At a minimum, an arson defense to a civil claim for insurance coverage requires the insurer to prove that: (1) the loss resulted from a fire that was incendiary in origin; (2) the insured had an opportunity to set the fire; and (3) the insured had a motive to set the fire. See Rena, Inc. v. Brien, 708 A.2d 747, 751 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1998) (citing Alexander v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). The insurer has the burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence, circumstantial or direct, ‘that plaintiff either set fire to the building[] or caused such to be done.

Lentz v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 9689, 2001 WL 389346, at *5 (Mass. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2001) (pre-litigation examination under oath admissible as direct evidence in support of affirmative defense that insured was untruthful during examination in breach of insurance policy); Kamenov v. Northern Assurance Co. of Am., 259 A.D.2d 958, 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (error to preclude defendant from reading examination under oath of plaintiff who made insurance claim); Alexander v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ("The transcripts of examinations under oath . . . are admissible as admissions by a party opponent"); cf. United States v. Tuschman, 405 F.2d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1969) ("Sworn representations . . . which were inconsistent with his subsequent testimony at trial, were admissible . . . as original evidence of the truth of the statements made."); McIntosh v. Eagle Fire Co. of N.Y., 325 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1963) ("Sworn statements are clearly admissible as an admission of a party against interest, and as such, it is immaterial whether or not the witness was able to testify or had testified in the action"). Royal Bahamian, 2010 WL 4123989, at *2 n.3.

Ordinarily, the trial court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Alexander v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995); Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d). In this case, however, the factual findings cannot be reviewed, de novo or otherwise, because the record on appeal contains no record of the evidence or of the trial court's findings of fact.

An insurer seeking to prove an arson defense has the burden of proving all of the requisite elements of the defense. Alexander v. Tennessee Farmer's Mut. Inc. Co., 905 S.W.2d 177 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995). An insurance company must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the loss was due to a fire of incendiary origin, (2) that the insured had an opportunity to set the fire, and (3) that he had a motive to do so.

In addition, we find it appropriate to mention Prisoner Howse's failure to provide any citations to the record or legal authority on appeal. While this court can suspend or relax the rules of appellate procedure in order to afford a pro se litigant a hearing on the merits, we are not under a duty to minutely search a voluminous record to verify unsupported allegations in a brief.Alexander v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 177 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995). With this in mind, we now turn to the remaining issues raised on appeal.

This Court has held that to successfully prove an allegation of arson, "an insurance company must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the loss was due to a fire of incendiary origin, (2) that the insured had an opportunity to set the fire, and (3) that he had a motive to do so." Alexander v. TennesseeFarmers Mut. Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tenn.App. 1995) (citing McReynolds v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 815 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn.App. 1991)). Mr. Tipton does not dispute that the fire was intentionally set, but argues that Tennessee Farmers has not sufficiently shown that he had the motive and opportunity to commit the arson.

Such evidence is not cited, and this Court is not under a duty to search the record for uncited evidence. Rule 6, Rules of this Court; Alexander v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., Tenn. App. 1995, 905 S.W.2d 177. No reversible error is presented by issues IV and V.

This court has previously addressed the nature of the arson defense and the quality of the evidence necessary to support that defense. See Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 215 N.J. Super. 278, 521 A.2d 912 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 152, 526 A.2d 211 (1987); Olesak v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 215 N.J. Super. 155, 160, 521 A.2d 849 (App.Div. 1987) ("The arson defense is most accurately viewed as an allegation that the insured purposely created the loss and therefore should not benefit from it.") See also Alexander v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 905 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995) ("To succeed on a defense of arson, an insurance company must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the loss was due to a fire of incendiary origin, (2) that the insured had an opportunity to set the fire, and (3) that he had a motive to do so.") It matters not whether the jury determines that the insured personally set the fire or did so through the acts of another. The key is that the insured caused the fire to be set.