In this case, the jury was authorized to conclude that the presence of an unembalmed corpse in the minor children's home for nearly three days was a criminally negligent act constituting an unsanitary condition and to infer from the reaction of the police officers that the resulting stench caused the children excessive mental pain. See Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 790(1)(c), 561 S.E.2d 64 (2002). Neither an incomplete understanding by the children nor an absence of physical symptoms, such as vomiting, would preclude the internal experience of excessive mental pain.
Id.Christian v. State, 277 Ga. 775, 776 ( 596 SE2d 6) (2004); Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789 (1) (b) ( 561 SE2d 64) (2002).Blackwelder v. State, 256 Ga. 283, 284 (4) ( 347 SE2d 600) (1986); Hutton v. State, 192 Ga. App. 239, 241 ( 384 SE2d 446) (1989).
However, the State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes occurred on the date alleged in the indictment unless the indictment specifically states that the date of the offense is material, which the indictment in this case failed to do. Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789 ( 561 S.E.2d 64) (2002). 2.
(a) Cruelty to children is statutorily defined as "maliciously caus[ing] a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain." OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). "What constitutes cruel or excessive physical pain is for the jury to determine" ( Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789 (1) (b) ( 561 S.E.2d 64) (2002)), taking into account generally-accepted societal norms. Sims v. State, 234 Ga. App. 678 (1) ( 507 S.E.2d 845) (1998).
" When construed most strongly in support of the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mikenney was guilty of felony murder during the commission of child cruelty. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 788 (1) ( 561 S.E.2d 64) (2002). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Bowman v. State, 184 Ga.App. 197(2), 361 S.E.2d 58 (1987); see also State v. Layman, 279 Ga. 340, 341, 613 S.E.2d 639 (2005) ( “the State is not restricted at trial to proving that an offense occurred on the date alleged in the indictment when the indictment does not specifically allege that the date of the offense is material”) (footnote omitted). Accord Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789(1)(b), 561 S.E.2d 64 (2002). This rule applies in prosecutions for multiple sexual assaults against child victims despite the impracticality of treating the dates specified in indictments as material averments.
To prove the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree, “[t]he State must present evidence establishing the age of the child, that the child suffered physical or mental pain, that the pain was cruel or excessive, that the defendant caused the pain, and that the defendant acted maliciously in so doing.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789(1)(b), 561 S.E.2d 64 (2002). Although Leilani argues that she was not the one who actually struck D.W. on November 13, 2008, Leilani could still be convicted as a party to the child cruelty crime.
The contention is without merit because the state is not restricted to proving an offense occurred on the date alleged in the indictment when the indictment does not specifically allege that the date of the offense is material.Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789 (1) (b) ( 561 SE2d 64) (2002). The general rule is that when the exact date of a crime is not a material allegation of the indictment, the crime may be proved to have taken place on any date prior to the return of the indictment, so long as the date is within the applicable statute of limitation.
OCGA § 16-5-70 (d) (2). See Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789-790 (1) (c) ( 561 SE2d 64) (2002); Hopkins v. State, 255 Ga. App. 202, 206 (3) ( 564 SE2d 805) (2002); Reyes v. State, 250 Ga. App. 769, 770 ( 552 SE2d 918) (2001); Bartlett u. State, 244 Ga. App. 49, 51 ( 537 SE2d 362) (2000). 3. Ferrell contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury on aggravated battery.
Consequently, the State was not required to prove the specific dates of the incidents. See Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789 (1) (b) ( 561 SE2d 64) (2002). The verdict was not ambiguous, and we find no reversible error with respect to the trial court's RICO instructions.