Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11965 No. 6401
11-23-2016
MATTHEW MARTIN ALEXIE, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Matthew Tallerico, Gazewood & Weiner, P.C., Fairbanks, for the Appellant. Jenna L. Gruenstein, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-11-6170 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, William F. Morse, Judge. Appearances: Matthew Tallerico, Gazewood & Weiner, P.C., Fairbanks, for the Appellant. Jenna L. Gruenstein, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge. PER CURIAM.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Matthew Martin Alexie was indicted for first-degree sexual assault. At Alexie's trial, at the close of the State's case, Alexie's attorney asked the superior court to enter a judgment of acquittal. The court denied this motion without comment, and the jury later convicted Alexie of the charged offense.
In this appeal, Alexie contends that it is error for a trial judge to deny a defense motion for judgment of acquittal without making findings of fact, without weighing the evidence, and without evaluating the credibility of the government's witnesses. The short answer to Alexie's contention is that the judge would have committed error if the judge had done any of these things.
When a trial judge rules on a defense motion for judgment of acquittal, the judge is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the government's witnesses. Instead, the judge is required to assume that the jury will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government's allegations, and that the jury will resolve all disputes in the testimony and all questions of witness credibility in favor of the government. The question the judge must answer is whether, viewing the evidence in this light, the evidence is sufficient to convince reasonable people that the government has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Patterson v. State, 966 P.2d 553, 556 (Alaska App. 1998).
In his brief, Alexie relies on an older formulation of this test, where the Alaska Supreme Court stated that a judgment of acquittal should only be denied if "fair-minded [jurors] in the exercise of reasonable judgment could differ on the question of whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt". This is an inexact formulation. The question is not whether reasonable people could "differ" on the question of the defendant's guilt. Obviously, a trial judge should not grant a judgment of acquittal if all reasonable jurors would unanimously agree that the defendant's guilt had been proved. Rather, the question the judge must answer is whether at least some reasonable jurors could conclude that the government had proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A judgment of acquittal should be granted "only if fair-minded persons would have to agree that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
Kinsman v. State, 512 P.2d 901, 903 (Alaska 1973), quoting Bush v. State, 397 P.2d 616, 618 (Alaska 1964).
Hammock v. State, 52 P.3d 746, 750-51 (Alaska App. 2002) (emphasis in the original).
Finally, we note that it is generally irrelevant, for purposes of appellate review, whether the trial judge explains his or her reasoning when denying a motion for judgment of acquittal. Even though such an explanation may be helpful for the participants at the trial, it rarely affects the resolution of the appeal. The test for granting or denying a judgment of acquittal is an objective one. Because of this, an appellate court decides the issue de novo, without any deference to the views or reasoning of the trial judge.
See, e.g., Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 905 (Alaska 1970).
See, e.g., Des Jardins v. State, 551 P.2d 181, 184 (Alaska 1976). --------
For these reasons, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.