There could, however, be situations where a statute is so clear on its face that a decision of this court is unnecessary to make it "obvious" what the correct interpretation is. And, in appropriate contexts, our review for plain error entails considering whether there is "authority that appears to be to the contrary[.]" Alexander v. United States , 116 A.3d 444, 449 n.5 (D.C. 2015). Here, in light of the government's previous concession, based upon its "review of the legislative history" of the YRA, that the five-year mandatory-minimum terms required by §§ 22–4502 (a) and – 4504 (b)"do not have to be imposed" when the Superior Court sentences a youth offender under the YRA, Green , 974 A.2d at 262 n.43, we deem it appropriate to analyze any statutory language or legislative history that may compel that conclusion (or the contrary conclusion the government now urges).
al citations omitted), cert. denied, No. 19-5891, 2019 WL 5150715 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019). See also United States v. Thompson, 924 F.3d 122, 128-29 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding that a probationer may be considered a fugitive for tolling purposes when he absconds from supervision, even when no warrant against him has been issued); United States v. Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that "[f]ugitive tolling begins when the defendant absconds from supervision—making it impossible for the Probation Office to supervise his actions—and ends when federal authorities are capable of resuming supervision."); Mantor v. State, 359 P.3d 985, 987-88 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) (stating that when probationary supervision is interrupted because of the defendant's misconduct, the defendant's period of probation tolls; this principle applies regardless of whether the interruption occurs because the defendant absconds from supervision or because the defendant is incarcerated for misconduct); Alexander v. United States, 116 A.3d 444, 447-48 (D.C. 2015) (holding that when a defendant absconds and court issues bench warrant for his arrest, the defendant's fugitive status begins and tolls the probationary period until authorities are capable of resuming supervision); Canchola v. State, 255 So. 3d 442, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (stating that "our court and sister courts of appeal have recognized the automatic tolling of a probationary term for a probationer who absconds during his probationary term."); State v. Hackett, 363 S.C. 177, 182 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing that "[t]o allow a probationer who is initially spared from revocation of probation to then abscond from supervision and to escape any further punishment, free and clear of all consequences, as long as he manages to elude apprehension for a set amount of time would lead to an absurd result.").