It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is reversed on the law without costs and the complaint is dismissed. Same memorandum as in Alexandra R. v Krone ([appeal No. 1] — AD3d — [Aug. 20, 2020] [4th Dept 2020]). All concur except Nemoyer and Curran, JJ., who dissent and vote to affirm in the same dissenting memorandum as in Alexandra R. v Krone ([appeal No. 1] — AD3d — [Aug. 20, 2020] [4th Dept 2020]).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment insofar as appealed from is reversed on the law without costs and the complaint is dismissed against defendant Eric J. Krone. Same memorandum as in Alexandra R. v Krone ([appeal No. 1] — AD3d — [Aug. 20, 2020] [4th Dept 2020]). All concur except Nemoyer and Curran, JJ., who dissent and vote to affirm in the same dissenting memorandum as in Alexandra R. v Krone ([appeal No. 1] — AD3d — [Aug. 20, 2020] [4th Dept 2020]).

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment insofar as appealed from is reversed on the law without costs and the complaint is dismissed against defendant Eric J. Krone. Same memorandum as in Alexandra R. v Krone ([appeal No. 1] — AD3d — [Aug. 20, 2020] [4th Dept 2020]). All concur except Nemoyer and Curran, JJ., who dissent and vote to affirm in the same dissenting memorandum as in Alexandra R. v Krone ([appeal No. 1] — AD3d — [Aug. 20, 2020] [4th Dept 2020]).

As the Court of Appeals has made clear, the reckless disregard standard "demands more than a showing of a lack of ‘due care under the circumstances’—the showing typically associated with ordinary negligence claims" ( Saarinen v. Kerr , 84 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 620 N.Y.S.2d 297, 644 N.E.2d 988 [1994] ). Rather, liability under the reckless disregard standard "is established upon a showing that the covered vehicle's operator has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" ( Deleon v. New York City Sanitation Dept. , 25 N.Y.3d 1102, 1105, 35 N.E.3d 448 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeAlexandra R. v. Krone , 186 A.D.3d 981, 982, 129 N.Y.S.3d 579 [4th Dept. 2020], appeal dismissed 36 N.Y.3d 933, 135 N.Y.S.3d 663, 160 N.E.3d 321 [2020], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 907, 2021 WL 4164486 [2021] ). Here, the evidence submitted by defendant established that he was traveling no more than 70 miles per hour when responding to the emergency, and that the posted speed limit in the area is 55 miles per hour.

A local planning board has broad discretion in deciding applications for site plan approvals, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the board's action was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion (seeMatter of Empire Import–Export of USA, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton Planning Bd., 186 A.D.3d 1364, 1364, 128 N.Y.S.3d 874 ; Matter of Rock of Salvation Church v. Village of Sleepy Hollow Planning Bd., 166 A.D.3d 985, 986, 89 N.Y.S.3d 208 ; Matter ofValentine v. McLaughlin, 87 A.D.3d 1155, 1157, 930 N.Y.S.2d 51 ). Where a planning board's decision has a rational basis in the record, a court may not substitute its own judgment, even where the evidence could support a different conclusion (see Matter ofRock of Salvation Church v. Village of Sleepy Hollow Planning Bd., 186 A.D.3d at 986, 129 N.Y.S.3d 579 ; Matter ofValentine v. McLaughlin, 87 A.D.3d at 1158, 930 N.Y.S.2d 51 ). Here, the Planning Board's decision to approve the amended site plan has a rational basis in the record, and was not was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Claimant now appeals. "Following a nonjury trial, the Appellate Division has ‘authority ... as broad as that of the trial court ... and ... may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts’ " ( Sweetman v. Suhr , 159 A.D.3d 1614, 1615, 72 N.Y.S.3d 756 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 913, 2018 WL 3152819 [2018], quoting Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford , 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809 [1983] ; seeBaba-Ali v. State of New York , 19 N.Y.3d 627, 640, 951 N.Y.S.2d 94, 975 N.E.2d 475 [2012], citing Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. , 60 N.Y.2d at 499, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809 ; Alexandra R. v. Krone , 186 A.D.3d 981, 982, 129 N.Y.S.3d 579 [4th Dept. 2020], appeal dismissed 36 N.Y.3d 933, 135 N.Y.S.3d 663, 160 N.E.3d 321 [2020] ; Upstate Forestry & Dev., LLC v. McDonough Hardwoods Ltd. , 178 A.D.3d 1412, 1412-1413, 114 N.Y.S.3d 790 [4th Dept. 2019] ). In this case, judgment should have been rendered in favor of claimant, not defendant.

Claimant now appeals. "Following a nonjury trial, the Appellate Division has 'authority... as broad as that of the trial court... and... may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts'" (Sweetman v Suhr, 159 A.D.3d 1614, 1615 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 913 [2018], quoting Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499 [1983]; see Baba-Ali v State of New York, 19 N.Y.3d 627, 640 [2012], citing Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc., 60 N.Y.2d at 499; Alexandra R. v Krone, 186 A.D.3d 981, 982 [4th Dept 2020], appeal dismissed 36 N.Y.3d 933 [2020]; Upstate Forestry & Dev., LLC v McDonough Hardwoods Ltd., 178 A.D.3d 1412, 1412-1413 [4th Dept 2019]). In this case, judgment should have been rendered in favor of claimant, not defendant.

Claimant now appeals. "Following a nonjury trial, the Appellate Division has 'authority... as broad as that of the trial court... and... may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts'" (Sweetman v Suhr, 159 A.D.3d 1614, 1615 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 913 [2018], quoting Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499 [1983]; see Baba-Ali v State of New York, 19 N.Y.3d 627, 640 [2012], citing Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc., 60 N.Y.2d at 499; Alexandra R. v Krone, 186 A.D.3d 981, 982 [4th Dept 2020], appeal dismissed 36 N.Y.3d 933 [2020]; Upstate Forestry & Dev., LLC v McDonough Hardwoods Ltd., 178 A.D.3d 1412, 1412-1413 [4th Dept 2019]). In this case, judgment should have been rendered in favor of claimant, not defendant.