.
Elan I. Baret, Baret Law Group, Hollywood, FL, for Plaintiffs. Johnathan Douglas Lott, Felipe Plechac-Diaz, DOJ-USAO, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.
Elan I. Baret, Baret Law Group, Hollywood, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Johnathan Douglas Lott, Felipe Plechac-Diaz, DOJ-USAO, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
RODNEY SMITH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [DE 7], Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition [DE 8], and Defendants’ Reply [DE 9]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that on September 25, 2020, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") received an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative filed by Avyatar Alfassi on behalf of his spouse, Naomi Tanami. (Compl. ¶ 15.) According to plaintiffs, the I-130 Petition was properly filed, and the applicable fees paid. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiffs claim that the California Service Center ("CSC") maintains a website stating that I-130 Petitions are processed by USCIS between 23.5 to 30.5 months following receipt, but that the Texas Service Center ("TSC") processes I-130 Petitions at a faster rate – between one week to seven months following receipt. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs argue that the CSC's processing time is unreasonable relative to the TSC's processing time. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs claim that thy have suffered extreme hardship and irreparable delay in waiting for USCIS to process their I-130 Petition. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiffs thus seek an Order from this Court instructing Defendants to expedite processing of their I-130 Petition, pursuant to the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. ("APA").
In response, Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants state that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ case because neither the Mandamus Act nor the APA independently confer subject-matter jurisdiction, and because the pace at which Defendants adjudicate I-130 Petitions is entirely discretionary. Defendants further argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which this Court can grant the requested relief because there is no statutory or regulatory guidance on how quickly USCIS should process I-130 Petitions.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to show that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party invoking the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that the matter falls within the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Taylor v. Appleton , 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994).
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Thus, they are under an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Cadet v. Bulger , 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir. 2004). If a federal court determines at any time during the litigation that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which the requested relief could be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff's allegations must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez , 480 F.3d 1043, 1066 (11th Cir. 2007). A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits. Horsley v. Feldt , 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Mandamus Act
Under the Mandamus Act, "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in the clearest and most compelling of cases. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Columbia , 542 U.S. 367, 392, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring); Cash v. Barnhart , 327 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003). It is intended to provide a remedy for plaintiffs only when they have exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the defendant owes them a clear, nondiscretionary duty. Heckler v. Ringer , 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a district court may exercise jurisdiction over a Mandamus action "only if (1) the plaintiff has a clear right to the relief requested; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available." Serrano v. United States AG , 655 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Cash , 327 F.3d at 1258 ). The party seeking a writ of Mandamus caries the burden of showing that his "right to the issuance of the writ is ‘clear and indisputable.’ " Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus. Inc., 541 F.3d 1048, 1055 (11th Cir. 2008).
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the jurisdiction of this Court to hear their purported Mandamus action. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a clear right to the relief requested (that USCIS expedite processing of their I-130 Petition) in large part because there is no congressionally or administratively prescribed timeframe within which USCIS has a duty to process or adjudicate I-130 petitions. Relatedly, because Defendants exert discretionary, and not mandatory, powers in processing I-130 Petitions, Plaintiffs have not established that Defendants have a clear duty to act with respect to the pacing of their I-130 Petition. See Sands v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 308 Fed. App'x 418 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court conclusion that the Mandamus Act provides no basis for jurisdiction where the action complained of is discretionary); see also Eldeeb v. Chertoff , 619 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that, with respect to an I-485, Application to Adjust Status, USCIS "has a non-discretionary duty to act on an application, a discretionary duty as to the pace of processing the application, and a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate an application."). Additionally, Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies prior to instituting the current action. For these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Mandamus Act provides an independent basis for jurisdiction necessary for the Court to adjudicate the case at bar.
Pursuant to USCIS policy: [i]mmigration benefit requestors may request that USCIS expedite the adjudication of their applications or petitions. USCIS considers all expedite requests on a case-by-case basis and generally requires documentation to support such requests. The decision to grant or deny an expedite request is within the sole discretion of USCIS. USCIS Policy Manual Vol. 1 Ch. 5, dated June 9, 2021, available at https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-1-part-a-chapter-5. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiffs have availed themselves of this potential administrative remedy in order to resolve their present claims.
B. The Administrative Procedures Act
Plaintiffs’ second claim challenges the pace of adjudication of Plaintiffs’ I-130 Petition under the APA. "Although the APA independently does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers jurisdiction on federal judges to review agency action under federal-question jurisdiction." Perez v. USCIS , 774 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S. 99, 105-07, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977) ). The APA requires federal administrative agencies to address matters presented to them within a reasonable time. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). To help achieve this goal, the APA instructs federal courts to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The scope of judicial review, however, is limited. A district court may only compel an agency to perform a ministerial or nondiscretionary act, or to take action upon a matter without directing the agency how it shall act. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004). Additionally, the APA makes agency action unreviewable by the district court if the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
Because the pace of USCIS’ processing of I-130 Petitions is left to the sound discretion of the agency, and because such pacing neither qualifies as or is subject to a nondiscretionary act, the Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the claim and the authority to Order USCIS to expedite review of Plaintiffs’ Petition. The Court is not aware of any statutory or regulatory provisions that govern the pace of USCIS’ processing of I-130 Petitions; as such, there is no identifiable standard against which the Court can measure whether the agency has "unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The passage of time cannot, standing alone, support a claim of unreasonable delay. INS v. Miranda , 459 U.S. 14, 18, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982). Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to demonstrate that the pace of USCIS’ processing of their I-130 Petition is a non-discretionary act actionable under the APA, or that processing petitions is somehow not "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). As such, the APA cannot serve to vest this Court with jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ second claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, the Court need not and cannot rule on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, it is,
ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint [DE 7] is GRANTED .
2. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
4. This case is CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on this 11th day of July, 2022.