Such liability is consistent with New York's view that a receiver appointed by court order is an officer of the court and subject to the court's control. Alexander v. Valumet Chocolate Co., Inc., 240 App. Div. 769, 266 N.Y.S. 15 (2d Dept. 1933). Thus, for example, a receiver may be held liable in conversion for holding property not subject to the receivership.
However title does not pass to him and remains with the owner of the property (Cobb v Sweet, supra). The receiver does not possess legal powers other than what is conferred by the court ordering the appointment (Decker v Gardner, 124 N.Y. 334). The receiver is an officer of the court, subject at all times to its direction and control (Alexander v Valumet Chocolate Co., 240 App. Div. 769 [2d Dept 1933]) and acts merely as the court's custodian or agent (Cohen v Sherman, 279 App. Div. 939 [2d Dept 1952]). While the receiver is a fiduciary and owes a duty to protect the property for the benefit of all the interested parties (Cohen v Hechtman, 187 Misc. 994 [Sup Ct, N Y County 1946]; In re Stoll-Meyer Woodcrafters, 84 N.Y.S.2d 757 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1948]) he is not the agent of the mortgagee or of the owner of the equity (Knickerbocker Ice Co. v Benson, 155 Misc. 738 [NY City Mun Ct, Borough of Manhattan, 1st Dist 1935]).
(Matter of Riker [Browne], 204 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62.) She is "an officer of the court and subject at all times to its direction and control" (Alexander v Valumet Chocolate Co., 240 App. Div. 769, 770). The "court may be said to pledge its faith to carry out the engagements and contracts authorized by it" (Knickerbocker Ice Co. v Benson, 155 Misc. 738, 740).