Although our supreme court has declined to define the exact meaning of "having charge of," and instead has followed a case by case approach, it has repeatedly reaffirmed the question as particularly one for the jury to decide. E.g., Voss v. Kingdon Naven, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 520, 525, 328 N.E.2d 297; see also Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 248, 251, 395 N.E.2d 384. The meaning of the term "having charge of" is determined by the "associations and circumstances surrounding its use."

The record reveals that the trial court responded to defendant's objections and during a sidebar stated that it was going to sustain the defense objections to this line of questioning, because the issue here was whether, in the expert's opinion, a specific safety standard had been violated and not whether the expert believed the support system used by plaintiff was the safest available. (See Louis v. Barenfanger (1968), 39 Ill.2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 935, 21 L.Ed.2d 271, 89 S.Ct. 296; Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 248, 250, 395 N.E.2d 384, 386.) The court was correct in this ruling.

Thus, although the Act does not specifically refer to improper construction sequencing as a basis for a violation, we find that it was intended to apply to cases where unsafe supports resulted from such sequencing. See Bishop v. Crowther (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 1, 415 N.E.2d 599 (in which a ladder was improperly positioned in part because the prior installation of new gutters prevented safer positioning); Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 248, 395 N.E.2d 384 (in which a complaint was held to state a cause of action under the Act by alleging, inter alia, that a safe scaffold could not be erected because of obstruction by a drywall partition constructed first). • 5 We find no merit to Venture's contention that any violation of the Act was not wilful. A wilful violation of the Act occurs when one of those in charge of the work knew of the existence of a dangerous condition or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the existence of that condition. ( Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 743, 460 N.E.2d 28, affirmed (1984), 104 Ill.2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946.) Within these parameters all those deemed to be in charge of the work have a duty of compliance with the Act.

Thus, before civil liability can arise under the Act, the plaintiff must prove both that the defendant was in charge of the work and committed a wilful violation. ( Smith v. Georgia Pacific Corp. (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 570, 574; Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 248, 250; Moore v. Clearing Industrial District, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 391, 395-96; Getz v. Del E. Webb Corp. (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 880, 886.) It is well established that these issues are generally questions of fact to be resolved by the factfinder ( Winter v. Davis (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 912, 915 (charge); Katz v. Shaf Home Builders, Inc. (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 526, 528 (wilful)), but the trial court may grant a directed verdict on these issues when there is insufficient evidence to create a factual question ( Derrico v. Clark Equipment Co. (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 4, 9 (charge); see Ewert v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc. (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 1008, 1015 (wilful)).

Such are the allegations in the complaint at bar. • 5 Chester Long's voluntary encounter with a known danger is contributory negligence as a matter of law. ( Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 248, 395 N.E.2d 384.) That being the case, his action premised on common-law negligence was properly dismissed.

In the recent case of Westerfield v. Arjack Co. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 137, 397 N.E.2d 451, the court identified a number of factors which should be considered in determining whether the totality of the circumstances establishes that a party had charge of the work: (1) actual supervision and control of the work; (2) retention of the right to supervise and control; (3) constant participation in ongoing activities at the construction site; (4) supervision and coordination of subcontractors; (5) responsibility for taking safety precautions at the job site; (6) authority to issue change orders; (7) the right to stop the work. The breadth of the doctrine of "having charge of," as interpreted by the Illinois courts, was discussed in Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 248, 251, 395 N.E.2d 384, 386, as follows: "Recently, in Norton, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the expansiveness of the concept of having charge of the work.

Coupled with the fact that Delaney made daily inspections and had work redone, the court found "he was in a peculiarly appropriate position to be the `first one to know if there is some deviation' and have it alleviated." 76 Ill.2d 481, 491, 394 N.E.2d 403, 408; accord, Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 248, 395 N.E.2d 384. Here, the record indicates that Davis owned and was familiar with the equipment because he had used it himself.